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ABSTRACT
From 2000 through 2012, the Navy relieved 195 Commanding Officers (COs) for 
a variety of personal and professional failures under a procedure called “detach for 
cause.” That seemingly low number is significant due to the associated damage to 
expensive weapon systems, the injury or deaths of Sailors, and damage to the 
organization’s image as it competes for recruits from the American people and resources 
from Congress. These repercussions make the failures far more consequential than raw 
numbers might indicate. Of 195 dismissals, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) accounted 
for 74 or 38% of them, a larger percentage than the other communities in the Navy.
This research was conducted to ascertain what flaws in the surrounding culture or 
the training and selection process might create SWO COs who are more likely to fail. 
Documentation was reviewed on the causes and numbers of dismissals, the performance 
evaluation system, the process for qualifying and selecting COs, and ethics and 
leadership training. Literature was also reviewed to gain insight into the nature and 
impact of the SWO organizational culture on developing officers.
A survey was used to determine the prevalent type of Ethical Work Climate and 
the presence of toxic leadership, as contributory factors in the failures of COs. Data were 
compiled, scored, and tested using chi-square, Cramer’s V, Z-score, and Pearson’s r 
calculations to determine the strength of association or correlation between factors. This 
uncovered the widespread occurrence of toxic leadership behaviors including narcissism, 
unpredictability, and abusive supervision. An elevated occurrence of the instrumental 
EWC was also revealed. Finally, recommendations were provided to address the findings 
and potentially reduce the number of failures among SWO COs.
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
During 2012, the United States Navy formally dismissed 17 Commanding 
Officers (COs) for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. This number of officers 
“detached for cause” (DFC) is part of a troubling situation that has inspired several 
internal reviews by the Navy. Prior research shows that the number dismissed stood at 25 
in 2010, yet the decrease to 17 is not viewed positively. In fact, to the leaders of the 
Navy, this is still an unacceptably high level of dismissals and the continuation of an 
undesirable trend (Higgs 2010; Maltby 2010; Navy Inspector General 2004). The concern 
for this rate of dismissals is based in part on the Navy’s desire and need to preserve its 
image of integrity and professional capability and in part on the extensive process 
required to create a Commanding Officer (CO). Unlike corporations, the Navy is far 
more constrained in managing its supervisory employees. Specifically, it cannot fire COs 
and replace them with qualified new hires off the street, but must “grow” them internally, 
at considerable expense in time and money.
The Navy’s continued ability to execute its mission rests on the support and 
financial resources it receives from Congress, which could be affected by negative 
opinions resulting from the dismissal of COs. Negative publicity surrounding CO 
dismissals could also adversely affect public opinion among civilians likely to serve in 
the Navy. A Gallup poll taken in 2011 concerning the relative prestige of the major
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branches of the armed forces revealed that only 8% of those surveyed considered the 
Navy to be the most prestigious among the branches, compared to 46% for the Marines 
(Newport 2011). All armed services rely on the ability to recruit prospective enlisted 
personnel and officers into their ranks, and the reputation of the services plays a role in 
the success of their recruiting efforts.
The position of CO is highly sought after and competition within the officer corps 
is fierce. The process of developing a CO entails years of specialized classroom and on- 
the-job training, and years of successful performance in a variety of technical and 
leadership roles. Throughout those years of development, officers are challenged by the 
difficulty of the work, the demands of the unique working environment, and direct head 
to head competition to outperform their peers and win selection to serve as a CO.
Scope of the Research 
Prior research has shown that among the Navy’s three major warfare communities 
of Air, Surface, and Submarine, the Surface Warfare community had the greatest number
I
of dismissals for the 2000 to 2010 time period. During that time, the Surface Warfare 
Officer (SWO) community had 55, or 36%, of the total of 155 DFCs. In addition, the 
preponderance of those dismissals, 24 of the 55, were for illegal or immoral personal 
behavior which was considered “detrimental to the good order and discipline of the 
Navy” (Higgs 2010, 25).
This work will explore the possibility that there are identifiable factors within that 
community and the process of developing its leaders, which contribute to this rate of 
failure. Specifically, it will examine the Surface Warfare community’s environment,
2
training, particularly in the area of leadership, organizational culture, and the CO 
selection process.
Structure of this Work 
As befits a program for practicing public administrators, the requirements for this 
work do not confine it solely to the form of a traditional dissertation. Rather, in addition 
to increasing the existing body of knowledge of its subject, this work is intended to 
influence the situation being studied. Accordingly, its approach incorporates researching
I
a problem being experienced by an organization for the purpose of identifying causative 
and contributory issues and developing recommendations for potential solutions.
Subsequent chapters lay the foundation for understanding the organization and the 
problem being studied. These chapters provide a review of the pertinent literature 
including Navy instructions and policies which govern the processes of developing, 
selecting, and dismissing COs, and academic writings that shed light on aspects of the 
subject processes and culture, potentially highlighting causative factors. The 
Methodology Chapter relates the execution of a plan to query the Surface Warfare 
community and “take a reading” on the prevailing organizational culture, to determine 
the presence of suspected causative and contributory factors identified in the preceding 
chapters. The following Results Chapter presents the data captured through the 
methodology, identifying significant trends and evidence of the presence of attitudes and 
practices that may relate to CO failures that lead to dismissals.
Finally, in the Discussion Chapter, all of the preceding information is integrated, 
and potential actions to address the conditions uncovered are evaluated. Based on this 
analysis, recommendations will be offered to amend current practices or adopt new
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policies to promote improved outcomes in the creation of COs and reducing the number 
of DFCs.
Background
Detachment for Cause: The Process
A detachment for cause (DFC) is an “administrative removal of an officer . . .  
from the officer’s duty assignment before the normal transfer or planned rotation date” 
(Hoewing 2007, 1). In 2012 17 COs were formally relieved of their duties as CO, and the 
news coverage surrounding these events told tales of misfortune and misjudgment: “Helo 
Squadron CO, CMC Fired After Mishaps;” “CO Fired Amid Investigation of 
Relationship;” “Navy Removes Command After Boozy Port Visit;” and “Destroyer CO 
Fired in Wake of Tanker Collision” (Faram 2012; Fellman 2012c; Stewart 2012; USA 
TODAY 2012). All those events led to the early end of a hard-won role.
The procedure surrounding these dismissals is as serious as the events that lead to 
them. The need for a DFC arises when an “officer’s performance or conduct detracts 
from accomplishing the command mission, and the officer’s continuance in the billet can 
only negatively impact the command” (Hoewing 2007, 1). This is one of the sternest, 
most detrimental actions that can be taken against an officer and is never taken lightly. 
DFCs are not specifically intended for COs alone but can apply to any officer. This paper 
examines only the dismissal of COs and primarily those formally detached for cause, not 
those simply relieved earlier than a planned rotation date. Formal records are maintained 
only for cases in which the magnitude of an incident or an officer’s performance warrants 
a formal DFC.
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The Naval Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) article 1611-020 Officer 
Detachment for Cause specifies and describes the causes which justify such an action:
1. Misconduct, either civil or military;
2. Substandard performance involving one or more significant events resulting from 
gross negligence or complete disregard for duty;
3. Substandard performance over an extended period of time;
4. Loss of confidence in an officer in command (Hoewing 2007,2-3.)
In almost all these cases there is a stated expectation that officers nominated for a 
DFC have been previously counseled on their performance and given an opportunity to
|
improve. Where appropriate, especially for those officers nominated for misconduct, 
disciplinary action is presumed to have been taken prior to the recommendation for a
j
DFC. Due to the extremely serious nature of the events leading to a request for a DFC 
and the consequences of such a request, a formal letter requesting and justifying the 
action must be submitted in accordance with the steps in Table 1, and the subject officer 
is given 15 days to respond in writing.
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Table 1. DFC Request Process
Step Action
1 State the specific reason or reasons for the request.
2 Indicate the time the officer has been on board and the length o f time in the position to which the 
DFC applies.
3 Provide a detailed statement describing the facts and circumstances, which support the basis for 
the request. For requests based on a significant event, describe the event involved, the officer’s 
duties, and the disregard or gross negligence associated with the performance o f  those duties.
4 If the request is made on the basis o f  substandard performance o f duty over an extended period 
o f time, indicate what corrective actions were taken to improve or correct the officer’s 
performance and the results o f  those actions. A special report o f  fitness is not required to support 
a DFC request; however, the request should document a chronology o f precipitating events and 
evidence o f command counseling and guidance.
5 Indicate whether or not the command has taken disciplinary action, explaining the rationale. If 
misconduct is not the sole basis for the DFC, do not forward the request until all disciplinary 
action is completed, including any appeals.
6 Include a statement that the request, if  approved, will be filed in the officer’s official record. 
NOTE: Nonpunitive censure may neither be mentioned in the request nor included as enclosures 
unless as surrebuttal to the officer’s claim that adequate counseling was not provided. (The facts 
and circumstances that invoke nonpunitive censure, however, may be mentioned in the request.) 
By contrast, there is no restriction on the inclusion o f LOIs in a DFC request to document 
command counseling and guidance.
7 Provide formal written notification to the officer, advising o f  the initiation o f  the DFC request 
and soliciting the officer’s response thereto (usually within 15 days). State in the DFC request 
that the officer has been given written notification and an opportunity to respond.
Source: The Naval Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) article 1611-020 
Officer Detachment for Cause 2007, 5.
Once the request has been endorsed by the chain of command above the officer 
being relieved, the officer’s statement has been provided, and the officer has been 
interviewed by the superior above the level initiating the request, the request with its 
supporting documentation is sent to the Navy Personnel Command. The Commander of 
the Navy Personnel Command reviews all documentation and renders the decision on 
whether the detachment will be reflected in the officer’s record as “for cause.” A “for 
cause” decision essentially ends any career progression for that officer as it documents a 
striking failure in the most highly sought after position in the Navy: Commanding 
Officer.
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Rationale for the Research
Training, promoting, and selecting COs is a critical and expensive function within 
the Navy. COs are entrusted with the vital mission of national defense, the lives of 
hundreds to thousands of personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
sophisticated equipment. Failures on the part of these individuals are potentially deadly to 
the Sailors in their charge and costly to the American taxpayer. A single ship-grounding 
incident in Hawaii in 2009 resulted in an estimated $25 to $40 million in repairs to the 
vessel (Cole 2009). More recently, the August 2012 collision in the Strait of Hormuz 
resulted in mission-ending damage to the guided missile destroyer USS Porter and the 
relief of its CO (Fellman 2012c). Per the U.S. Navy online Fact File, a single F/A-18F 
Super Hornet Strike Fighter costs $57 million and an aircraft lost due to inadequate 
maintenance or improper operation would be the responsibility of the unit CO. Similarly, 
an Arleigh Burke class destroyer can cost between $500 million and $1.5 billion 
depending on the time it was acquired and the variant of the design (Barr Group 
Aerospace 2012; Global Security 2011). In a February 2013 interview, Admiral Gortney, 
Commander of Fleet Forces Command, stated that damages caused by operational 
mishaps during 2012, resulted in an unplanned, unfunded $850 million repair bill 
(Lombardo 2013a). Clearly, the Navy has a keen interest in the safe operation and 
preservation of these expensive assets.
The officers themselves are an expensive resource as well. A typical CO is a 
Commander (rank), also sometimes referred to as an 0-5 (pay grade), with 17 years or 
more of experience, an undergraduate and usually a master’s degree, and at least one 
cumulative year of dedicated upper level training. At this point in a career, the Navy has
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invested over $1.4 million in salary and benefits for this officer. It has also invested 
approximately $97,000 to $215,000 in initial education and subsequent training for a 
SWO (Parcell 2008). This figure varies with the source of the officer’s commission, 
obtained either through Officer Candidate School (OCS), a civilian university using a 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship, or through the United 
States Naval Academy (USNA), respectively.
For other communities, specific technical training, such as flight training, 
submarine school, or nuclear reactor training, also adds hundreds of thousands of dollars 
to the Navy’s investment in an individual. Taking just these costs into account, the 
dismissal of a CO could represent the loss of an approximately $2 million investment, 
excluding possible damage repair costs (Higgs 2010). If an incident results in damage, it 
could mean a significant disruption to a unit’s operating schedule as repairs are made, in 
addition to the repair costs. In turn, this impacts the training, maintenance, and operating 
schedules of similar units as these schedules must be adjusted to cover the gap left by the 
loss of the damaged unit, in order to meet mission requirements without it. Other 
personnel rotation and career schedules are also disrupted as a temporary CO will have to 
be appointed until a qualified relief is diverted from another assignment to assume 
command in the place of the dismissed officer. Depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the dismissal, there could be a considerable impact on the morale of the crew 
as well, representing a further degradation of a unit’s combat readiness.
As the country seeks to end military operations in Afghanistan and faces a debt 
crisis of previously unseen proportions, the continued operation of the military in its 
current configuration is under scrutiny. The current economic conditions have placed the
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national budget under severe duress, which poses a direct threat to the budgets of all 
branches of the Armed Forces. Consequently, the Navy cannot afford expensive losses 
of, or damage to, its material assets. Nor can it afford damage to its image and credibility 
as an effective fighting force resulting from displays of ineptitude, malfeasance, or lack 
of restraint and judgment on the part of a few commanding officers. A resultant loss of 
political support during budget formulation and approval processes could swing financial 
support away from the Navy and toward its competing sister services. Accordingly, the 
rate of dismissals must be reduced.
Civil-Military Relations
The importance of the situation being studied is determined in part by the 
relationship between the Navy and the civilian command authority which controls it. The 
degree of military professionalism and its influence on the development and execution of 
foreign policy have long been a topic of interest to American politicians and scholars.
The military is a product of American society and its relationship with the American 
people shapes its role, its relevance, and its ability to function. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to explore this relationship as a foundation of the situation being studied and 
the context it brings to the Navy’s place in American society.
Colonial Origins.
Americans have always had a complex relationship with their military. As a 
nation the United States has always displayed an aversion to military power, beginning 
with its origin. Consider that many of the reasons for the Revolutionary War centered on 
the colonists chafing at the presence of George Ill’s troops and the usurpation of civil 
authority by military force. Specific complaints were cited in the Declaration of
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Independence: “He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without 
consent of our legislatures;” “He has affected to render the military independent of and 
superior to, the civil power;” and “for quartering large bodies of armed troops among us” 
(Pious 1986, 719). Thus the colonial leaders equated military power with tyranny. The 
provision for a standing army in the new constitution was highly controversial, requiring 
Alexander Hamilton’s reassurance in Federalist Paper No. 28 that the national army 
would be employed only in the extreme cases of “seditions and insurrections” (Sanchez 
1991, 113-115).
The Navy was bom in 1775, inspired by the success of Colonel John Glover, a 
New England sea captain and a member of the Marble Head Regiment which later ferried 
Washington’s troops across the Delaware (Fowler 2000, 13). Glover offered Washington 
the charter of his own sloop Hannah to interdict unarmed British supply vessels. His 
success in disrupting these supply lines spurred the chartering of additional vessels, but 
Congress resisted the creation of a Continental Navy at first, instead authorizing each 
colony to create and fund its own force of armed vessels. Shortly thereafter, due in part to 
the strong promotion by John Adams, Congress approved the formation of a Continental 
Navy. On October 13, 1775 Congress voted to approve the deployment of two ships “to 
cruise eastward” (Fowler 2000, 14). Despite this necessary growth in strength and 
capability, the aversion to the military remained. George Washington in his “Sentiments 
on a Peace Establishment” recognizes the anti-military prejudice while cautiously 
supporting the creation of a Regular Army: “Altho’ [sic] a large standing Army in time of 
peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a country, yet a few Troops
10
under certain circumstances are not only safe, but indispensably necessary” (Coffman 
1992,51).
Subsequently, Washington recommended a force of 2,631 officers and men. 
Congress responded with an authorization for only 80 officers and men to guard 
remaining war-stocks and a call-up of 700 militia troops for one year’s service on the 
frontier (Coffman 1992, 51). In fact, from the 1780s to the 1890s the Regular Army 
functioned routinely, and in some periods primarily, as a frontier constabulary (Coffman 
1992, 50). A member of Jefferson’s cabinet remarked in 1802: “The distribution of our 
little army to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the 
most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived” (Coffman 
1986, 3). This same outlook is seen in the behavior of Congress and President Jefferson 
following the Navy’s victories against the French in the Quasi War. Despite taking 80 
French vessels with only the loss of one American vessel, Congress acted with haste to 
dismantle its squadrons following the convention that ended the war on September 30, 
1800 (Fowler 2000, 18). Jefferson viewed the Navy as an unnecessary expense, 
preferring the use of gunboats to patrol home waters, to the expensive frigates that 
engaged the French in the Caribbean (Fowler 2000, 19).
This attitude supports what Coffman refers to as the “national ethos” which he 
cites as one controlling factor of the size of the army in peacetime. This same ethos can 
be more broadly applied to the size of the military as a whole and as a basis for American 
civil-military relations. Specifically, this ethos is composed of two factors: a traditional 
prejudice against professional soldiers and standing armies, and a belief that in the event
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of war, civilians answering the call to arms, not regulars, would save the day (Coffman 
1986, 8).
Empirical data supports Coffman in that during the 160 years between the 
Revolutionary War and World War II, America maintained a very small army relative to 
other nations. For example, in the 1840s Mexico’s army was quadruple the size of the 
10,000 man American army, and in the 1880s, America’s 28,000 man force was less than 
half the size of Belgium’s (Coffman 1992, 53).
From Civil War to World War.
The military grew enormously during the Civil War. The Navy at the outset 
possessed only 90 warships, only half of which were in active service, but by war’s end it 
was operating 671 vessels (Symonds 2000, 47). However, in keeping with traditional 
practices, the military did not play an active role in developing national policy. 
Throughout the war, civilian control of the military was absolute, with the President, as 
well as Congress, playing active roles (Avant 1994, 24).
In the tumult following the assassination of Lincoln, the Army did capitalize on 
the divisions between the policies of Congress and the President to work with 
Congressional Republicans to achieve its desires in Reconstruction legislation. It 
succeeded in achieving a continuation of martial law, legal protection for Army 
personnel, and the disenfranchisement of most former rebels (Avant 1994, 26). Before 
the Civil War there had been no thought that there might be a uniquely military 
perspective on policy and strategy (Johnson and Metz 1995, 198). Now, such a 
perspective had influenced national legislation, but it was a transient event.
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After the Civil War, the military was again reduced in size. The Navy was 
reduced to only 50 commissioned vessels and 8,500 personnel (Bradford 2000, 63). At 
the same time the military began a process of professionalization which it conducted in 
virtual isolation from civil influence. Congress’ primary concern was budgetary; as long 
as no budget increases were requested, the military was free to set its own standards for 
education, training, promotions, and retirements (Avant 1994, 26).
It was at this time, possibly from the Prussian example the Army began to study, 
there arose a notion within the officer corps that political participation and military 
professionalism were incompatible (Johnson and Metz 1995,198). According to 
Huntington “not one in five hundred military officers ever voted” (1957, 258).
It was also during this time the Navy embarked on a campaign of intellectual 
growth, creating the Naval Institute “as a forum for the advancement of professional, 
literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy” (Bradford 2000, 63). Later, the Naval War 
College was founded as the world’s first learning institution for senior officers which 
quickly added Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to its faculty (Bradford 2000, 63). These
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were significant efforts to increase the level of professionalism among naval officers, 
raising them from merely proficient mariners to innovators in naval warfare. Mahan’s 
writings on naval history, strategy, and the role of sea power influenced Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. This was shown by the later creation and 
deployment of the Great White Fleet by then President Roosevelt (Bradford 2000, 69).
With this notable exception, when it came to the development of policy and 
strategy on a national scale, the military did not desire a role. By all accounts this attitude 
prevailed through the Spanish-American War and World War I, bringing the militaiy to
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the very edge of World War II where “the respect of the American Military for civil 
supremacy was perhaps at its highest, reaching a degree of self-denial that even ardent 
champions of the principle might, in retrospect, regard as excessive” (Weigley 1993,41). 
World War II.
The years 1939-1945 saw enormous changes in the character of civil-military 
relations in the country. One primary factor in the evolution was Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who was widely regarded as one of the most astute, influential, and active Commanders- 
in-Chief in our history. The other factor was, of course, the war which expanded the 
military from 200,000 men in 1939 to more than 12,000,000 by war’s end. This 
expansion was accompanied by tremendous growth in the power of the armed services’ 
chiefs and an active role in national policy-making for the military.
Analysts differ widely on the conditions of relations between the military and 
civilian authority during this time. Hendrickson finds relations “though judged defective, 
were relatively harmonious and reasonably effective” (1988, 27). Weigley attributes the 
harmony to “remarkably silent military acquiescence” (1993,43). Huntington (1957, 
315-320) and Stoler (1991, 62-65) both find that the relative weakness or ineffectiveness 
of the civilian service secretaries and the State Department provided the military with this 
opportunity for playing a new and greater role. Stoler argues most convincingly that the 
effective relations resulted from Roosevelt’s knowledge of the military, based on his 
service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the professionalism and skill of the service 
chiefs, and that the “total and global nature of the conflict fused political and military 
issues to an unprecedented degree, making separation impossible” (1991, 66).
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This is not to say that the service chiefs dominated policy-making: Johnson and 
Metz (1995, 198) remark on the chiefs’ opposition to the invasion of North Africa, and 
Stoler (1991, 65, 67) notes at least 20 disagreements on such topics as aid to allies, size of 
the armed forces, and global strategy. In most such cases Roosevelt’s views prevailed, 
and in all cases his decisions were executed by a professional, loyal, and politically 
attuned military.
The Cold War - An Uneasy Truce.
For all the successes of the Service Chiefs, Roosevelt had been unwilling to 
institutionalize their existence or his relationship with them. It was not until the National 
Security Act of 1947, that the Joint Chiefs were officially sanctioned and simultaneously 
relegated to a purely “military” role. The act transferred the responsibility of advising the 
President on national security to the National Security Council, composed of civilians. It 
also placed the chiefs within the Department of Defense (DOD), with the Secretary of 
Defense as the primary advisor to the President.
This act was indicative of the tenuous equilibrium between the need for military 
input and the desire to control the military that marks the Cold War era. The Joint Chiefs 
had foreseen the possibility of future conflict with the Soviet Union and had pressed for a 
world-wide system of air and naval bases to ensure our national security. There would be 
no complete post-war demobilization but the maintenance of sufficient forces and bases 
to counter an enemy such as a resurgent Germany or Japan or possibly a hostile Soviet 
Union. The country entered a period of “perpetual semi-mobilization that transformed the 
traditional civil-military equation” (Bacevich 1994-1995, 78).
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Many civilians, mainly a newly-risen community of civilian strategists in 
universities and think tanks, felt that the military was unable to accept the concept of a 
limited war or the subtle application of force in support o f statecraft (Johnson and Metz 
1995, 200). Others warned of the transformation of America into a “garrison state” in 
which the military’s needs and dictates would erode democracy and civil rights 
(Huntington 1957, 346-354).
Countering the pressure to quarantine the military from policy-making were three 
factors: first, the Soviet military threat; second, the popularity and prestige of the military 
(Huntington 1957, 354); and third, the dramatic increase in military spending which made 
it a vital component of the economy (Johnson and Metz 1995, 200; Kohn 1994, 5).
It was during this time President Eisenhower warned the nation of the now- 
famous “military-industrial complex” and its impact on national policy (Bacevich 2011; 
Janiewski 2011; Kampmark 2011; Schlesinger 2011). In his January 17, 1961 farewell 
address, Eisenhower asserted that the government “must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex” 
(Kampmark 2011, 11; Schlesinger 2011). During his presidency, the Korean War and the 
rising power of the Soviet Union had resulted in Eisenhower engaging in “bruising 
battles to constrain military budgets” (Janiewski 2011, 681), as he struggled with the 
“unstated alliance of interested parties: generals, defense officials, military contractors, 
and members of Congress” (Bacevich 2011, 76).
Eisenhower’s concern had been “to ensure our position of strength without 
bankrupting ourselves” (Janiewski 2011, 681). He viewed his successors as “two people 
who know practically nothing about these matters” and feared they, influenced by the
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Democrat’s claims of missile gaps, would increase the nuclear arsenal “to vindicate past 
judgments to which they have been party” (Janiewski 2011, 682). When Kennedy 
assumed power, the nuclear stockpile contained 24,000 warheads, and by the end of the 
decade, it had grown to 31,000 (Bacevich 2011, 76).
The 1960s was a period of great tension in civil-military relations. The factors 
behind the tension were numerous, but the primary concerns were nuclear weapons 
strategy and the Vietnam War. Johnson and Metz and Kohn see the maturing of the 
United States’ strategic weapons policy and employment doctrine as a critical factor, 
though they differ on the implications. Johnson and Metz (1995, 200) see this factor as 
reducing the chances of conventional war, the military’s forte. Kohn views the nuclear 
capability as threatening civilian control making it “imperative to take authority to use 
these weapons away from the military, lest operational commanders displace Congress 
and the President in determining whether the country would go to war” (1994, 5). Kohn 
also cites civilian concern over potential friction between United States (U.S.) and Soviet 
forces, during normal operations in patrolling various hot spots around the world, which 
required civilians to “invade” traditional military operational authority (1994).
Contributing significantly to the period of tension was Kennedy’s Secretary of 
Defense, Robert McNamara. During the 1950s there had been an inordinate amount of 
inter-service discord and competition over roles and missions, such as the Air Force and 
Navy conflict over the procurement of B-36 bombers or “supercarriers,” and the Air 
Force-Army conflict over control of an intermediate range ballistic missile (Hendrickson 
1988, 39). Into this fray Secretary McNamara brought new planning and decision-making 
techniques including management by objectives, the Planning, Programming, and
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Budgeting System (PPBS), and operations research analysis. The military resisted many 
of the changes and wholesale adoptions of programs it did not understand, but McNamara 
greatly centralized power, shifting it from the military to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.
Kohn terms these reforms “the re-imposition of civilian control through 
bureaucratic procedures and structures, the traditional method for exercising presidential 
authority over the military in peacetime” (1994, 5). He also remarks that McNamara 
“ignored or dismissed military advice, disparaged military experience and expertise, and 
circumvented or sacked generals and admirals who opposed him” (Kohn 1994, 6). 
Hendrickson is less supportive of the Secretary’s unwillingness or inability to delegate 
responsibility, attributing it to “his distrust of - and at times even contempt for - the 
advice of the uniformed military, partly from excessive faith in his own powers” (1988, 
49).
Regardless of opinion, McNamara’s influence on the prosecution of the Vietnam 
War brought civil-military relations to its nadir. The civilians believed they were 
controlling military operations to achieve political objectives (Johnson and Metz 1995, 
201; Kohn 1994, 6). The military believed “arrogant, uninformed, irresponsible 
politicians were not only preventing winning the war, but squandering American 
resources, and worse, lives” (Kohn 1994, 6). Hendrickson cites the “famous Tuesday 
luncheons” at which bomb targets were selected, without military personnel in 
attendance, giving some credence to Hendrickson’s “military view” (1988, 48).
Faced with this precipitous loss of autonomy and power, the military turned to 
reform. The services formed a unified front reducing interservice discord, and established
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alliances with supporters in Congress and the executive branch (Johnson and Metz 1995, 
201; Kohn 1994, 7). Their reform efforts included upgrading internal political and 
strategic expertise through civilian graduate education for senior officers, and 
emphasizing world politics, strategy, and national security policy-making in the curricula 
of the four war colleges. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral William J. Crowe, few officers in the 1980s “made it into the higher ranks 
without a firm grasp of international relations, congressional politics, and public affairs” 
(Johnson and Metz 1995, 201).
Fortunately for the military, there were eight years in which the Republican 
control of the White House provided some relaxation of the previously restrictive civilian 
control. Defense management was largely again decentralized, and from 1969 to 1973 
Melvin Laird, as Secretary of Defense, renewed the relations between civilians and the 
service chiefs (Hendrickson 1988,44-45).
Despite the ongoing reforms, the 1970s were difficult years for the military. Still 
stinging from public sentiment on the Vietnam War and the humiliation of its conclusion, 
the armed forces had to contend with massive funding shortfalls (Cimbala 1995, 27; 
Hendrickson 1988, 45; Kohn 1994, 7), which severely affected readiness. Late in the 
decade these shortfalls gave rise, under Jimmy Carter, to what has come to be called “The 
Hollow Force,” which emphasized force structure and weapons modernization over 
readiness issues, such as training and ammunition stocks (Hendrickson 1988, 106; Kohn 
1994). It is during this period that Kohn contends the military abandoned its traditions of 
non-partisanship and, goaded by “Jimmy Carter’s contemptuously anti-military 
administration,” began “espousing Republicanism with a capital R” (1994, 7).
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To be sure, the military flourished under Ronald Reagan’s administration.
According to Hendrickson, from 1981 to 1985 an increase in defense funding occurred,
which totaled $329.5 billion (1988,45). Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, the
“chief cheerleader for Ronald Reagan’s military buildup,” (Kohn 1994, 8)
showered money on the services and, in an effort to get it spent, gave them 
considerable authority over its use, frequently ignoring or circumventing 
his own office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, one of the chief tools 
McNamara had used to vet the recommendations of the military services 
(Kohn 1994, 8).
Derision aside, Kohn best summarizes one aspect of this era: “Weinberger rebuilt the 
military: the forces, the institution, and with President Reagan’s help, the pride and the 
image in American consciousness” (1994, 8).
At the same time the forces were growing, reformers in Congress and the defense 
intellectual community were lobbying for change, not just for a coherent modem strategy 
but for alterations in the organization, doctrine, manpower policy, and weapons 
acquisition systems (Hendrickson 1988; Johnson and Metz 1995, 202). This was 
intended, in part, to correct the apparent lack of competence and joint operability 
evidenced by the Mayaguez rescue (1975) and the tragic Iranian hostage rescue attempt at 
Desert One (1980). The result of the reformers’ efforts was the 1986 Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433). The act, referred to as Goldwater- 
Nichols for its sponsors, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Congressman Bill 
Nichols (D-Ala.), has been called “the most important piece of military legislation in the 
last forty years . . .  [and] the most dangerous” (Previdi 1988, 9).
Specifically, the act made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the 
principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National
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Security Council. It empowered the Chairman to offer cross-service advice without prior 
approval of the other service chiefs, and converted the joint staff from a corporate JCS 
staff to the Chairman’s own. The act also modified the military personnel system, so that 
officers are trained and rewarded for service in joint positions (Hendrickson 1988, 111­
112).
Critics of this act argued that by strengthening the Chairman, Congress 
dramatically increased the power of the military, and thus challenged the civilian control 
imposed by McNamara. John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy, finds that “in their 
understandable quest for efficiency, the military reformers have . . .  disenfranchised the 
civilian officials of each service, and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary 
power in the person of the Chairman” (Powell et al. 1994, 24).
The debate on the effect of Goldwater-Nichols continued to bum and at the center 
of the controversy was General Colin Powell, the first post Goldwater-Nichols Chairman, 
called by Kohn “the most powerful military leader since George C. Marshall, the most 
popular since Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the most political since Douglas MacArthur” 
and under whom “civilian control eroded most since the rise of the military establishment 
in the 1940s and 1950s” (1994, 9). Powell and his philosophy on the employment of 
force, later called the “Powell Doctrine,” continued to influence civil-military relations 
through his service as Secretary of State.
The debate continues to this day, though the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have changed the tone somewhat. There have been events that have reinforced U.S. 
citizens’ and the government’s confidence in the civilian control of the military. Such 
events include Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki retiring in 2003 after a clash with
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Defense Secretary Rumsfeld over troop strength in Iraq; the 2009 retirement of Admiral 
Fallon, commander of the Central Command, due to apparent disagreement with the 
position of the Bush White House concerning the use of military force against Iran; and 
the June 2010 relief of General McChrystal, commander of U.S. and allied forces in 
Afghanistan following his published disparaging remarks about senior White House 
Officials and allies.
All of this which has gone before has shaped the American people’s view of the 
military, its expectations of the military’s service and professionalism, its tolerance for 
error and missteps, and its willingness to entrust its sons and daughters to the military. 
These preceding events, regardless of their other influences, show that the civilian 
government of the U.S. still exercises full authority over its military forces, and those 
forces adhere faithfully to their oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.”
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Environment
Organizational Construct
Organizationally, the Navy is a highly structured machine bureaucracy, 
hierarchical, defined by specialization of function, and a rigid system of rank-based 
authority. Ships are a microcosm of the larger design with crews organized in a 
hierarchical design driven by functions and technical specialization. Atop this hierarchy 
is the CO, charged with “the authority and responsibility for effectively using available 
resources and for planning the employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions” (Bird 2012, 
1-2). Under the concept of “unity of command,” the CO is “ultimately responsible for the 
unit and the personnel assigned” (Bird 2012, 1-1).
Aboard ship, the crew is divided into departments by technical function such as 
Supply, Engineering, Operations, and Combat Systems. On most ships, the departments 
are led by Lieutenants (pay grade 0-3) or Lieutenant Commanders (pay grade 0-4) 
although the positions call for higher ranked officers on larger vessels such as large 
amphibious ships and aircraft carriers. Departments are subdivided into divisions also 
based on technical functions, for example Combat Systems would include divisions of 
Sailors whose technical specialties support the operations of gun and missile systems, fire 
control radars, and sonars. The Operations department would include navigation and
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communication divisions. Divisions are led by Division Officers who typically are 
Ensigns (pay grade 0-1) or Lieutenants (junior grade) (pay grade 0-2). A division can 
number from 20 to 100 sailors depending on the ship type and the function of the 
division.
Officers oversee key aspects of all activities, from the firing of main weapon 
systems and operation of the engineering plant, to the conduct of routine maintenance and 
administrative functions, to ensure effective and safe execution of tactical and support 
functions. They do so by overseeing cross-functional teams in which most direct 
supervision and technical guidance is conducted by senior petty officers (non­
commissioned officers). All of the major functions of a combatant vessel are team events, 
including navigation events such as departing or entering port, operating weapon 
systems, conducting damage control functions such as firefighting, and sustainment 
functions such as refueling and replenishing supplies while underway at sea.
With the exception of a very few specialized craft, the officer directing a ship’s 
course, called the “conning officer” does not physically manipulate any controls, unlike 
an aircraft or a car. Instead, this officer gives verbal orders to enlisted watchstanders who 
actually handle the ship’s controls. The officer maintains a sharp visual watch on the 
effects of the orders given and the situation around the vessel. Many routine events such 
as launching small craft, replenishing at sea, and even mooring the ship have elements of 
danger for the teams that conduct them.
As a bureaucracy, the Navy deals with the elements of danger by minimizing the 
risk of error with defined standardized procedures in the form of instructions, checklists, 
and manuals. A prime example is the Standard Organization and Regulation Manual
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(SORM) which spells out the duties and responsibilities of all officer positions aboard
ship and a multitude of organizational details down to the standard committees, their
purpose, and the frequency of their meetings (Bird 2012). Training and inspections focus
on the knowledge of and use of this and a multitude of other instructions, enforcing their
use and promulgation.
Physical Environment
The physical environment of a warship is essentially that of an industrial plant
operating in an inhospitable climate. These steel vessels, bearing sophisticated electronics
and complex mechanical and hydraulic systems, operate in a corrosive and frequently
physically jarring marine environment and require extensive continuous maintenance to
sustain operability. Ships’ crews employ heavy industrial machinery, toxic chemicals,
flammable fuels, explosives, and high voltage electricity in activities that require around
the clock operations in all types of weather. As described by Gunderson in a report for
the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
Shipboard living may involve excessive noise, crowding, heat stress and 
poor ventilation, unpleasant odors, lack of privacy, lack of recreational 
facilities, boredom, long or irregular hours with sleep deprivation, poor 
environmental design (for example, mazes of pipes, wiring, and ducts in 
living spaces), and arduous and incessant routine maintenance (cleaning, 
painting, and repair) (1976, 68).
Aboard ship the situation is not one of an intense, focused danger like that 
experienced by an infantry foot patrol facing a hostile opponent in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Rather, it is one of a casual, ever-present danger needing only a moment of inattention or 
miscommunication for a heavy boat being hoisted for launching, or a cable or mooring 
line under heavy tension to inflict serious harm. The nature of these operations and the 
hazards of the environment demand competent teamwork. To be effective and safe, this
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teamwork must incorporate skill, responsiveness to commands and changing situations, 
and clear communication. The communication is both within the team and with the CO or 
person entrusted to maintain proper awareness of the larger operational picture and the 
relative importance of an activity.
For example, conducting replenishment which is restocking food and materials at 
sea requires maneuvering vessels to within 100 feet of each other and passing and 
connecting heavy cargo-carrying rigs between the ships. This process can also involve 
simultaneously conducting flight operations to allow the delivery of cargo by helicopter.
It would be dangerous to conduct any sort of training or maintenance that could affect the 
engineering plant’s delivery of electricity or propulsion at that time. The CO, or the 
designated Officer of the Deck (OOD), who is charged with the safe operation of the ship 
as a watchstanding duty, must maintain and communicate that situational awareness to 
key personnel participating in the replenishment to minimize the danger of accidents 
during these events. The numbers of personnel employed, even in routine operations and 
the requirements of watchstanding to ensure safety and continuous readiness for 
emergency or hostile action, require very long days of most personnel, but particularly 
junior officers.
One of the primary tasks of Surface Warfare junior officers aboard ship is to 
fulfill the qualification requirements to be officially designated as Surface Warfare 
officers. This qualification requires extensive watchstanding in order to complete 
mandatory seamanship and engineering qualifications. These watches, also an essential 
part of operating the ship, occur around the clock.
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Customarily, watchstanding and time spent studying the ship’s capabilities are 
executed in addition to a full day’s work. For a junior officer, this entails overseeing the 
operation of one of the ship’s divisions, involving endless paperwork, and a host of 
additional administrative duties, some minor, such as Voting Officer, Morale Welfare and 
Recreation Officer, or Command Historian, and others, more vital, such as Security 
Manager or Legal Officer. This means that, until the warfare qualification is completed,
18 to 20 hour workdays at sea are common occurrences for junior officers.
i
Even after qualifications are completed and junior officers advance in rank and 
responsibility, due to the operational tempo and the requirements for significant officer 
presence in navigation, engineering, and safety o f operation stations, sleep deprivation is
i
a normal condition for most officers. During particularly intense training periods and in 
operations in company with an aircraft carrier battle group, it is common for officers, 
particularly Commanding Officers and Executive Officers (XOs), to work for several 
days continuously without sleep.
Dozens of studies have been conducted on the effects of sleep deprivation on 
mood, cognitive ability, risk taking, vigilance, decision making, communication, and 
impulsive behavior control (Acheson, Richards, and de Wit 2007; Harrison and Home 
2000; Kobbeltvedt, Brun, and Laberg 2005). There is broad acceptance that sleep 
deprivation causes delayed reactions to stimuli, slowness in certain cognitive processes, 
and increases in negative moods (Kobbeltvedt, Brun, and Laberg 2005). As a secondary 
effect, Harrison and Home cite several studies that attribute greater risk-taking while 
affected by a negative mood (2000,239).
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Possibly the most relevant effect in this environment is decreased innovative 
thinking and communication ability. Most key shipboard evolutions such as mooring, 
anchoring, navigating restricted waters, and maneuvering alongside another ship are team 
events and are heavily reliant on communications. They are also the cause of many, 
though not the majority of, CO dismissals (Higgs 2010; Maltby 2010). In these 
evolutions, the precise location of the ship and its movements are monitored and 
controlled using information relayed verbally. If those communications and the responses 
to them are not clearly understood and the appropriate action taken, the result could be 
collisions or groundings.
Harrison and Home cite several studies which document decreased ability to 
comprehend and assimilate incoming information, especially in large amounts (2000, 
238), as would be the case in these situations as one monitors speed, course, the effects of 
wind, range and bearing to shore, navigation aids, and other vessels. In their study 
conducted in 1997, Harrison and Home noted the marked degradation of an individual’s 
ability to communicate clearly due to sleep deprivation. The condition led to increased 
mumbling, slurring, extended pauses, and incomplete messages. There was also an 
increase in editing information, leaving out new or changed information. Additionally, 
the deprived recipients of the communication experienced increased perserveration, 
which is continuing on a course of action that was no longer optimum in the face of new 
information (Harrison and Home 2000, 238). Taken as a whole, the findings of these 
studies indicate that sleep deprivation could have a pronounced detrimental impact on the 
effectiveness of the communications-intense team activities that are essential to executing 
the Surface Warfare mission.
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Miller, Matsangas, and Kenney chronicle a 10 year series of studies conducted by 
the Naval Post Graduate School on sleep deprivation, primarily focusing on Navy 
training commands, and Navy and Marine Corps operational units. These studies dealt 
mostly with attempts to accommodate and manage participants' sleep cycles and the 
effects of the operational environment and pace of activity on service members. The 
studies in surface warfare units showed consistent, widespread sleep deprivation. This is 
despite the Navy’s implementation of the Navy Standard Work Week in 2007 in an 
attempt to staff units in such a way to sustain safe and combat effective operations, 
accounting for the need for rest (Miller, Matsangas, and Kenney 2012).
Another aspect of both the organizational and physical environment, particularly 
for the COs, is isolation. Ships spend a great deal of time at sea operating independently,
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patrolling, and providing military capabilities and American presence in remote locations. 
Deployments from homeport can range from six to nine months depending on mission 
requirements. Even when operating with a carrier strike group, ships are not in close 
proximity and interactions between COs are limited. Generally, the CO is the most senior 
officer onboard and has no peer. The CO may report to a squadron Commodore 
thousands of miles away or the Strike Group Commander tens of miles away, but there is 
no one immediately at hand to hold that officer accountable for behavior or decisions.
The CO may confide in and consult with the XO, who is the second in command of the 
ship, and the Command Master Chief (CMC), the senior enlisted person on board. 
However, they are both the CO’s subordinates and subject to the CO’s evaluation of their 
performance. Their ability and willingness to address inappropriate behavior or 
questionable decisions on the CO’s part could be affected by that relationship.
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Junior officers have another stressor in the environment which is neither 
organizational nor physical, but emotional. Shipboard service for junior SWOs is a very 
competitive atmosphere. One is competing with one’s colleagues for success as measured 
by performance evaluations and the accomplishment of qualifications. SWOs desiring to 
be truly successful in a career in that community must pursue qualifications and selection 
for CO. The selection criteria are very high, the positions are few relative to the number 
of SWOs seeking them, and every fitness report written comparing officers against their 
peers is part of the record by which they will be judged. It is in this intense, demanding, 
tradition bound, and dangerous environment that the Surface Warfare community train 
and develop the young men and women who will be its future leaders.
Training
Primary Training
The Navy has three primary training pipelines for personnel who enter the Navy 
to become officers: the United States Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS). Each of 
these programs provides roughly one quarter of all officer accessions into the Navy. The 
remaining quarter receive their commission through small specialized programs that 
directly commission specialists such as doctors and dentists and an enlisted-to-officer 
program called Seaman to Admiral-21.
These programs and institutions are all guided by the Officer Professional Core 
Competencies Manual which specifies the “knowledge, skills, and abilities basically 
trained Naval officers must possess upon graduation from an accession program” (Miller 
and Steindl 2011, Executive Summary). Within its Leadership and Management module
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are the topics of honor, judgment, integrity, and moral courage. In addition to instruction 
in leadership and ethics, the midshipmen and officer candidates receive hands-on 
leadership training through a variety of leadership positions within their organizations. 
The student bodies in these institutions are organized in a typical military hierarchy with 
students performing leadership roles at multiple levels, with a wide range of 
responsibilities and authority over the performance and behavior of their classmates. 
These assignments ensure that the students receive a modicum of practical experience in 
leading before joining the fleet.
The Naval Academy was founded in 1845 and provides midshipmen an education 
in all aspects of naval operations, engineering, navigation, and military customs and 
tradition, as well as baccalaureate degrees in majors including naval architecture, 
electrical engineering, oceanography, computer science, quantitative economics, and 
history.
The Naval Academy has in place the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Center for 
Ethical Leadership, whose website displays the mission to “Empower leaders to make 
courageous ethical decisions.” This center is a research and outreach adjunct to the 
Department of Leadership, Ethics, and Law. The department develops and provides the 
ethical and leadership training for the USNA midshipmen with a curriculum that spans 
the four year course of instruction. The topics covered include required courses in 
leadership theory and application, moral reasoning for naval leaders, naval law, and 
electives in psychology and human behavior.
The Stockdale Center augments the curriculum with seminars, speakers, and 
workshops, as well as conducting research in the field. This program, begun in 1998,
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perhaps in response to a series of cheating scandals in the mid-1990s (McKay 2009), 
provides a structured curriculum stressing moral leadership. Unfortunately for the 
purpose of this study, the effects of this program on its graduates would not yet be 
observable among COs, as it has not been in place a sufficient period of time for its 
graduates to achieve command in appreciable numbers.
The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) was established in 1926 
and currently has programs on 150 college campuses nation-wide including such schools 
as Stanford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell, Duke, University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill, and Notre Dame. In conjunction with their civilian baccalaureate 
studies, program participants are provided instruction similar to that of the USNA 
midshipmen. NROTC midshipmen receive training in ships’ engineering plants, weapons 
systems, naval operations, navigation, and seapower and maritime affairs (Naval Reserve 
Officers Training Corps 2011).
More importantly to this study, they receive approximately 30 hours of courses in 
leadership, management, and leadership ethics (Stein 2005). These courses include 
extensive readings on the theory and practice of leadership as well as written and video 
case studies employing plausible scenarios to developing ethical leadership decision 
making skills.
The Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island hosts a number of 
schools for various groups within the Navy, but its primary mission is to provide a 12 
week curriculum designed to equip the Officer Candidates with the basic knowledge of 
the naval profession, including military, nautical, and systems engineering topics. In 
addition, they receive instruction in leadership topics such as team-building,
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decision-making, motivation, leadership qualities, and military law. As with the other 
institutions, OCS must meet the requirements set out by the Officer Professional 
Competency Manual, including those for leadership and ethics training.
Once the midshipmen or officer candidates are commissioned as naval officers 
with the rank of Ensign (01), they spend roughly two years of additional study and on- 
the-job training to become qualified Surface Warfare Officers. They begin this process 
with a recently created eight week course, the Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC). 
This is the latest iteration in a long series of attempts to perfect a fundamentals course for 
all new SWOs that began in 1970 with the six week long Surface Warfare Officer Basic 
Course. By the 1980s the course had been lengthened to six months and became the 
Surface Warfare Officer School Division Officer Course (SWOSDOC) (Robinson 2008). 
However, the end of the Cold War, budget considerations, and changing attitudes toward 
classroom training and new learning technologies, first reduced classroom time and later 
ended SWOSDOC completely.
In 2003, SWO classroom instruction ended with the creation of the “SWOS at 
Sea” computer-based shipboard curriculum. This five compact disc set of lessons was to 
be completed completely at sea in conjunction with the young SWOs’ regular duties 
(Eyer 2009). Retention surveys and observations from senior SWOs began the return to 
classroom training with the creation of Surface Warfare Introduction (SWO INTRO), a 
four week course initiated in 2008 by Vice Admiral D.C. Curtis, then Commander of 
Naval Surface Forces (Naval Surface Forces Public Affairs 2011). That course evolved 
into BDOC which began in October 2012 (Gonzalez 2012).
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Despite the fluctuation in learning venues and course lengths, leadership has 
always been a component of the instruction. During the period SWO INTRO was in use, 
young SWOs attended the one week long Division Officer Leadership Course with 
instruction in leading change, resource stewardship, mission accomplishment, leading 
people, and working with people. This course is now incorporated into BDOC, where it is 
the first course in the Navy Officer Leadership Continuum. This continuum of training 
refreshes and reinforces leadership training at the outset of each major career milestone 
role, from Division Officer (DIVO) and Department Head (DH), through XO to CO and 
Major Command (Covell 2012).
Surface Warfare Qualification
The foremost duty for Ensigns is to achieve their Surface Warfare qualification. 
This is the foundational requirement for a career as a SWO and must be achieved within 
the first 22 months of shipboard service, generally during the first Division Officer tour. 
Officers normally spend the first three to three and a half years as Division Officers, 
which can include serving on two different ships and managing a division of Sailors in 
each.
The Surface Warfare qualification entails the previously described classroom 
training, and an extensive array of highly structured on-the-job training requirements 
using a structured system called Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS). The training 
includes (1) completion of the SWO BDOC; (2) completion of one or more modules of 
the computer based training program called Surface Warfare Officer Study Guide; and 
(3) completion of PQS for the following watchstations and duties: Inport Officer of the 
Deck, Underway Officer of the Deck, Division Officer Afloat, Small Boat Officer,
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Combat Information Center Watch Officer, Basic Damage Control, Engineering Officer 
of the Watch, Division Officer Afloat, and Anti-terrorism Watch Officer. Once the 
preceding three requirements are done, (4) the officer must qualify and stand watch as an 
Officer of the Deck, a position that oversees the maneuvering of a ship through fleet 
operations and specific actions such as anchoring, and mooring (Gelinne 2011).
Once this process is completed, the officer attends the Advanced Shiphandling 
and Tactics (AS AT) course and must pass an exam on the nautical Rules of the Road 
with a score of 90% or above. When all the preceding has been accomplished, the officer 
must request an oral board to (5) evaluate the individual’s ability to operate the ship in 
combat operations, employ all weapon systems, conduct damage control operations, and 
conduct all normal administrative and training functions to prepare a ship for all 
operations (Gelinne 2011). Once all this has been satisfactorily completed, the officer is 
designated as a SWO and is entitled to wear the SWO breast pin. See Illustration 1.
Illustration 1. Surface Warfare Officer Breast Pin
Source: Department o f  the Navy, U.S. Navy Uniform Regulations 1998, 279.
The SWO approach to qualifying in one’s basic warfare skills is distinctly 
different than in the aviation community. Aviators spend their first two years in a 
dedicated training environment to develop their warfare skills and win their wings, prior 
to reporting to an operational command. Similarly, submariners undergo a year and a half 
of training on route to their first sea assignment, although they, too, must undergo 
significant hands-on training once onboard to qualify as designated submariners.
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After completing the division officer tours and the SWO qualification, officers
typically rotate ashore, for service on a headquarters staff or to attend a graduate
education program. Once this is complete, the SWOs return to sea as department heads,
overseeing the weapons, engineering, or operations department, for example. In
preparation for this tour, the officers, now Lieutenants (03), will attend the Surface
Warfare Officers School Department Head course.
This course is the descendant of the Destroyer School established in 1966. The
creation of the Destroyer School was a significant step toward professionalizing the SWO
community, which had previously relied strictly on on-the-job training to equip its
officers to fulfill their duties (Robinson 2008). Then, as in the Surface Warfare School
today, prospective Department Heads were trained in all aspects of naval warfare and the
administrative programs guiding the daily functions of the Navy. Attendance at the
Department Head course is coupled with a leadership course much like the Division
Officer’s Leadership Course, which emphasizes the principles contained in the Navy
Leadership Continuum Model.
Command Qualification
Command of a surface ship is a challenging assignment which places 
extraordinary demands on professional skills in the area of seamanship, 
warfighting, tactics, resource management, judgment, endurance, and 
leadership. Qualification must be limited to those officers who have both 
met the requirements and who, by their outstanding performance over a 
breadth of sea tours, have clearly demonstrated the potential for command 
(Thomas and Hunt 2012, 2).
Having achieved SWO designations as Division Officers, SWO Department 
Heads embark on an extensive program of additional technical qualifications in order to 
be found qualified for command. This process includes further extensive watchstanding,
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demonstrated and documented practical knowledge, a comprehensive examination, and 
oral examinations. Prospective COs must serve for 60 months on a ship or afloat staff, 
complete the SWO Department Head course, achieve qualification as an Engineering 
Officer of the Watch, capable of operating the engineering plant of a ship, and Tactical 
Action Officer, capable of “fighting the ship” or employing its weapons in combat. 
Officers must also demonstrate specific skills in shiphandling including mooring to and 
departing from a pier, anchoring, maneuvering through restricted waters, replenishing 
from another ship while underway, and recovering a simulated person lost over the side 
(Thomas and Hunt 2012).
Once all qualifications have been achieved, a comprehensive Command 
Qualification Examination covering all topics of naval operations and administration is 
administered. When that test has been satisfactorily completed, an officer may request a 
recommendation for the final oral review board. The application must include the 
officer’s commanding officer’s statement that he or she would be willing to have that 
individual assume command of his or her ship. This final review board is composed of 
current commanding officers (05s) and chaired by a Squadron Commodore, a Captain 
(06).
This board quizzes the officer on any and all aspects of naval service, stressing 
scenarios to challenge the individual’s technical knowledge, judgment, and decision­
making. A satisfactory finding by this board is forwarded up the officer’s chain of 
command to the Surface Force Type Commander who designates the officer “qualified 
for command” and notifies the Navy Personnel Command. Navy Personnel Command 
annotates the officer’s record, making him or her eligible to have his or her record
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reviewed and compared with all other qualified officers for a CO position by an 
administrative selection board (Thomas and Hunt 2012). This process sets a very high 
standard for officers who achieve command.
However, selection for command does not mean an end to training. Once selected 
for command, officers from every community are required to attend the two week 
Command Leadership Course (CLC) at the Navy’s Command Leadership School. While 
there they complete a 360 degree assessment and a written exam which covers leadership 
tenets, CO rights, responsibilities, and duties under Navy Regulations and the Uniform 
Code o f Military Justice (UCMJ) (Thomas and Hunt 2012). Officers who are especially 
successful in their role as CO at the Commander (05) level may be selected for a Major 
Command which may be a larger, more capable ship, such as a cruiser, or a Destroyer 
Squadron, which oversees a group of four to seven destroyers and frigates. There is a 
specific leadership course for those officers as well.
The XO, CO, and Major Command courses focus on decision-making skills as 
well as the topics mentioned earlier. The required reading includes texts on ethics and 
principled leadership, and the course includes the review of 10 to 12 case studies on the 
relief of commanding officers for cause, for the value of lessons learned (Higgs 2010). 
An idealized depiction of the complete SWO career path including promotion windows 
and training periods is shown in Illustration 2. This conveys the duration of the process 
and some idea of the personal dedication and commitment involved on the part of those 
striving for successful careers in the SWO community.
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Illustration 2. SWO Career Path
Source: Surface Warfare Career Planning Seminar Brief Fall 2012. 
Explanation of terms and abbreviations:
Numerals running above the colored tour descriptions indicate the 
numbers of years in service coinciding with the events.
DIVO: Division Officer
DH: Department Head
PL: pipeline, the training period immediately prior to assuming a 
certain position.
PCC: post-commander command 
Statutory: a selection board required by law 
Administrative: a selection board required by Navy policy
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Throughout a naval career, all personnel must also participate in a program of 
non-occupational training called “General Military Training (GMT).” This program 
provides lessons on a broad range of topics focused on promoting Navy values, reducing 
negative behavior, and providing individual skills to aid personnel in successfully dealing 
with the rigors of a Navy career and in living a responsible life. This training is 
conducted within each unit using standard curricula either in person by senior leaders or 
trained facilitators, or online. For 2014 the following topics for GMT requiring face-to- 
face instruction include alcohol abuse prevention and control, hazing policy and 
prevention, stress management, sexual assault prevention and response awareness, and 
personal financial management. Online course requirements for the year include anger 
management, combatting trafficking in persons, drug abuse prevention and control, and
|
fraternization awareness and prevention. Attendance and completion of all such training
is reported by the command at the individual level and tracked by the Navy at the highest
| '
levels (Moran 2013).
In addition to traditional training, junior officers can access the experience and
i
knowledge of senior SWOs through the Commander Naval Surface Force online 
e-Mentor program. Begun in 2009, the program employs technology to assist junior 
officers to match themselves with mentors with compatible backgrounds. By April of 
2010, the program boasted an enrollment of 650 officers including 100 COs.
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Organizational Culture
Organizational Culture Defined
The Navy is an organization, which is “a consciously coordinated social entity, 
with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to 
achieve a common goal or set of goals” (Robbins 1990, 4). Simply put, the Navy is a 
collection of people, interacting and cooperating for a shared purpose. While doing so, 
the actions of the participants in the organization are guided in part by their 
organizational culture. This is the “personality of an organization that guides how 
employees think and act on the job” (Desson and Clouthier 2010, 1).
Organizational culture has been defined in many ways: “a system of shared 
meaning” (Robbins 1990, 438); “a negotiated order that emerges between actors . . .  
influenced in particular by people with symbolic power - the power to define a situation 
in which interactions take place” (Hallet 2003, 130); and, perhaps most definitively as, “a 
pattern of basic shared assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved problems of 
external adaption and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and is therefore taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to those problems” (Schein 1990, 111).
Organizational cultures develop over time, through shared experiences, and are 
begun based on the vision, beliefs, and values of the founders (Robbins 1990, 444;
Schein 2010, 219). Robbins holds that cultures serve a number of functions, the first 
being to define one organization from another. The second is to create a sense of identity 
among its members. The third function is to facilitate commitment on the part of 
members to the goals or outcomes sought by the group. A culture’s fourth function is to
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provide stability, the “social glue that holds the group together,” by establishing 
behavioral standards for the members, and fifth, it sets a “sense-making and control 
mechanism” of “assumptions, understandings, and implicit rules” that members employ 
in their interactions and activities to achieve the group’s purposes (Robbins 1997, 240).
Schein asserts that there are three levels of an organization’s culture, which range 
from the tangible to the conceptual: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and basic 
underlying assumptions. Artifacts are the tangible or overt symbols which in the case of 
the Navy would include uniforms and rank insignia and rituals, such as saluting, 
ceremonies, stories about the organization, as well as published statements of values. 
Espoused beliefs and values are the content of ethical standards, codes of conduct, and 
mission statements. Basic assumptions are deeper in the organization’s unconscious, 
underlying and uncontested rules that shape the way members perceive situations and the 
way they behave in response (2010,23-31). According to Schein, assumptions begin as 
values, but as they prove to be valid and “stand the test of time, gradually come to be 
taken for granted and then take on the characteristics of assumptions” (1990, 112).
These cultures are sustained through the selection of persons who fit the desired 
characteristics of members, the role-modeling behavior of senior management, and the 
socialization of members (Robbins 1990, 447). The process of socialization is one of 
adaptation to the “values, norms, and expected behavior patterns” of their organization 
(Robbins 1990, 97). This adaption involves learning which values are “operational and 
rewarded” in the organization (Victor and Cullen 1987, 51). Socialization or 
acculturation takes place throughout a member’s association with an organization through 
the member learning stories, such as accounts of successes and historical events; rituals
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such as awards ceremonies or the Navy’s change of command ceremonies; material 
symbols which convey the image of the organization, for example the heraldic crests of 
ships and squadrons; and finally, language such as technical jargon or common phrases 
and acronyms used by the organization (Robbins 1990, 448-450).
Reconciling Civilian and Military Culture
A critical step in creating a Sailor or a CO is the adaption to military culture early 
in the career. That transition from civilian to military member is one with which most feel 
they have some familiarity, if not from personal or close family experience, from popular 
culture. Most have been exposed to images of basic military training through the media 
of television, film, and written accounts. It is a transition initially marked by the loss of 
independence and individuality.
The midshipman or officer candidate is removed from the comforts and familiar 
environment of home and placed in a highly structured environment that emphasizes 
obedience, teamwork, and discipline. According to Hollingshead, “From the viewpoint of 
the institution, the ideal soldier would be the one who had so identified himself with the 
military situation that all his personal, psychic, and emotional needs would be satisfied by 
the instrumentalities provided by the institution” (1946, 442). Such an individual would, 
theoretically, not be concerned about the issues which affected civilian life: not 
livelihood, not relationships, nor the possibility of death in action, apparently creating an 
ideal soldier. However, that is not possible, nor is it truly desirable.
As Rosen points out, a military too separated from its society may create distrust 
and be seen as an “alien element” by its own society (1995, 6). This separation may result 
in a society that is unwilling to entrust its defense to an entity that differs too greatly from
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the society in terms of values. Rosen cites Max Weber’s assertion that military discipline 
“would destroy the loyalties and habits of behavior that soldiers brought with them into 
the army from society” (Rosen 1995, 6). Huntington similarly stated that military 
effectiveness, that is “the management of violence,” is diminished when the military is 
made to reflect competing elements of society, specifically citing examples of the service 
of French nobility (1957, 26-29). Kohn asserts most firmly that the Army has never 
represented the American society, “unless a centralized, stratified, cohesive, authoritarian 
institution that stressed obedience and sacrifice can reflect a decentralized, 
heterogeneous, individualistic, democratic, capitalist society” (1981, 563). These 
opinions highlight the divergence of military values and structures from the society it 
protects, but the military is a product of the society and, in the case of the United States, 
does the bidding of the society.
All those who enter the military profession must make the transition from a full 
participant in society to a protector of the society, with rights that are greatly constrained 
and responsibilities that exceed and defy the limitations of our laws and conventions. 
Aside from the obvious requirement that one is willing and able to wield violence and 
destruction as an instrument of the government, other conventions are also set aside. 
Consider for example the successful service of women in many militaries, including 
America’s own. The protection of women from exposure to violence had for centuries 
been a cultural norm in Western society, yet women serve today with strong endorsement 
of their male colleagues (Titunik 2008, 146). Yet, while some conventions are set aside, 
others requiring adherence to values of integrity, courage, and honor are imposed to a 
degree rarely seen in society. Each individual joining an organization must reconcile the
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differences between the values possessed upon entry and those values espoused by the 
organization.
Ethical and Moral Aspects
All officers entering the Navy bring with them a set o f values and a moral 
perspective, and in some cases those values and perspectives may not match the 
expectations of their service. An important means of enculturation for a significant 
portion of the officer corps is the Naval Academy, which is steeped in tradition and naval 
lore and introduces midshipmen to the values of the Navy for the first time. Dombusch, 
in recounting his experiences at the Coast Guard Academy, asserts that one of the things 
learned at the Academy is that “regulations are not considered of paramount importance 
when they conflict with informal codes” (1955, 317).
Granted that it is a different academy, but Karsten cites historical precedent for 
similar attitudes at the Naval Academy where there were committed “many offenses of a 
military nature . . .  which would be severely punished by the authorities . . .  yet at which 
most midshipmen would just smile” (1972, 39). The Naval Academy experienced a 
highly publicized cheating scandal in the mid-1990s, prior to the creation of the 
Stockdale Center, in which 134 seniors were implicated. Investigations led to 62 being 
found guilty of honor code violations, with 24 of these ordered expelled by Secretary of 
the Navy John Dalton (McKay 2009; Valentine 1994). This could be seen as the 
continued influence of attitudes and values like those remarked upon by Dombusch and 
Karsten. It is also indicative of the difficulty of instilling and sustaining the formal values 
of an institution, by overwriting the values and ethical standards of its students with its 
own.
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IDr. David Callahan, a Princeton-educated political scientist, makes a compelling 
case on the rise of unethical behavior in America in The Cheating Culture. It is his 
position that American society now values success far more than honesty, and as a result, 
the entire culture is rife with all manner of cheating. Callahan asserts that “individualism 
and self-reliance have morphed into selfishness and self-absorption; competitiveness has 
become social Darwinism; desire for the good life has turned into materialism; aspiration 
has become envy” (2004, 19-20).
Callahan offers an extensive array of examples of significant, newsworthy 
instances, cheating in business, academia, law, politics, medicine, journalism, and sports. 
Practically every facet of life is represented. Beyond the view of news cameras, Callahan 
paints a portrait of a society fully engaged in “trickle-down corruption” in which 
employee theft, low level tax evasion, theft of cable services, and lying to insurers are 
actions so common as to be generally socially acceptable (2004,167-195). Callahan’s 
premise is that inequities in our economic and political systems have created a “winning 
class” of the wealthy and powerful for whom cheating provides massive returns and 
whose positions greatly reduce the risk of punishment. Beneath this class is the “anxious 
class” of middle and lower income status for whom “[t]he message is not just that the 
world is unfair and the rich can get away with murder; it’s that people who cut comers 
get ahead” (2004, 194).
One does not have to agree with Callahan’s assessment of the causes behind this 
phenomenon to believe that the overall effect of being exposed to the constant media 
barrage of illegal and unethical activity could be to lessen an individual’s commitment to 
ethical behavior. Several national surveys on ethics appear to support Callahan’s
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assessment of the national ethical climate. The Josephson Institute, Center for Youth 
Ethics, conducts a biennial survey of American high school students for its Report Card 
on the Ethics o f  American Youth. In the 2011 report, 59% of the 40,000 teenagers 
surveyed admitted to cheating on an exam in the past year, and 48% of the males said 
they sometimes lie to save money. This is an interesting contrast to the 92% of the 
students who said they were satisfied with their personal ethics and character (Josephson 
Institute Center for Youth Ethics 2011). Does that indicate an attitude toward cheating 
that no longer categorizes it as unethical behavior?
Similarly, the Ethics Resource Center’s 2011 National Business Ethics Survey 
(NBES) revealed that 45% of U.S. workers observed misconduct on the job, and 42% of 
companies are perceived as having weak ethics cultures. This indicates a 13% rise in 
firms with poor ethics climates in the two years since the previous survey (2012,12). 
Susan Meisinger, an expert in human resources (HR), commenting on the survey, points 
out that among the employees who feel a bond to their co-workers and the firm, 72% are 
willing to report misconduct, in contrast with 58% who do not feel that “their workplace 
is a close community” (2012, 2). Thus, a positive workplace environment inspires ethical 
behavior.
Dr. Michael Mumford has studied and written extensively on leadership and 
organizational integrity and their influence on ethical decision making. In a study of 105 
doctoral students in scientific research fields, he found that the ethical climate of an 
organization, particularly the aspect of interpersonal conflict within an organization, had 
a significant impact on the making of ethical decisions (Mumford et al. 2007, 361). 
Students with more positive perceptions of the ethical climate were less likely to make
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unethical decisions, while those with more negative perceptions were more likely to 
make unethical decisions.
Expanding on this work, Mumford conducted a subsequent study on the impact of 
exposure to unethical events on ethical decision making. This study determined that 
people exposed to unethical events in the workplace that are accepted by their peers or 
role models, tended to incorporate that knowledge into their model of workplace behavior 
to be used in decision making. This would lead, in turn, to a rise in unethical decisions 
(Mumford et al. 2009, 376).
Professor John Darley, in his work “The Cognitive and Social Psychology of 
Contagious Organizational Corruption,” offers us further insight into the phenomena 
Mumford recorded. Darley asserts that the initiation of decisions with morally incorrect 
outcomes often begin with our tendency to make automatic intuitive decisions in cases 
where a more deliberate evaluation of the ethical circumstances is more appropriate. If 
those intuitive judgments have as their frame of reference the ethical example set by 
society as described by Callahan, then the outcome could be unethical or in an ethical 
gray area. If that erroneous decision is not detected and corrected by the organization, 
then a number of psychological theories would indicate that it will soon become 
acceptable to the group and may begin the growth of an unethical culture.
As individuals become members of an organization, social identity theory 
proposes that they alter their personality in an effort to become a “prototypical” member 
of it, fully reflecting its values and nature. Our personal identity is then tied by group 
loyalty and commitment to the actions and behaviors of the group. If members do not 
comment on an unethical action, though they think it is wrong “due to insecurity or their
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lower position in the organizational hierarchy,” then all the individuals in the group may 
engage in “pluralistic ignorance” and mistakenly assume it as appropriate because no one 
else challenges it (Darley 2005, 1186). This initial misstep may grow exponentially 
through a phenomenon Darley refers to as “entrainment.” In this situation the group is 
drawn along into increasingly dubious or unethical actions as each new, imperceptibly 
larger action continues to change the ethical standard and raise the tolerance for unethical 
behavior (2005, 1185-1186).
This preceding information lends credence to the perceptions of Admiral Arleigh 
Burke. In a treatise on integrity, Admiral Burke wrote “The integrity of a society or group 
is approximately equal to the lowest common denominator of its people. When the 
standards are lowered for an individual, the standards of the group or society to which the 
individual belongs are lowered” (Montor et al. 1987, 27).
Those lowered standards, perhaps driven by Darley’s entrainment, would shape 
the ethical work climate (EWC) of an organization. EWC is a concept developed by Bart 
Victor and John Cullen that describes a framework built of “the perceived prescriptions 
and proscriptions and permissions regarding moral obligations in organizations” (1988, 
101). This framework helps an individual facing an ethical quandary to determine “what 
should I do?” (1988, 101). Their work was subsequently validated and employed by 
numerous researchers (Barnett and Schubert 2002; Cullen, Victor, and Bronson 1993; 
Peterson 2002; Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe 1998; Vardi 2001; Weber 1995; Weber 
and Gerde 2011; Weber and Seger 2002).
The EWC is defined in two dimensions, the first being ethical criterion. This 
dimension defines the EWC by three classes of moral theory based on the basic
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considerations used for moral judgments. They are egoism, which stresses self-interest; 
benevolence, which stresses joint interests; and principle, which stresses adherence to a 
moral code or principle (Victor and Cullen 1988, 104). The second dimension is the locus 
of analysis which is a referent group that is the “source of moral reasoning” (Victor and 
Cullen 1988, 105). Based on sociological theories of reference groups and their roles, this 
dimension has three components: individual, in which the source of reasoning is personal 
ethics or self-interest; local, in which the source is the immediate surrounding 
organization; and cosmopolitan, in which the source extends beyond the organization to 
include others such as members of a shared profession or an abstract influence such as a 
body of law or ethical code (Victor and Cullen 1988, 106).
To measure and identify EWCs, Victor and Cullen developed the Ethical Climate 
Questionnaire (ECQ) and administered it to 872 employees of four firms. Through factor 
analysis Victor and Cullen identified five EWC types: instrumental, caring, 
independence, rules and procedures, and law and codes (1988). In subsequent studies, an 
instrumental EWC, which is characterized by self-interest and a focus on utilitarian 
values, like mission accomplishment, has appeared to be the least desirable EWC. Barnett 
and Schubert (2002) and Weber and Seger (2002) demonstrated that, compared to other 
EWCs, instrumental was the least likely to promote ethical behavior. It was also found to 
be associated with unethical conduct (Peterson 2002; Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe 
1998), including theft and falsification of reports (Weber, Kurke, and Pentico 2003). In 
comparison, a caring EWC is characterized by concern for others, and is associated with 
commitment to the group/organization; an independence EWC is focused on the exercise 
of personal morality and decision-making; a rules and procedures EWC is driven by
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compliance with organizational standards; and law and codes is most concerned with 
adherence to external law and professional practices (Armstrong and Francis 2008; 
Barnett and Schubert 2002; Trevino, Butterfield, and McCabe 1998; Victor and Cullen 
1988; Weber and Seger 2002).
Additional research by Weber (1995) and Weber and Seger (2002) succeeded in 
associating EWCs to organizational unit functions, specifically using James Thompson’s 
1967 classifications of technical core, buffer, and boundary-spanning units. A technical 
core unit is a main line production unit; a buffer unit enables the technical core with 
logistical or human resources support; and a boundary-spanning unit provides the 
organization’s interface with the external environment.
The previous research had all been business-focused, surveying savings and loans, 
printing firms, financial institutions, health care firms, and steel manufacturers, until 
Weber and Gerde’s research into EWCs within military organizations. Their work 
validated its applicability to military organizations by surveying 10 different military 
work groups of U.S. Army and Air Force active duty, Reserve, and National Guard 
personnel (2011). They also determined that military units which were at greater risk or 
whose functions had greater military mission impact were more likely to have either an 
instrumental or caring EWC than other military units with a supporting role (2011).
It is possible that an organization’s EWC and its informal culture or subculture 
are closely associated. Both are affected by the behavior and values of its members, 
perhaps more strongly so than by the formal values espoused by the larger, formal 
organization. This relationship could override the formal culture imposed by the
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bureaucratic structure, supporting Admiral Burke’s perspective on the lowering of 
standards.
In the fall of 2010, the Navy Personnel Command invited Michael Josephson of 
the Josephson Institute of Ethics to speak on the topic of ethics. As part of the seminar, 
senior and midgrade officers and civilian employees participated in a survey on ethics 
and values. Josephson queried 300 persons, and 100 responded which yielded a strong 
response rate of 33%. The survey participants were asked about a series of behaviors and 
whether in their opinion this conduct was so frequent or serious that it should be 
addressed more consistently by the Navy. The degrees of agreement with the conditions 
below were rather surprising:
1. Overly generous and/or misleading fitness reports - 60% agreement
2. Officers overlooking poor or mediocre performance of subordinates - 59% 
agreement
3. Unaccountability - 59% agreement
4. Looking the other way at improper conduct by high level officers - 55% 
agreement
5. Willingness to lie, deceive, or conceal for personal advantage or avoidance of 
negative consequences - 53% agreement
6. Arrogance or abuse of power with respect to subordinates - 52% agreement 
(Josephson 2010).
This is a rather harsh assessment of the ethical standards these officers have 
encountered and is indicative of an instrumental EWC as described by Weber and Gerde 
and of an environment Munford would find conducive to participants making unethical
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decisions. Such an environment could contribute to unethical behavior on the part of 
COs, leading to DFCs.
In “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,”
Ludwig and Longenecker place the responsibility squarely on failed leaders. In their 
assessment, leaders are placed in danger of ethical failure due to four conditions produced 
by success. As they portray the situation, success creates complacency, allowing leaders 
to lose focus on their purpose; it provides leaders with “privileged access to information, 
people, or objects;” it is accompanied by “increasingly unrestrained control” of resources; 
and it inflates leaders’ belief in their own ability to control the results and consequences 
of their actions (1993, 265). While there is merit in their observations of the freedom that 
accompanies achieving a pinnacle position, their perspective ignores the organizational 
culture and any values or expectations of leaders that it imposes, falling short by 
excluding this noteworthy aspect.
Navy Culture
The official organizational culture of the Navy, as defined by Jermier et al.
(1991), would encompass the formal mission statement which is:
Deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, win our Nation’s wars. Employ 
the global reach and persistent presence of forward-stationed and 
rotational forces to secure the Nation from direct attack, assure Joint 
operational access and retain global freedom of action. With global 
partners, protect the maritime freedom that is the basis for global 
prosperity. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding 
set of allies and international partners to enhance global security.
(Greenert 2012b)
It would also include the standards of conduct as defined by multiple regulations 
and instructions, the core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment, and the formal 
organization structure (Greenert 2012b). Jermier et al. define culture as “the basic,
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taken-for-granted assumptions, and deep patterns of meaning shared by organizational 
participants and manifestations of these assumptions and patterns” (emphasis theirs) 
(1991, 170). They go on to describe manifestations of this culture as including “myths, 
values, ideologies; stories and heroes; slogans, rituals, rites, and ceremonies” (1991,170). 
All these things are thoroughly embraced within the military, perhaps more so than other 
organizations due to the need to instill loyalty, espirit de corps, and discipline.
For example, the Navy reveres the heroes, “the hallowed dead,” of its past 
(Karsten 1972, 27). Their heroic deeds and victories in battle are taught as lessons in 
leadership and service, and their names, such as John Paul Jones, Stephen Decatur, and 
Arleigh Burke, grace the hulls of modem warships. The Navy holds ceremonies full of 
pomp and martial music for the commissioning and decommissioning of ships and for 
changes of command.
It also observes a ritual going back hundreds of years: the crossing the line 
ceremony, when passing over the equator. In it, “polliwogs,” Sailors who have never 
crossed the equator, earn their entry into the “Royal Order of Shellbacks,” as veterans of 
a crossing are called, with comedic labors, skits and a ritual baptism (Lovette 1939,42; 
Mack and Connell 1980,192). This ritual also often involved a gauntlet of shellbacks 
with fire hose sections swatting the polliwogs, who were often made to crawl through 
troughs of garbage as well. All of this was to prove their worthiness of the Shellback title. 
That is until 2005, when these type actions were identified and prohibited as hazing 
(Navas 2005). These traditions, among others, set a particular environment for the 
practice of leadership and behavior in general that is significantly different than behavior 
in society.
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While the military organizations have been in the vanguard of changes in some 
values and behaviors in advance of society in general, such as the integration of African- 
Americans, there are other aspects of the military that are heavily influenced by tradition 
and reflect customs no longer familiar to most members of American society. There are 
in current use official Navy instructions on etiquette, ceremonies, and social customs. 
These include such things as the proper forms of address for dignitaries, the proper form 
of toasting a monarch, and the use of calling cards when paying a formal call on one’s 
CO for the first time (Talbot 2001).
While incongruous with the predominantly middle-class upbringing of most 
Naval Officers, these publications are not without purpose. Navy warships do visit ports 
of many small and distant nations where American diplomats are unlikely to ever visit. In 
these cases, the Navy practices statecraft and “small d” diplomacy, representing our 
national interests and our people to government and business leaders as goodwill 
ambassadors. Junior officers can find themselves in foreign locales, dining and
i  .  .  .associating with foreign government ministers, aristocracy, and the most senior officers 
of their militaries.
Accompanying the details of appropriate etiquette is the stated expectation for 
officers to conduct themselves as gentlemen and ladies with “chivalric demeanor,” which
I
implies an elevated social status that harkens back again to roots in the Royal Navy 
(Mack and Connell 1980, 83). At the time it served as the model for our Navy, officers of 
the British navy, as in most branches of the military, were from the gentry, the wealthy 
class, and this phenomenon was seen in the American Navy as well (Karsten 1972).
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Karsten argues convincingly that the aspiring Naval Officers of the time were 
more urbane and prosperous than most of their peers. His analysis of the formative days 
of the U.S. Navy from 1847 to 1900 shows that while 10% of Americans lived in 
metropolitan areas, 30% of Midshipman came from urban settings. Furthermore, 
Midshipmen came predominantly from wealthier families. Specifically, while only 5.38% 
of males worked in the seven wealthiest occupations, including government officials, 
66.2% of Midshipmen came from such families. Conversely, although 30% of men were 
employed as planters, ranchers, and farmers, only 10% of Midshipmen came from such
I
families (Karsten 1972, 15). As in its British model, the association with gentlemanly 
behavior and values was incorporated into the culture of the American Navy as well. In 
fact, today’s Uniform Code o f  Military Justice (UCMJ) still contains article 133 which 
cites as a punishable offense “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.”
Another distinctive aspect of shipboard life that is at odds with civilian society is 
the officers’ wardroom. While the Sailors have their meals served cafeteria style on trays 
on the large mess-deck, chief petty officers, and officers have private lounge-dining 
rooms for their use. It is understood that large corporate offices may have separate, nicely 
appointed dining rooms for the executives, but in the Navy, the junior enlisted personnel 
serve as mess attendants or waiters for the officers. This is a temporary duty assignment, 
called “mess cooking” for 30-90 days generally, for the most junior personnel, usually 
soon after reporting aboard the ship. These junior sailors augment the small number of 
Culinary Specialists, formerly called Mess Specialists, to provide needed manpower for 
food preparation and cleaning the food service areas. Their duties also include food 
service and cleaning the messing and berthing areas of the officers and chief petty
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officers. This practice replaces, to an extent, the duties of enlisted personnel originally 
called stewards. Until the rate was disestablished in the mid-1970s, stewards’ duties 
included serving meals, cleaning officer staterooms, and even shining officer’s shoes 
(Karsten 1972; Szalay and Bryson 1977). These men were essentially servants, and the 
majority of who were Filipinos recruited specifically for these positions by special 
agreement with the Philippines (Szalay and Bryson 1977).
These conditions and roles seem at odds with our American democratic and 
egalitarian society, and surely affect relations between officers and the enlisted personnel 
they lead. Trappings of social class distinctions could affect the perspective of some 
individuals as to their role and station within the organization and the way they view 
themselves within society. These influences shape the perceptions and behavior of our 
Commanding-Officers-in-training.
Surface Warfare Subculture.
Within the Navy, as with any large organization, there are subcultures that 
influence the behaviors of their members. Organizational subcultures originate from 
many sources: members’ personal characteristics such as race, age, gender, or ethnic 
background; personal/social history, such as family background, education, and social 
class position; and positional characteristics such as occupational specialty, assignment 
within the organization, or the time of day worked (Jermier et al. 1991,172). Within the 
Navy, the effect can be seen in the slight variations of the manifestations within the 
various warfare communities and the smaller technical specialties and staff corps.
One obvious manifestation is the warfare insignia or breast pin. For over a 
hundred years of its history, the surface Navy was the Navy, but with the advent of
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Iairplanes and submarines that began to change. The aviation community was the first to 
receive a distinctive breast pin to represent the specialization of its officers. Naval 
Aviator wings were approved for uniform wear in September of 1917 (Grossnick et al. 
1997, 656). The submarine force was the next to receive a pin, the submariner’s dolphin 
pin that was adopted in 1924 (Thornton 1997, 138). However, it was not until 1973 that 
the SWO community was recognized as having a distinct specialty, with a specific 
numeric designator, rather than being the “general pool” of Officers and Sailors from 
which specialists were created (Robinson 2008, 41). It would take until 1975 before the 
official SWO breast pin was approved (Tweedie 2012,1). The desire for a counterpart for 
the aviator wings could reflect the common occurrence of competition between smaller 
groups within a larger organization. There is strong competition between the warfare 
communities, and this mostly good natured competition can be seen in the derisive 
nicknames used in referring to the communities: “black shoes” for SWOs, “airdales” for 
aviators, and “bubbleheads” for submariners (Walter 2011).
The breast pin was not the only distinctive identifying item the aviators possessed 
for which the SWOs had no counterpart. The iconic leather flight jacket was another 
uniform item authorized for and issued to aviators from before World War II through 
today. In October of 1985, the Navy’s Uniform Board authorized the SWO community to 
wear its own distinctive item: a deep blue “wooly-pully” style sweater similar to those 
worn by British military personnel (Busey 1985). Originally authorized only for Surface 
Warfare qualified officers and chief petty officers, the sweater’s use was slowly 
expanded to more communities and eventually replaced altogether by a less distinctive 
black sweater authorized for all Navy personnel (Department of the Navy 1991).
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The desire for the breast pin, the nick names, and the sweater are indicative of a 
deeper level o f  competition by the SWOs which dates back to World War II and plays a 
role in defining the community’s culture. Prior to the war, the battleship had been the 
preeminent naval weapon system, and the possession of these ships was the measure of a 
nation’s naval might. The Battle o f Midway, which has been cited as a turning point in the 
Pacific campaign (Potter and Nimitz 1960, 246), was an aircraft carrier duel, and the first 
naval battle in which the combatant vessels were never in visual range. Its outcome 
shifted the focus of naval strength to the aircraft carrier, and began the rise of aviators as 
a dominant force in the Navy. The Surface Warfare community lost its dominant role and 
saw it erode further during the Cold War. In that era, the role o f aircraft carriers, with the 
mission o f  projecting American power ashore from the sea, and the ballistic missile 
submarines, a key part o f  the nuclear deterrent system, overshadowed the SWO mission of 
control of the seas.
As the relative importance of the SWO mission waned, there were empirical 
indicators of the shift in the standing of the SWO community within the Navy as well, 
pay being a particularly obvious one. According to Kostiuk, “military aviators have 
received extra pay for almost as long as they have been flying” (1985, 1). This may be 
true, though this researcher can only confirm such payments have been made since the 
issuance of Executive Order 1157 of June 1964 which included pay for “aerial flight” 
under a provision for incentive pays for hazardous duty.
Commonly called “flight pay,” the hazardous duty pay was changed to Aviation 
Career Incentive Pay in 1974 (Kostiuk 1985, 1) and resulted in aviators earning 
thousands o f  dollars per year more than their SWO counterparts. In addition, in 1981 a
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program of retention bonuses for aviators, the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, was 
begun. This program made experienced aviators eligible for bonuses o f  up $12,000 per 
year for each year of additional service to which they committed. The program was 
discontinued from 1984 through 1988 and then re-authorized as Aviation Continuation 
Pay (Government Accountability Office 1994, 3). Today the program, now called 
Aviation Career Continuation Pay, offers bonuses o f  up to $25,000 per additional year of 
service, depending on the type o f  aircraft flown (Van Buskirk 2013b, 1).
Similarly, submariners have received additional compensation for submarine 
service dating back at least to 1905. Following a dive aboard USSPlunger (Submarine 
#2) in August of 1905, Theodore Roosevelt issued Executive Order 366-B on November 
8 which authorized enlisted men “$1 additional pay for each day during any part of which 
they shall have been submerged in a submarine torpedo boat while under way” (Naval 
History and Heritage Command 2014; Roosevelt 1905). This payment was to be made, 
“ [bjesides the $5 per month allowed them for submarine service” (Roosevelt 1905).
This program has continued, across a century, to today and has been expanded 
from enlisted personnel only to include submarine qualified officers increasing monthly 
pay for senior officers by as much as $835 (Comptroller General o f  the United States 
1975; U. S. Code Title 37 section 301c 2010). In 1969 an additional bonus program was 
created to retain nuclear engineering trained and qualified officers, which also continues 
today as the Nuclear Career Incentive Bonus and authorizes annual bonus payments not 
to exceed $22,000 per year for service beyond their minimum obligated service (U. S. 
Code Title 37 section 312c 2010; Lorio 2006).
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This is not to imply any unwarranted favoritism or discrimination against SWOs, 
as these financial incentives were legitimate responses to market pressures to successfully 
compete to retain officers with valuable, marketable skills in whom the Navy had made 
great investments. However, in contrast to the trend in special and incentive pays above, 
it was not until 1978 that a program was created to incentivize surface ship service, which 
was based on rank and years of duty at sea, not SWO qualification (U. S. Code Title 37 
section 305a 2010). It was not until 1994 that retention concerns led to the creation of 
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay, offering bonuses, now up to $50,000, for 
SWO lieutenants to remain on active duty beyond their minimum service requirement 
and to complete Department Head assignments (Stoker and Crawford 2008; U. S. Code 
Title 37 section 319 2010). A subsequent program announced in 2002, the Surface 
Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus, created additional bonuses of up to 
$46,000 for lieutenant commanders to continue to serve in the SWO community through 
their 15th year of service (Henry 2002).
These programs represent targeted application of incentives for the purpose of 
retaining required expertise, not an attempt to achieve compensation parity among the 
communities. While the differences in compensation are rational and justified from a 
practical perspective, they could also serve to inspire a diminished feeling of worth 
within the SWO community. As the days of the battleships faded from the communal 
memory, the aviation and submarine communities continued to grow in importance, 
while their members’ marketable training earned them greater financial rewards.
This was not the only policy which appeared to disprize the SWO community. For 
decades it was a practice to automatically transfer to the SWO community all officers
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who failed, voluntarily dropped out, or were medically discharged from flight and 
submarine training. To be sure, by virtue of being admitted to these demanding programs, 
these officers, commonly referred to as “attrites,” were intelligent and capable individuals 
with potential to become valuable members of the SWO community. However, service as 
SWOs had not been their first choice of careers. This was such a standard practice that 
accession planning to set recruiting goals for new SWOs even allowed for a percentage of 
accessions through aviation and submarine officer attrition. Given the attrites’ lack of 
choice in the situation, and the circumstances surrounding their assignments as SWOs, it 
is understandable that a parochial view of this situation among SWOs was that their 
community was a dumping ground for the failures o f other communities.
This practice continued late into the 1990s, but today attrites are not automatically 
retained or sent to another community. Instead, they must request to continue to serve and 
to transition to another community via a Probationary Officer Continuation and 
Redesignation Board, and most are not retained (Van Buskirk 2013c). This process 
requires attrites to request to enter the SWO ranks and allows the SWO community to 
manage its own accessions more closely and to select those who enter its ranks. While all 
of these past practices were rational responses on the part of the Navy to market 
conditions and the need to retain capable officers, the practices could be perceived as 
detrimental to the character of the SWO community. In view of these practices, it would 
be understandable for the SWOs to consider their community the least well-paid and the 
least highly regarded warfare community in a service founded by their organizational 
ancestors.
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The image the Surface Warfare community strives to project is one of toughness, 
of valuing hard work and perseverance in the face of hardship, and of prizing mission 
accomplishment, practically at any cost. In a 2008 study on the retention of females in the 
SWO community. Stoker and Crawford described the community “having a traditional, 
relatively authoritarian leadership style, sea-duty intensive careers, strenuous at-sea work 
schedules, and a very competitive environment for JO’s” (2008, 4). In similar study on 
SWO career dissatisfiers among female and male junior officers in 2006, Sharon Graham 
found that the focus group participants saw the community as one which had no pride in 
itself and was characterized by “incompetent leadership, leaders who do not respect or 
care about their subordinates, who micromanage the daily lives of the crew, and who do 
not want to mentor younger officers” (2006, 31). In the 2013 Surface Warfare Junior 
Officer Survey conducted by the Navy in the spring of 2013, respondents reported that 
workload, micromanagement, quality of leadership, and zero defects mentality were 
retention cons. Workload and quality of leadership were also factors in the same survey 
in 2008 (Copeman 2014, 5).
There has been much said in the Navy over the years about the zero-defectj . ,
mentality that is unforgiving of mistakes, and its association with the SWO community, 
which was often described as “eating its young” (Graham 2006; Stoker and Crawford 
2008; Higgs 2010; Homer 2009; Light 2011). This phrase means the community 
consumes the weak, extracting their labor and using them up, while driving them away 
after a short career. Sankowsky captures this practice well in describing a narcissistic 
leader who “pushes followers to the point of burnout while still reaping the benefits of 
their efforts” (1995, 61).
Participants in Graham’s focus groups on factors leading to a decision to leave the 
SWO community highlighted a significant presence of leaders who “degrade and 
humiliate their subordinates in front of peers,” and who make the “juniors feel unworthy” 
(2006, 32). The responses in Graham’s facilitated sessions could lead to the conclusion 
that leaders in the community perpetuate a Darwinian, hyper-competitive environment, 
which includes abusive supervision and values only the work of subordinates, rather than 
the personnel. This is a culture that fosters and sustains an “eat their young” mentality 
(2006, 31-40). To some, the Surface Warfare community is viewed as a collection of 
dour workaholics at sea who become rowdy rake hells once ashore overseas. Illustration 
3 illustrates a popular image of the community.
Illustration 3. SWO Work Ethic
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Light’s assessment of the community found it “stoic, business-like . . .  always 
expected to be working” (2011, 15). The “work hard, play hard” outlook has also long 
been prevalent in the SWO community. Light remarks that “our history is steeped in tales 
of behavior which does not fit the model to which we aspire today: drunks, bar fights, 
gender biases” (2011, 13). The penchant for “hard steaming,” excessive drinking ashore, 
has been perpetuated by the oral history of the clan: the “sea story.” These are tales of 
adventure and misadventure in exotic ports, hair-raising dangers and near-mishaps at sea, 
and triumphs over balky gear, bureaucratic red tape, and “screamer” bosses. These stories 
portray a group of tough “hard chargers” overcoming barriers through wits, strength, and 
determination to “get the job done,” then celebrating those victories with alcohol and 
sexual escapades ashore. Like other oral histories, these tales unify the community and 
portray its distinctive character. However, they may have also propagated acceptance of 
potentially unethical, destructive, or dangerous behavior.
In her study of dominant narratives in the Navy, which guide actions and aid 
understanding the culture, Reily found a narrative she labeled “some stories should not be 
told.” These stories reflected the antics of Sailors, and officers, on liberty, but the senior 
enlisted leaders she interviewed shared them not for amusement or self-aggrandizement, 
but in a context of concern for the messages they might convey about acceptable behavior 
in the Navy (2009,157-170).
The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have not been blind to the 
conflict between espoused values and the occurrence of alcohol abuse and sexual 
promiscuity. The Navy has worked internally to downplay the role and use of alcohol in 
the lives of its personnel since 1996 with its “Right Spirit” campaign and has recently
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initiated a new campaign to continue that effort, one which includes the use of 
Breathalyzers (Faram 2013a; 2013b). In January 2013 the Navy distributed Alcohol 
Detection Devices to every command for random sampling in the unit to educate 
personnel on the dangers of alcohol abuse and to “assist with identifying those who may 
need support before an incident places the member or unit readiness at risk” (Van 
Buskirk 2013a). For its part, the DOD criminalized the patronage of prostitutes in 2005, 
by adding it as a crime under the Uniform Code o f  Military Justice (UCMJ) (Batdorff 
2006). This followed an executive order by President Bush setting a zero tolerance policy 
for human trafficking. Training in this topic is part of the Navy’s GMT, previously 
described.
SWOs are the inheritors of the most traditional aspect of naval warfare, control of 
the sea, and it seems, a very traditional approach for conducting its operations. Lovette, in 
the 1939 version of Naval Customs, Traditions, and Usage, states that “[t]he Service 
must ever guard against becoming soft and permitting the material comforts of the age to 
weaken its fiber. Privations and a ‘hard school’ have produced our outstanding sailors” 
(5). Mack and Connell in the 1980 update to that work add “[t]he modem ‘hard school’ is 
a continuation of the old tradition of keeping the sea of daily drills, frequent target 
practices and maneuvers, without which our customary high standards of readiness could 
never have been realized” (7).
However, by retaining this “hard school,” the Navy would seem to be training for 
the last war rather than the next. The U.S. Navy has engaged in no pitched naval battles 
since World War II. The last significant surface to surface engagement it fought was 
Operation Praying Mantis in 1988. This engagement, over Iranian naval mines in the
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Arabian Gulf, pitted U.S. frigates, destroyers, and a cruiser against Iranian missile patrol
boats (Perkins 1989).
Since then, unlike their aviator colleagues, SWOs have had few opportunities to
strike an enemy during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps to partially satisfy a
need for a challenge in substitution for an opponent, SWOs subject themselves to
grueling work schedules as proof of toughness and the ability to handle the stress of war
at sea, should it come. In his study of hegemonic masculinity in the Navy, Barrett
discovered that the SWO community judged its members through the endurance of
hardship and the demonstration of competence under great pressure (1996, 136). This
outlook helps define the SWOs as a distinct subculture. The attitude which may best
reflect the Surface Warfare philosophy may be this statement by Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Robert B. Carney as quoted by Mack and Connell:
War is highly competitive; we are trying to train people to endure the 
hardships and strain of war, and we would be doing ourselves and our 
country a disservice to adopt measures which would soften the fibre of the 
men in uniform. (1980, 7)
Reily identified a dominant narrative that supports this perspective that she 
labeled “suck it up.” This narrative equates roughly to “life is hard, not fair, just get on 
with it and don’t complain.” It also contains an aspect of “subjugate personal needs to the 
needs of the organization” (2009, 126). This is consistent with the hard-bitten character 
of the SWO community.
Professor Homer of the Naval Academy’s Department of Leadership, Ethics, and 
the Law conducted an informal survey of his SWO graduates and found sleep 
deprivation, bullying, and stress were common themes in descriptions of SWO culture 
(Homer 2009). Once at sea, going for days without sleep is something of a point of pride
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among SWOs, as proof of toughness. Barrett found that SWOs regarded averaging four 
hours of sleep per night and often going without sleep for 48 hours as a valued sign of 
endurance and masculinity (1996, 136).
Higgins, aboard a U.S. warship during a NATO exercise at sea, observed that 
junior officers routinely got only three to four hours of sleep a night and that the XO 
considered it normal as “we train like we fight” (1999, 56). This was in sharp contrast to 
the crew of a Dutch frigate he visited, in which proper rest for all, even while engaged in 
the same exercise as the U.S. ships, was a firm requirement. To the Dutch Navy “sleep is 
a weapon” (Higgins 1999, 57). Proper rest is more conducive to clear thinking and 
effective operations than the rigid enforcement of daylight working hours in the 
American Navy, which, at that time, made no provision for rest by nighttime 
watchstanders. Some progress may be possible in this area in the foreseeable future as the 
Naval Post Graduate School expert on fatigue and human performance, Nita Miller 
Shattuck, had begun three new studies on adjusting watchstanding practices underway on 
ships at sea as of October 2013. This effort had the support of the “heads of the surface 
Navy, who called upon ship COs to embrace the concept of crew rest,” as the aviation 
community and the Coast Guard have for years (Fellman 2013, 13). Shattuck reported 
that these efforts had to contend with the skepticism of the community which “long 
viewed sleeplessness as a badge of honor” (Fellman 2013, 12).
The Practice of Leadership
The Navy’s attitude toward command of a ship is best captured by this quote by 
Admiral James Stavridis in Command at Sea: “The responsibility of the commanding 
officer for his or her command is absolute . . .  the authority of the commanding officer is
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commensurate with his or her responsibility” (Stavridis and Mack 1999, 2). This 
immense amount of authority and responsibility calls for highly skilled leadership, and 
this study deals with leaders who have failed to fulfill these leadership responsibilities.
A critical aspect of the situation being studied is the nature of the leadership 
approach and its effectiveness as exercised by the dismissed COs. Leadership is a 
tremendously popular topic in all professions, but one of particular importance within the 
military. One of the dominant concepts of leadership today is transformational leadership. 
Developed by Bernard Bass, this concept identifies effective leaders as emotionally, 
intellectually, and inspirationally engaging with the employees. These leaders provide 
vision and sense of mission, instill pride, set high performance expectations, promote 
rationality, and are considerate of their subordinates (Bass 1990; Bass and Steidlmeier 
1999; Harms and Crede 2010; Pawar and Eastman 1997).
Transformational leadership can be described as “behaviors that transform and 
inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the 
good of the organization” (Avolio, Walumbwa, and Weber 2009, 423). This style of 
leadership is in contrast to the transactional leaders whose practices are grounded in self­
interest and based primarily on employee performance contingent upon the receipt of 
rewards or the fear of punishment (Bass 1990; Bass and Steidlmeier 1999). It is clear 
from reviewing components of the Navy’s leadership curricula and seeing the inclusion 
of desirable traits such as motivation, honor, loyalty, compassion, and unselfishness, that 
the Navy is seeking to foster transformational leadership.
This is also indicated “on the deck plates” as good leaders are described by 
Sailors and chief petty officers as those who “take care of their people.” This specific
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leadership aspect was the second most dominant narrative in Reily’s work and the stories 
reflecting this narrative “emphasized the importance of teamwork and sharing in the 
glory of a job well done” (2009,119). The same theme was recurrent in a 1985 report by 
McBer and Company on behalf of the Navy. In its study of 21 units, divided between 
those objectively graded as “average” or “superior,” it found that COs who demonstrated 
care for their crew, in a variety of ways, were more successful (McBer and Company 
1985, 56, 63-66).
This is consistent with Bass’s individualized consideration facet of a 
transformational leader. That person provides for employees with personal attention and 
mentoring (Bass 1990). Furthermore, as it relates to the ethical failures leading to DFCs, 
Bass and Steidlmeier assert that “for transformational leadership to be ‘authentic’ it must 
be incorporated with a central core of moral values” (1999, 210). “Those who do not 
possess underlying values . . .  (that are) morally uplifting” are “pseudo-transformational” 
and are “the false messiahs and tyrants of history.” These pseudo-transformational 
leaders “seek power and position even at the expense of their followers’ achievements” 
(Bass and Steidlmeier 1999, 187).
The idea of a pseudo-transformational leader highlights the charismatic 
component of transformational leadership. Avolio, Bass, and Jung describe this aspect of 
transformational leadership as “providing] followers with a clear sense of purpose that is 
energizing, is a role model for ethical conduct and builds identification with the leaders 
and his or her articulated vision” (1999, 444). However, there is a notable, highly 
debated, and not yet well-understood, connection between charisma and narcissism 
(Humphreys et al. 2010; Maccoby 2004; Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). A
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pseudo-transformational leader is one who is charismatic but lacks underlying moral 
values which limit and guide a leader’s use of power and authority over subordinates. 
Depending on the strength of this aspect of a leader’s nature, such a person could be 
considered a narcissist.
Narcissism.
Charismatic leaders and narcissistic leaders both win the devotion of followers in 
part through charm and magnetism (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). However, those with 
strong narcissistic traits tend to be self-centered, have an inflated sense of their own 
abilities, are prone to grandiose thinking, have a need for recognition and superiority, and 
lack empathy for others, all characteristics which could interfere with succeeding in a 
leadership role (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland 2008; Humphreys et al. 2010; Maccoby 
2004; Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). However, narcissists are likely to achieve 
leadership positions because they are also extroverts and egotists who like and seek 
power (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland 2008; Grabmeier 2008; Rosenthal and Pittinsky 
2006). In a combination of three studies led by Dr. Amy Brunell of Ohio State, 993 
students were evaluated for the characteristics of narcissism, their desire to lead, and the 
likelihood of their selection as leaders by the group. There was a strong correlation 
between the students’ scores on all of these factors: in other words, the narcissists were 
the most likely to be selected as leaders (Grabmeier 2008). Unfortunately, the study also 
showed they were not better equipped with the skills needed to succeed in those roles.
In a similar vein, a study conducted by Harms, Roberts, and Wood found that 
within informal group settings, those who thought highly of themselves, and believed 
they had more power and control of their lives and surroundings than others generally
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achieved leadership roles (2007, 697). They also found that a higher degree of 
agreeableness was required to “offset the negative impressions peers often have of 
overtly ambitious individuals” (Harms, Roberts, and Wood 2007, 697).
Bass and Steidlmeir refer to leadership as a “many-headed hydra that alternately 
shows the faces of Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot as well as those of Nelson Mandela and 
Mother Teresa” (1999, 181). The negative aspect of narcissism could be the cause of 
those starkly contrasting visages. Narcissists have a plethora of characteristics that would 
complicate and impede their performance as leaders. Maccoby cites their discomfort with 
their own emotions and lack of empathy. This would interfere with developing trusting 
relationships that are critical to team work. They also have greater challenges to be 
successful leaders due to arrogance, inflexibility, amorality, and anger when dealing with 
subordinates (Grabmeier 2008; Harms, Roberts, and Wood 2007; Maccoby 2004; 
Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006; Sankowsky 1995).
Being sensitive to criticism and subject to feelings of inferiority, they cannot 
tolerate dissent and prefer to hear only the sorts of information they seek out (Maccoby 
2004; Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006). In fact, narcissists can become so invested in their 
vision and perspective that they are ‘"unwilling or unable to consider information to the 
contrary” (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006, 621). Inflexibility such as this was a recurring 
issue seen by Pois and Langer as they studied major historical failures of leaders at war, 
such as Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg (2004).
Investigating negative narcissistic traits, Hansen and Kahnweiler conducted a 
study into the “beliefs and perspectives that shape business executives as an occupational 
culture” (1997, 117). They found that in many cases the “villains” identified in the stories
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of the subjects frequently displayed the shortcomings of narcissists such as self- 
centeredness and a lack of empathy (Hansen and Kahnweiler 1997,128). In contrast. Dr. 
Peter Harms published the findings of a three year study of 900 cadets at West Point. In 
the study, Harms determined that a number of the Hogan Development Survey’s 12 “dark 
side” traits including narcissism, can be present yet have no negative effect on the cadets’ 
leadership development (Harms, Spain, and Hannah 2011). However, it was pointed out 
that the findings do not indicate anything about their performance under real-world 
leadership challenges after graduation.
Doctors Jean Twenge and Keith Campbell describe a growing epidemic of 
narcissism in America, based on their study of 85 samples covering 16,275 college 
students who had taken the Narcissistic Personality Inventory between 1979 and 2006 
(2009, 30). They found there was a 30% increase in students scoring above the average 
observed in the 1979-85 timeframe. This is a surprisingly large increase in just less than 
20 years. Twenge and Campbell report that “almost every trait related to narcissism rose 
between the 1950s and 1990s, including assertiveness, dominance, extraversion, self­
esteem, and individualistic focus” (2009, 33). They also cited surprising results 
concerning the rise of narcissism found in a 2008 study by the National Institute of 
Health on the occurrence of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) nationwide. The 
study revealed that compared to only 3.2% of Americans age 65 and older, 9.4% of those 
in their 20s had experienced this disorder. More surprisingly, 11.5% of young men had 
experienced it (Twenge and Campbell 2009, 36). The authors’ deepest concern was that, 
should the disorder continue to spread among the 20-29 age group at the rate observed,
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1.3% per year, by the time those people reached 65, 54% would have experienced NPD 
(2009, 36).
Toxic Leadership.
In studying DFCs, one of the common problems seen is an abuse of authority in 
the form of abusive treatment of subordinates, which is consistent with narcissistic 
behavior. In a recent article in Navy Times, Sam Fellman highlighted the issue of toxic 
leaders employing abusive or harsh leadership in the Navy. Fellman pointed out that the 
cases of four of the fifteen COs relieved by that point in 2012 involved a poor command 
climate, which typically arises from harsh leadership. He also pointed to examples of
|
egregious behavior on the parts of eight COs relieved for abusive, humiliating, and 
intimidating behavior. This type of behavior is a frequent cause of failure due to poor 
command climate or performance (Fellman 2012d; Light 2011; Maltby 2010). This 
behavior could be indicative of narcissism, which encompasses arrogance, anger, and 
amoral ity (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006).
The use of controlling behavior and harsh or toxic leadership has been found to be 
counter-productive. It has been seen as stifling innovation, creating resentment, 
destroying trust, and reducing collaborative behavior (Ferris et al. 2007; Reed and Olsen
I
2010; Rowe et al. 2012; Zellars, Tepper, and Duffy 2002). Bierly, in studying the high 
risk and high reliability organizations of the nuclear submarine community, found that 
the instillation of personal accountability and trust in the ability to communicate 
problems freely up and down the chain of command, regardless of rank, was vital to its 
outstanding safety record (1995). This relationship of trust and accountability fosters the 
effective teamwork so vital to operations at sea, whether on a submarine or a surface
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ship. Teamwork is also fostered through the contributions of organizational citizenship 
behavior (OCB).
OCBs are those discretionary personal actions which, taken in the aggregate, 
facilitate organizational effectiveness, such as voluntarily aiding co-workers at work, 
overlooking rather than complaining about trivial issues, and treating co-workers 
respectfully (Zellars, Tepper, and Duffy 2002). In researching the effects of abusive 
supervision on OCB, Zellars, Tepper, and Duffy found that employees subjected to abuse 
performed fewer OCBs than non-abused counterparts (2002, 1073). For that study, 
abusive supervision was defined as “using derogatory names, engaging in explosive 
outbursts (e.g., yelling at someone for disagreeing), intimidating by use o f  threats o fjob 
loss, withholding needed information, making aggressive eye contact, giving the silent 
treatment, and humiliating or ridiculing someone in front of others” (1068).
Similar behaviors were cited by Reed in an article addressing the presence of toxic 
leadership in the Army. In 2009, Reed and Olsen sought further information on the 
presence and the effects of toxic leadership among the officers attending the Army 
Command and General Staff College course by administering Blake Ashforth’s “Petty 
Tyranny in Organizations” survey. Although the sample was small with 167 respondents, 
61% had experienced toxic leadership. That study also found that officers reporting toxic 
treatment were significantly more inclined to depart the service and were more 
dissatisfied with every aspect o f  the service condition such as pay and benefits, 
professional relationships, and the effectiveness of the Army’s performance evaluation 
and command selection process (Reed and Olsen 2010, 61-62). It is also of interest that 
several of the most widely reported toxic behaviors, arrogance (49.7%), inflexibility
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(44.9%), self-interest/promotion (40.1%), and anger/emotional outburst (35.9%) closely 
parallel negative attributes of narcissism.
Judging by the evidence seen in the works of Fellman, Graham, Homer, McBer 
and Company, Stoker and Crawford, and Reily, harsh or toxic leadership in the Navy is 
not uncommon, but it is not Navy policy or a practice promoted in its training. In fact, 
harsh or abusive leadership and behavior control, or micromanagement, are counter to the 
leadership methods in the Navy curricula (Stein 2005). As seen in the preceding 
information, use of these methods could undermine team effectiveness and be a 
contributing factor in situations leading to DFCs.
Selection Process
As previously mentioned, all officers who attain command have been subjected to 
multiple reviews of their performance by boards of senior officers to determine their 
fitness for advancement or service in a particular capacity. The performance management 
process or fitness report system provides the documentation of performance upon which 
selection decisions are based.
Performance Management
The performance of all Naval Officers below Flag rank, Rear Admiral through 
Admiral, is evaluated annually, using the same system. The fitness report form, or 
FITREP as it is commonly called, provides the means to grade officers on seven 
performance traits on a five point scale, one being the lowest and five the highest. Per the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1610.10C, which governs the performance 
evaluation system, a grade of three represents performance that fully meets the Navy 
standard (Ferguson 2011). The graded performance traits are “Professional Expertise,”
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“Command or Organizational Climate/Equal Opportunity,” “Military Bearing/Character,” 
“Teamwork,” “Mission Accomplishment and Initiative,” “Leadership,” and “Tactical 
Performance.” There is also an area on the form for required remarks to elaborate on the 
ratee’s performance and to justify high grades.
The FITREP also includes a five step scale for evaluating the officer’s promotion 
potential. An officer is rated as “Significant Problems,” “Progressing,” “Promotable,” 
“Must Promote,” or “Early Promote.” Because promotion and selection for positions of 
greater responsibility are competitive, promotion recommendations are subject to a 
forced distribution which is determined by the number of officers of the same rank and 
community (technical specialty) within a command. No more than 20% of any group of 
officers can receive the “early promote” recommendation, and the percentage of the 
“must” and “early promote” combined decreases as the officers in the competing group 
become more senior. For example, for Lieutenant Commanders (04), no more than 40% 
of a group can receive either “must” or “early promote” recommendations. The most 
junior officers, Ensigns (Ol) and Lieutenants (junior grade) (02), can only receive 
recommendations of “promotable.”
The number of officers in the comparison group is a required entry on the form as 
is the number of officers receiving each different type of promotion recommendation. As 
a means of discouraging grade inflation, a serious concern within the Navy, every rating 
official’s “ratings awarded” average is tracked for every rank, and the average for the 
appropriate rank is entered on each officer’s entered FITREP. This indicates to the 
individual officer, and to promotion boards, whether the rating officer is an “easy 
grader,” giving additional information on the relative value of the ratee’s grade. The
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contents of these reports are summarized and used as the basis for promotion boards and 
selection boards which determine those who will advance to XO, CO, and Major 
Command positions.
Though considered key to aid promotion selections, the forced distribution of 
promotion recommendations is not without critics. Also called “stacking,” “forced 
ranking,” “stacked ranking,” “rank or yank,” and “the vitality curve,” the method has 
been used by such corporate exemplars as General Electric, Microsoft, Pepsico, and 
Conoco, and extolled by CEO Jack Welch. Nevertheless, forced distribution or forced 
ranking is no longer as highly regarded as it once was (Hazels and Sasse 2008; Johnson 
2004; Lipman 2012).
In 20-34% of corporate America, this method of evaluating performance against 
peers is used and is intended to motivate, reward (the top 20%), and identify employees 
for dismissal (the bottom 10%) (Grote 2005; Johnson 2004). Proponents of the practice 
consider it to be the best way to identify high performers for rewards, advancement, and 
professional development (Bates 2003; Grote 2005). According to Grote, it is “the 
antidote to the problem of inflated ratings and failure to differentiate” in many 
performance management systems (2005, 15). Sher, in support of the method, says the 
issue he sees is that employees “aren’t evaluated with sufficient rigor, and low performers 
are tolerated” (2012, 1).
In contrast, the critics of the method condemn it as a “poor way to manage poor 
performers,” (Johnson 2004) and say that it “promotes employee dissatisfaction and 
discontent” (Smith 2003). Brent Longnecker, an HR expert, noted that systems can 
inspire competition that results in “intense internal conflict [that] can destroy any
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semblance of employee teamwork and cooperation” (HRFocus 2002a). Bates found it to 
be “arbitrary, unfair, illegal, a morale killer, and the death of teamwork” (2003). 
Furthermore, 200 HR professionals from large firms were surveyed concerning this 
methodology and reported that it lowered productivity, increased skepticism, damaged 
morale, decreased employee engagement, and increased mistrust of management (Pfeffer 
and Sutton 2006).
The Navy’s use of this type system is consistent with the other services, as the 
military must be carefully managed in order to have the right number of officers at the 
right grade as required by the mission. As mentioned at the outset, unlike corporations, 
the Navy is far more constrained in managing its leadership positions. It cannot simply 
fire and rehire command qualified officers off the street, but must develop them through 
the long process described in the earlier section on training. However, using forced 
distribution during this process, particularly if it is not administered without bias or 
favoritism, could contribute to the aspect of intense competitiveness seen in the SWO 
community.
Even discounting forced distribution, there are a number of flaws in this system. 
The first is that, like all performance evaluation systems, it is reliant on rater objectivity. 
The Navy is concerned about inflated ratings because the officers making the policy have 
observed their peers at some point attempting to “game the system” in order to give their 
officers more favorable FITREPs to make them more likely to be promoted. As one way 
to introduce more objectivity, a previous Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) directed a 
study be done on prevailing corporate evaluation systems and a comparison with other 
services rating systems (Higgs 2010).
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The objective was to establish sufficient justification to implement the use of 
goals with measurable outcomes for each officer. The individual officer’s success in 
achieving these goals would form the basis for his or her FITREP. However, prior to the 
study’s completion the project was dropped, reportedly due to a lack of support for the 
concept from the highest levels of Navy leadership. Johnson, in her assessment of forced 
ranking systems and their use, emphasized that the use of written objectives or goals was 
key to being able to use a forced ranking system effectively (2004).
Another aspect viewed as a possible shortcoming is the usage of the “Teamwork” 
performance trait. Anecdotally, this trait has not been very highly valued, or accurately 
graded, despite the need for proficient teamwork in numerous hazardous activities as 
previously described. In a discussion on amending the FITREP form with a retired 
admiral and former CNP, the usefulness and validity of grading this trait was questioned. 
It was noted that the prevailing attitude was that teamwork was only viewed as important 
if the officer being graded was leading the team. The admiral responded “You’re right. 
The Navy rewards leadership but punishes management” (Higgs 2010, 37).
Another flaw that has been noted is the combination of “Military Bearing” with 
“Character” into a single performance trait (Higgs 2010; Light 2011). Military bearing is 
essentially wearing the uniform properly, maintaining the required level of physical 
fitness, and observing military etiquette. This is in contrast to “Character” which is 
described as upholding the Navy’s core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. 
Within the core value of Honor is the requirement to “[cjonduct ourselves in the highest 
ethical manner in all relationships with peers, superiors, and subordinates. Be honest and 
truthful in our dealings with each other and with those outside the Navy” (Higgs 2010,
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37). Despite its seeming importance, the grade for that key aspect of an officer’s 
performance is combined with one for appearance and demeanor.
During the 2000 to 2012 time frame, 43% o f  the SWO DFCs were based on 
behavior that failed to meet the standards defined for the character performance trait. It 
seems improbable that COs who failed so demonstrably in this area could have reached 
that position with no previous similar transgressions. Did those transgressions truly not 
occur or could they have been disregarded or downplayed in evaluating officer’s 
otherwise superior performance? It seems clear that, in view o f  the number of DFCs 
related to personal behavior that are occurring, the “Character” trait should figure 
prominently in performance appraisals and its grading taken very seriously (Higgs 2010; 
Light 2011).
One of the Navy’s foremost surface admirals, Admiral Arleigh Burke, conducted
a study on discipline in the Navy that was then condensed and sent to the senior leaders
of the Navy as a guide on leadership and discipline. One of his passages addressed the
evaluation of performance very directly and succinctly:
Commanders must distinguish between good and bad men and take action 
accordingly. This means that men who fail must be punished promptly at 
mast and that each man's record must reflect his conduct and ability. It 
means that commanding officers must tackle the onerous problem of the 
relative fitness of officers, so that officer's fitness reports reflect faithfully 
the worth of the officer. There must be a clear differentiation between the 
excellent and the poor, or again the conscientious man is penalized and the 
poor man is favored. (Burke 1972, 27)
Selection Boards
Selections boards are formal, structured proceedings used to choose officers for 
promotion and a variety of critical positions. For promotions, boards are convened and 
operated under the Secretary o f  the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1420. IB
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Promotion, Special Selection, Selective Early Retirement, and Selective Early Removal 
Boards for Commissioned Officers o f the Navy and Marine Corps. This process is also 
governed by law, in particular the Defense Officer Personnel Manning Act (DOPMA) of 
1980. This act established a common officer community framework for all services to 
guide officer training, appointment, promotion, separation, and retirement. It also 
provides for Congress to set the total authorized officer “end-strength” (number permitted 
to serve), and to set the allowable number of officers in each pay-grade above 03 
(Lieutenant). Officers above 03 are referred to as “field grade.”
For example, the Navy is authorized 750 new field grade officers in the ranks of 
04-010 (Rostker et al. 1993, 8). These are legal limits, which cannot be exceeded, but 
need not be met if the numbers of officers are not required to meet the Navy’s needs. This 
number serves as an entering argument for the promotion planners of the Assistant Chief 
of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education. These planners 
create a five year promotion plan, estimating end strength requirements, and promotion 
opportunity as a percentage by pay grade and community. That plan is refined in the year 
of execution taking into account vacancies created through promotions, retirements, and 
separations to develop a promotion zone. This zone is the size of the population to be 
considered in order to fill the projected requirement. As seen in Illustration 4, the 
promotion opportunity is a percentage of the officers being considered, and the flow point 
is the average number o f years of service when an officer is promoted to that grade. The 
abbreviation “AFQ” means “All Fully Qualified.”
82
Illustration 4. DOD Officer Promotion Parameters
Promotion
Opportunity
Flow
Point
50 +- 10% y T A P T  ( 0 - 6 ) \ 21-23 yrs
70 +- 10% /  CDR (0-5) \ 15-17 yrs
80 +-10% /  LCDR (0-4) \ 9-11 yrs
AFQ / LT (0-3) \  4 yrs
AFQ / LTJCi (0-2) \  2 yrs
/  ENS(O-I)  \
Source: Booker, Officer Promotions Brief July 2010, slide 8.
The selection board process begins with the creation of the board precept by the 
Commander of the Navy Personnel Command. The precept lays out the authority, 
function, goals, and standards of performance for conducting the board and any special 
aspects of performance the members should look for and including things that should not 
be considered. For example, some years ago, it was considered detrimental to have too 
many consecutive tours in one geographic location. The active process of selection 
begins with verifying the eligibility of the officers in zone, and then proceeds into an 
extensive manual validation of the officers’ individual service and performance records.
Once the records are validated, a summary of the performance records is 
generated by the supporting information technology (IT) systems. This work is performed 
by “recorders,” officers nominated for this temporary additional duty by their commands. 
The Secretary of the Navy’s (SECNAV) instruction details how many officers from each
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community are required for the promotion selection boards to ensure a diversity of 
experience and perspectives. The selection board process is highly confidential and the 
results carefully safeguarded until all required approvals are obtained. All participants in 
the board and the administrative personnel are sworn in with an oath affirming their 
commitment to the confidentiality, impartiality, and integrity of the process. These board 
members are assigned a certain number of records to review and brief to the entire board.
While the briefer displays and highlights pertinent career accomplishments and 
performance grades of a candidate for promotion, the summary performance record is 
displayed for the entire board to view and comment upon and question the briefer. Once 
the briefing is completed, the members cast an electronic vote on the record, and the IT 
system tallies the vote as a numerical score. This process continues until all eligible 
records have been reviewed, and the appropriate number of officers has been selected 
based on the board-determined scores. A report of the proceeding and the list of names of 
those selected are then generated and forwarded for endorsement to the Secretary of the 
Navy for approval and relayed to the Congress for final approval. Once all approvals 
have been received, the results of the board are announced.
Administrative boards are conducted by the individual warfare communities for 
the purpose of selecting officers for a number of different critical positions including 
Commanding Officer. In accordance with Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) 
Instruction 1401.5 A, Supplemental Guidance for U.S. Navy Selection Boards, these 
boards are conducted using the same process as promotion boards, and though they are 
guided by Navy policy and regulation, they are not required by law. Such boards are 
conducted for selection for graduate education, redesignation (movement from one
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community to another), and astronaut and test pilot assignments among others. For this 
study, the concern is the boards which move a SWO into the position of CO. These 
boards are convened by the senior sponsor of the community, within the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations. The board members are all senior serving members of that 
community, led by a Vice Admiral (09) serving as the board president. SWOs have 
typically been subject to board screening for assignments to Department Head, Executive 
Officer, Commander Command, and Major Command (Quinn 2011).
Taking into consideration all of the information above, a typical Commander CO 
with 17 years of service, has had his or her performance evaluated and compared to peers 
in at least 17 fitness reports, been reviewed by two selection boards for promotion, and 
been reviewed by three administrative boards to achieve that position. This is an 
extensive degree of scrutiny.
Research Questions
At this point it is important to refine the scope of this study to identify an aspect 
of this situation that is contributory, definable, and manageable for the conduct of further 
research. In reviewing the information captured thus far, it appears that the training 
program that produces Surface Warfare COs is comprehensive, covering the technical 
and administrative aspects as well as pertinent areas in leadership and ethical topics, and 
is sustained through carefully targeted and focused reinforcement. Accordingly, it will 
not be pursued further. Similarly, the most troubling aspect of the physical environment, 
sleep deprivation, has been studied extensively elsewhere and the findings indicate 
adjustments in the Navy’s acceptance of sleep deprivation would be prudent. As there are 
currently multiple studies underway on this issue, that aspect will not be the subject of
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additional research here. In regards to the selection process, if  one presumes that the 
information on an individual officer’s performance is adequate and accurate, the 
combination of all the boards described constitutes an extensive and thorough process for 
identifying highly skilled officers capable of succeeding in the role of CO. Remaining 
then for further, deeper examination is the culture of the SWO community, the unwritten 
values and practices that shape the behavior and the performance of its members. 
Assumptions and Research Questions
If one relies on the findings of Barnett and Schubert (2002), Peterson (2002), and 
Vardi (2001), Weber, Kurke, and Pentico (2003) on the negative implications of an 
instrumental EWC and on the influence of unethical acts by others as shown by Mumford 
and Darley, then the prevalence o f  the instrumental EWC could indicate a culture more 
intent on achieving its goals than adhering to espoused ethical values. Therefore, the first 
research question is “is the instrumental EWC prevalent in the SWO community?”
If one relies on the works o f Fellman, Graham, Higgs, Homer, Light, McBer and 
Company, and Reily which present evidence of abusive leadership by Navy leaders, then 
one can conclude that toxic leadership is present in the Navy. If, in association with this 
assumption, one considers the work o f  Ashforth, Reed and Olsen, and Zellars, Tepper, 
and Duffy, one will conclude that toxic leadership, whether called harsh or abusive, is 
detrimental to organizational efficiency. As discussed, it creates stress, demoralizes the 
crew, stymies communication, and motivates the crew to withhold OCBs, degrading team 
cohesion. This leads to the second research question, “is toxic leadership significantly 
present in the SWO community?”
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The third question considers the possible consequences of the combined presence 
of both the instrumental EWC and toxic leadership and asks, “are instrumental EWCs and 
toxic leadership occurring simultaneously in the same units?” The fourth and final 
question for further research goes to the heart of the matter, asking “Does the 
performance of individual units suffer from the occurrence of the instrumental EWC and 
toxic leadership?”
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY
As previously described, the requirements for this study do not confine it to the 
format of a traditional dissertation. It is an applied project, researching a problem being 
experienced by the Navy for the purpose of identifying causative and contributory issues 
and developing recommendations for potential solutions. It is based on action research 
methodology which is used to answer such questions as: “What are the nature and scope 
of the problem? What is it about the problem or its effects that justifies new, expanded, or 
modified . . .  programs?” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004, 3)
The process of creating COs is a multi-faceted process, critical to the Navy’s 
success, with a multitude of stakeholders including the American taxpayers. It is 
managed by a number of organizations which only control certain phases or aspects of 
the process. The organizational culture that surrounds that process has significant 
influence on the individuals undergoing the process and therefore on the outcome. In this 
case, it is proposed that the unacceptable rate of DFCs among COs is an outcome of 
defects in the culture and the process that creates them, specifically the presence of 
ethical work climates that do not value and support ethical behavior and the use of toxic 
leadership which degrades team cohesion and communication.
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Research Method
While this project was begun with the cooperation of the Commander of the Navy 
Personnel Command and the Director of the Career Progression Department, the Navy as 
a larger organization was not approached at the next organizational level, which would be 
the Chief of Naval Operations, for an official endorsement. Nor was endorsement 
requested from the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, who acts as the senior sponsor for 
the Surface Warfare community. There were several concerns which dictated this course 
of action. The first concern was that the Navy limits the number of surveys of its 
personnel that can be conducted, and this project would have to compete for approval and 
a place within those limits. This would place this project in competition with studies 
commissioned by the Navy for its own purposes, as well as those from internal academic 
institutions such as the Naval Post Graduate School.
The second concern was for the participants’ willingness to share potentially 
negative opinions of the organization to which they belong. It was thought that 
participants would be more open to a project that did not require their command 
leadership involvement and was conducted without Navy supervision. The final concern 
was that seeking formal Navy approval and endorsement would open the project to 
additional organizational oversight and scrutiny, to address any organizational sensitivity 
to negative publicity. Such sensitivity might have led to a requirement to submit data and 
findings for official review and approval for release, lengthening the time required to 
conduct this project and potentially affecting the interpretation of the findings. For these
Research Environment
89
reasons, it was decided to pursue participation in the study of the community by informal 
means.
While this approach maintained the ability to interact with the community freely, 
the absence of official endorsement and command cooperation, including encouraging or 
compelling participation, also meant that participation was totally voluntary. The 
informal approach also meant that direct communication through formal channels was 
not available. These factors meant that the sample of the population received could not be 
assured to be completely representative of its membership.
Research Design
In the terminology of Herr and Anderson, this project was conducted in pursuit of 
practical interests for a practitioner positioned as an insider with the collaboration of 
other insiders (2005). The approach and research instrument design for the study was 
shaped in part by personal experience and observations gathered over a 22 year career in 
the community of interest. However, care was taken to ensure objectivity was maintained 
through consultation with the guiding committee members and local colleagues in the 
academic and research fields.
The project was executed in a multi-phase process utilizing a mixed method 
approach, although it was primarily a qualitative effort. Patten asserts that a qualitative 
approach is preferred when “participants belong to a culture that is closed or 
secretive . . and when “potential participants are not available for extensive interaction 
or observation” and both situations could be considered to exist in this case (2009, 21). 
The work includes a qualitative analysis of Navy instructions, academic writings, and 
applied literature relevant to the situation and the culture of the SWO community within
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the Navy. It is also comprised of quantitative analysis of data, gathered through the use of 
a survey, on the ethical work climate (EWC) and on the perceived presence and use of 
toxic leadership methods within the Surface Warfare community.
As previously stated, the survey was conducted without official Navy backing, 
which limited access to potential participants, which in turn means contact with each 
SWO cannot be assured. The absence of the assurance that each SWO has an equal 
probability of participating, means that the quantitative portion of this study could not be 
conducted using a probability sampling design (O’Sullivan and Rassel 1989). Instead, it 
relied on purposive sampling with participants being solicited generally, as members of 
the community rather than as individuals, but in venues where SWOs are heavily 
concentrated. Social media was selected as the most accessible, widely available, and 
potentially productive venue for participant solicitation.
Navy personnel have been observed to be widely engaged in social media and 
have affinity groups or communities on Linked In and blogs devoted to a multitude of 
military topics, technical specialties, and subgroups within the various branches of 
service. Within the Navy Personnel Command, the Surface Warfare detailers actively use 
social media to inform their constituents and interact with them. This is evidenced by the 
Surface Warfare Career Planning Seminar brief, hosted on the Navy Personnel 
Command’s web page. This PowerPoint presentation from the Surface Warfare Officer 
detailers cites Twitter, Facebook, and Sailor Bob, a blog devoted to the SWO community, 
as means they use for informal communications. Detailers are the officers assigned to the 
Navy Personnel Command who execute the distribution of officers to the Fleet. They are 
in direct and regular contact with the officers they distribute and act as career advisors to
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their constituents. Their use of social media as a routine means of communication 
validates its use as an appropriate means to access the SWO community.
Most Navy commands have command websites and Facebook pages. Command 
websites for warships are largely standardized and present an explanation of the heraldic 
unit crest, the vessel’s history, the biography of the ship’s namesake, and the biographies 
of the CO, XO, and Command Master Chief (CMC), the senior enlisted person and 
advisor to the CO. They usually present basic instructions for Sailors first reporting 
aboard, and perhaps, a photo gallery featuring the ship and crew in action. In most cases 
there are links to initiate an email to the Public Affairs Officer (PAO), CMC, or XO. 
Ships’ Facebook pages are less standardized and are used to share unclassified news 
about the ships’ activities and positive information about the personnel assigned onboard 
with their family members and any other interested parties. These pages also provide 
visitors with the opportunity to post messages to a ship’s crew or to contact a page’s 
administrator, often the PAO.
Research Phases
The initial phase was multi-faceted, including refreshing and updating the data on 
CO DFCs that have occurred between 2010 and 2012 and the search for patterns or trends 
within the dismissals for further examination. This stage also included the review of 
current instructions on the processes of training and selecting Commanding Officers and 
an assessment of the effectiveness of those processes.
The second phase was data collection which entailed surveying the target group of 
currently serving SWO junior officers seeking to determine the existence and strength of 
attitudes and behaviors, specifically the prevalence of instrumental EWCs and toxic
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leadership, suspected to contribute to the cause of CO failures which lead to DFCs. The 
primary target was junior officers because they are still undergoing their development 
toward becoming COs, yet are less invested in the status quo of the community than more 
senior officers and, possibly, more willing to discuss its shortcomings without 
defensiveness. However, the collection instrument did accommodate the input of more 
senior, retired, and former officers. This served two purposes: one, to identify those not 
currently serving to allow their removal from certain measures; and two, to set them apart 
as a distinct group which could be examined for significant contrasts from the target 
group, if the number of respondents of these sorts warranted it.
The third and final analytical phase of the project entailed conducting descriptive
|
and inferential statistical analysis o f the data gathered through the survey to judge the 
presence and the strength of attitudes and behaviors which contribute to the failure of 
COs. The results of that survey and its analysis appear in Chapter 4.
Research Questions and Hypotheses.
I Research Question 1: “What is the prevalent EWC in the SWO community?” Weber and 
Gerde (2011) found support for their hypothesis that military groups who are “closer to 
the tip of the spear,” or whose operating environments entail more significant risk or 
magnitude of consequences than other military groups, are more likely to have an 
instrumental or caring EWC. Based on this work, those EWC types would be expected to 
be significant in the SWO community. Furthermore, based on preceding descriptions of 
the highly competitive and harsh SWO culture, it is theorized that the instrumental EWC 
would be the predominant type.
I
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Hypothesis 1: Instrumental EWCs will be more prevalent than other EWCs within the 
SWO community.
Null Hypothesis 1: The instrumental EWC will be equal to or less present than the other 
EWCs.
Research Question 2: Is toxic leadership significantly present in the SWO community? 
Hypothesis 2: Toxic leadership will prove to be significant in the SWO community.
Null Hypothesis 2: Toxic leadership presence will not be significant.
Research Question 3: Are instrumental EWCs and toxic leadership occurring 
simultaneously in the same units?
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive correlation between the presence of the 
instrumental EWC and toxic leadership.
Null Hypothesis 3: There will be no relationship between the instrumental EWC and the 
presence of toxic leadership.
Research Question 4: Does performance of individual units reflect the occurrence of the 
presence of the instrumental EWC and toxic leadership?
Hypothesis 4: There will be a negative correlation between the presence of an 
instrumental EWC and toxic leadership and the objectively measured performance of 
individual ships.
Null Hypothesis 4: There will no relationship between the presence of the instrumental 
EWC and toxic leadership and the performance of individual ships.
Instrumentation
For the purposes of this study, three sets of questions were employed to capture 
participant input on EWC, the presence of toxic leadership, and the success of the ships
94
they served upon. For EWC and toxic leadership information, two previously proven 
survey instruments were used in combination. The first was the Ethical Climate 
Questionnaire (ECQ) developed by Bart Victor and John Cullen in order to measure the 
ethical work climate (EWC) (1987). In development, the questionnaire initially contained 
36 questions testing nine theoretical ethical climate types and was submitted to 35 
university professors. Following analysis, the questionnaire was revised and administered 
to 151 business, faculty, and military personnel. Following this second round of extensive 
analysis, the final instrument was reduced to 26 questions measuring the existence of five 
ethical work climates (Victor and Cullen 1987).
For this study, the instrument was modified slightly for use in the Navy 
environment. This was done by removing references to a “company” and substituting the 
word “organization” or “Navy” as appropriate. In addition, one question that measures 
the efficiency aspect of the EWC refers to the importance of “saving costs” which does 
not have the same consideration in military operations as it does in business. Therefore, 
this question was modified to read “ensure safe operations” as the nearest analog in the 
Navy sea-going environment. The actual survey questions are contained in Appendix D. 
To test the instrument for scale reliability, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated using the
j
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) through the assistance of the Navy’s 
Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Office. The calculation showed acceptable 
to good reliability with alpha’s ranging from .69 to .87. The complete results are shown 
in Appendix E.
The second instrument used was Schmidt’s Toxic Leadership scale, developed by 
Andrew A. Schmidt at the University of Maryland to measure “the dimensions of toxic
95
leadership” (Schmidt 2008, 5). This instrument was developed using 23 Navy and Marine 
Corps personnel, primarily officer candidates, in focus groups to capture the themes and 
descriptive statements of toxic leadership. The initial effort produced six factors to be 
defined with 189 items that included Tepper’s measures of Abusive Leadership (2000) 
and the Authoritarian Leadership scale of Cheng et al. These were refined through the use 
of a Q-sort process into five factors defined by 108 items that comprise toxic leadership. 
The five factors were validated by a survey administered to 215 students that contained 
measures of positive and transformational leadership. These measures were taken from 
Avolio and Bass’ Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire and the Leaders-Member 
Exchange Scale of Dansereau, Graen, and Haga. The final scale is now comprised of 30 
items that measure the five factors of self-promotion, abusive supervision, 
unpredictability, narcissism, and authoritarian leadership (Schmidt 2008). As with the 
ECQ, the scale reliability of this instrument was tested using SPSS to calculate 
Cronbach’s alpha. The results showed very high reliability with alpha’s ranging from .95 
to .98. The complete results are shown in Appendix E. The toxic leadership measures are 
included in Appendix F.
A third survey section measured the successfulness of the units in which the 
respondents serve or served, in order to test Hypothesis 4. Following the pattern of 
McBer and Company (1985, 77), respondents were asked about the success of their ship 
in completing a number of inspections and qualifications that make up the Annual Battle 
Effectiveness/Command Excellence Award program. This program is conducted as part 
of the overall Surface Force training process, governed by Commander Naval Surface 
Force Atlantic/Pacific instruction COMNAVSURFLANT/PACINST 3502.2E. This
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program judges ships based on their achievement of required certifications and 
qualifications over a broad range of warfare, engineering, command and control, and 
logistical activities. The introductory question simply asked which of the listed 
inspections and certifications required in COMNAVSURFLANT/PACINST 3502.2E 
were accomplished during the time corresponding to the respondent’s answers in the 
EWC and toxic leadership sections. The required inspections and certifications in this 
section are shown in Appendix G.
To establish the context for the survey questions, junior officers in the grades of 
01 through 03 were asked to report on their current experiences, while the officers in the 
grades of 04, or lieutenant commander, and above were asked to refer back to their 
shipboard division officer tours where their leadership methods and ethical outlooks were 
shaped.
The survey was conducted using Survey Monkey and answers in the EWC and 
toxic leadership sections were submitted using a six level Likert scale. In the unit success 
section, answers were given on a three level Likert scale with “1” meaning yes, the unit 
had completed the named certification or qualification. Responses of “2” meant the unit 
had not completed the qualification, and “3” meant that the item was not applicable. In 
the EWC section respondents indicated the degree to which they found the statements to 
be true, with a score of “O” indicating the statement was completely false, and a “5” 
indicating the statement was completely true.
In the toxic leadership section, respondents indicated their level of agreement or 
disagreement with a statement of experiencing or witnessing toxic leadership behaviors. 
An answer of “0” indicated total disagreement while a “5” indicated total agreement with
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the statement. In neither section was a neutral option given, requiring respondents to 
express a position, either positive or negative. The survey also captured multiple 
demographic data elements. This was to enable determining if the EWC and toxic 
leadership components were perceived to be more prevalent in some subsets, for 
example, such as aboard cruiser/destroyer type ships or among NROTC graduates. 
Depending upon the number of responses allowing differentiation between institutions, 
such information could facilitate more accurate analysis of solution options and the 
targeting of relevant solution proposals. The demographic data elements are described in 
Appendix H. The survey was reviewed and approved for use by the Valdosta State 
University Institutional Review Board (IRB). That approval appears in Appendix I.
Data Collection
A Facebook page was created specifically for the purpose of presenting this 
project and serving as the access point for data collection (see Appendix A). An overview 
of the project described its purpose in general terms to avoid injecting any bias by leading 
respondents to answer in a particular way, and access to the survey instrument was 
allowed from 1 May 2013 until 1 September 2013. Survey participation was solicited first 
by two requests posted in two different topic areas on the Sailor Bob blog, the same one 
used by the Surface Warfare detailers. Next, requests for participation were made by 
posts to 104 individual ships’ official Facebook pages (see Appendix B). The ships, all 
surface warships, were identified for contact from the U.S. Navy’s official website, 
www.navy.mil, where ship “fact files” describe the technical characteristics of each class 
of warship and listed the ships in commission as of November 2012. This provided the 
source of ships’ names whose pages were then located in Facebook.
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There were 33 cases in which ships either had no Facebook page, the page did not 
permit a solicitation to be posted, or the page did not appear to be kept current. In these 
cases the ship’s official website was accessed by a link from www.navy.mil and used to 
email a participation request. Requests were made to either the PAO or XO, depending 
on who was listed as a point of contact, to relay the participation request to the officers 
onboard (see Appendix C). A participation request was also posted to the Surface Warrior 
Facebook page maintained by the Commander Naval Surface Forces. A discussion thread 
was also created in the Surface Warfare discussion group of Linkedln, a professional 
social networking and discussion site.
Additional solicitations were made by an email request to the XO of the Surface 
Warfare Officer School which was shared with students and staff, by an email request to 
the Deputy Assistant Commanders of the Reserve Administration and Career Progression 
departments, and the Head of the Surface Warfare Officer Detailing Division of the 
Distribution department, all within the Navy Personnel Command. Finally, the PAOs of 
all Aircraft Carriers were emailed requests in the same fashion as the ships without 
Facebook pages, as a means of more effectively reaching the SWOs on ships where they 
are only one of many warfare and staff communities.
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
DFCs: Numbers and Causes 
The following is an overview of the numbers and causes for DFCs of COs in three 
community groupings for the time period January 2000 through December 2012. This 
data provides the context for the survey phase of the project, providing the extent of the 
DFC situation and the nature of the situations which result in DFCs. The categorization 
of DFC causes and their component criteria are as follows:
1. Significant event: a serious mishap such as a grounding, collision, aircraft mishap 
(loss or serious damage of an aircraft), or the accidental death of a crewmember.
2. Command performance: substandard performance in mission accomplishment, 
operational assignments, or command readiness. Also failure to improve upon 
such performance once noted.
3. Command climate: command displays satisfactory performance but markedly 
poor morale due to an abusive or unhealthy climate which is attributable to the 
CO’s performance and leadership.
4. Personal behavior: commission of illegal or immoral acts which are detrimental to 
the good order and discipline of the Navy.
5. SWO: Surface Warfare Officer, a designation for those specializing in surface 
ship operations or the community.
6. SUB: abbreviation for the community of submarine qualified officers.
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7. AIR: abbreviation for the community of aviators.
8. RLSC: abbreviation for Restricted Line/Staff Corps/Special Communities made 
up of a number of specialty communities such as Special Warfare, Civil Engineer 
Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Human Resources, and Limited Duty 
Officers. This categorization is not standard within the Navy and is used only in 
this paper.
Table 2. Summary of DFCs 2000-2012
COM Category 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 TOTAL
SWO SE 2 3 2 2 1 2 I 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 17
CP 0 0 1 2 | 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 2 11
CC 1 1 0 1 ! 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 3 14
PB 0 0 1 4 4 2 2 2 1 0 9 3 4 32
SUB SE 0 2 1 3 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 12
CP I 0 1 0 ! 0 0 I 1 1 I 3 1 2 12
CC 0 0 0 0 : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PB 0 0 0 i 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 8
AIR SE 0 1 0 2 ! 1 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 1 6
CP 0 3 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 10
CC 0 I 0 1 : 0 I 0 0 0 0 0
1
0 0 3
PB ] 0 1 5 ! 3 3 0 1 5 2 1 3 1 26
RLSC SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
CP 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 I 3 3 1 13
CC 1 0 1 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 0 11
PB 0 1 3 0 2 1 1 3 4 I I 1 1 19
TOTAL 6 12 12 26 15 12 11 11 12 14 29 18 17 195
SE = Significant Event CP = Command Performance COM = Community 
CC = Command Climate PB = Personal Behavior
Source: Navy Personnel Command Career Progression Department.
As illustrated in Table 2, there were 195 DFCs among COs during the period 
2000-2012. Calculations were done to determine the magnitude of this number relative to 
the numbers of commands within the Navy. There are approximately 1291 active and
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reserve command billets for officers below the rank of admiral (Navy Inspector General 
2004). At this point in the project, it was decided to focus further attention only on 
commands of the warfare communities. These communities are the focus for achieving 
the Navy’s deterrent and war-fighting missions. These functions are executed by units at 
the greatest risk of members’ death and damage due to the failure of COs. However, 
these commands are not all warships or aviation squadrons, but include all the various 
units, both tactical and administrative, afloat and ashore which are designated for COs 
from these specific communities.
Focusing on the main warfare communities provided a count of 245 surface 
commands, 133 submarine commands, and 262 aviation commands (Navy Inspector 
General 2004). All of these units do not change commanding officers simultaneously, of 
course, and lengths of tour can vary slightly, so one must also account for the flow 
through the command positions to determine how many commanding officers served 
during the evaluation period. This is estimated by multiplying the number of commands 
by 1.43 to account for the 43% of commands changing commanding officers in any given 
year. The resulting figure is multiplied by the number of years in the period of interest, in 
this case 13, for the period 2000-2012 to arrive at the total number of COs serving during 
the period. This sum is divided by the total number of DFCs in the community to 
determine the overall loss rate due to DFCs for the war-fighting communities. The results 
are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. DFC Rates by Major Warfare Community 2000-2012
Community
Number of 
Commands Number of COs
Number 
of DFCs DFC Rate
SWO 245 4,554 74 1.6%
SUB 133 2,472 32 1.3%
AIR 262 4,870 45 .9%
The overall DFC rates within communities have shown little change since this
was first examined in 2010. The original rates for the SWO, SUB, and AIR communities 
at that time were 1.6%, 1.3%, and 1.0%, respectively. The variation between the
communities has remained, although the difference between SWO and AIR has increased
slightly. The variance between the SWO and AIR communities in 2010 was a factor that
inspired this current project. This variance also begs the question of why one community
suffers fewer losses to DFCs than another. The variation is also a possible motivator for
. . . examining differing community methods of training and operating, and differences in
community cultures. Such an examination could reveal “best practices” in use which
might be adopted by the other communities to reduce events leading to DFCs. Figure 1
provides a picture of the relative number of DFCs by cause, as a point of further
discussion on this topic.
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□  SWO OSUB BAIR
Figure 1. DFCs by Cause and Community 2000-2012
Two things are clear in the information contained in Figure 1. The first is the 
marked predominance of personal behavior as the primary cause of DFCs. In the 
definition provided earlier, personal behavior is spelled out as “illegal or immoral acts 
that are detrimental to good order and discipline.” This general description covers a broad 
range of activities including fraternization, adultery, alcohol-related incidents, sexual 
harassment, misuse of government equipment, and theft. It is most telling that the Navy 
Inspector General report of 2004 and the subsequent study by Maltby both noted that 
their review of these cases led them to believe that the COs removed for personal 
behavior were well aware of the rules about the detrimental behavior but acted 
inappropriately regardless (Navy Inspector General 2004). It is also significant to note
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that the perception of being above the rules, such as those governing appropriate 
behavior, is an aspect of narcissism (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006).
The data show that the AIR community has a dramatically lower number of 
significant events compared to the SWO and SUB communities. This is accurate but it 
can be misleading. In almost every case, the significant events undergone in the SWO 
and SUB communities are either groundings or collisions. These accidents usually 
involve COs directly and have a very different nature than aircraft mishaps which can 
more commonly be attributed to pilot error or mechanical failures which can attributed to 
the actions of a squadron CO.
Groundings and collisions most frequently occur in coastal waters in conjunction 
with entering or leaving port. Navigating and operating vessels in these areas requires 
highly skilled and thoroughly practiced teamwork to avoid dense traffic and navigational 
hazards. These skills and conditions, particularly strong teamwork, are usually found 
lacking when a grounding or collision occurs. It is also important to note that although 
the DFC instances shown in this work have been neatly characterized and placed in 
boxes, the reality is not always so clear cut.
The simultaneous existence of several conditions which could warrant a DFC is 
not uncommon, and they are often interrelated. For example, a grounding incident may be 
the climactic event leading to a DFC, but the event may have occurred because the CO 
created a hostile environment for the officers and crew by being abusive, which 
weakened the communications and teamwork within the crew.
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Figure 2. DFCs by Community and Cause 2000-2012
The presentation in Figure 2 illuminates the information shown in Tables 2 and 3 
and Figure 1, making it obvious that the SWO community leads the others in DFCs 
during the period. The mathematical preponderance of dismissals cannot be attributed to 
a disproportionate number of command opportunities alone, as the number of designated 
SWO and AIR commands is very similar, as shown in Table 2. Not only does the SWO 
community lead in DFCs overall, it leads in three of the four categories: significant 
events, command climate, and personal behavior. As Figure 1 shows, personal behavior 
is the most common cause for a DFC, and the SWO community leads in that category 
and in the command climate and significant event categories as well.
106
Figure 3. SWO DFC Occurrences by Cause 2000-2012
Figure 3 shows the causes of DFCs by percentage, based upon the numbers of 
occurrences shown in Figure 2. The high percentage of DFCs due to personal behavior, 
43%, and command climate, 19%, as shown in Figure 3, relate directly to the issues of 
toxic leadership and ethical work climate (EWC) being researched through the survey. 
Having reviewed the fundamental data on the numbers and causes of DFCs within the 
warfare communities and established the SWO predominance relative to the other 
communities, from this point forward the analysis and discussion will focus on the results 
of the EWC and toxic leadership survey, in search of conditions in the SWO community 
which could be contributing to the number and type of DFCs observed.
107
Survey Data
Prior to conducting analysis, the data received from the respondents had to be 
refined to remove partial responses and those from individuals outside of the target 
population. During the survey’s period of availability from 1 May 2013 to 1 September 
2013, 166 individuals accessed the survey. Of these, 34 abandoned the survey without 
providing more than demographic information. An additional 20 participants only 
partially completed the key portions of the survey on either the EWC or toxic leadership. 
Those incomplete responses were also excluded in the analysis as they did not convey an 
adequate picture of the respondent’s experience. Finally, nine responses were submitted 
by either former or retired officers, outside the key target group of actively serving 
officers. As the number of these responses was not large enough to serve as a significant 
comparison group, these were also excluded from the analysis. This refining process left 
103 responses suitable for the purpose of testing the previously described hypotheses. 
Respondent Demographics
Figures 4 through 8 depict the key demographic data elements of the respondents.
Data Refinement
Figure 4. Respondent Gender 
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The survey respondents were predominantly male, nearly mirroring the community 
which is 81% male and 19% female per the Navy’s Officer Personnel Information 
System (OPINS) as of 31 March 2013.
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Figure 5. Respondent Ethnicity 
Respondents were predominantly Caucasian, somewhat exceeding the community
|
composition which is 72% white, 10% African American, 5% Hispanic, 1% Native 
American, 4% Asian, 1 % Pacific Islander, and 7% multiple races or declined to provide 
the information, per OPINS as of 31 March 2013.
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Figure 6. Respondent Paygrade Distribution
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Figure 6 depicts the distribution of respondents by paygrade. The respondents 
were heavily clustered in the 03 and 04 paygrades, or the ranks of Lieutenant and 
Lieutenant Commander, who are in the midst of the Commanding Officer development 
process. Their experience through multiple shipboard tours and multiple COs by this 
stage in their careers serves as a basis for well-informed responses on the quality of 
leadership they have experienced. The percentage of respondents in each pay grade does 
not match the distribution of officers in the community exactly. In the SWO community 
the officers in the paygrades 01-03 make up 71% of the community, while the same 
group makes up 62% of the respondents. Lieutenants or 03 s responded in numbers more 
closely approximating their numbers in the community: 35% of respondents compared to 
30% of the SWO community.
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Figure 7. Respondent Commissioning Source 
Figure 7 shows that the various institutions that commission officers were each
well represented by the number of respondents. The 14 officers from “other” sources
would be leaders who progressed up to their current positions from the enlisted ranks.
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Figure 8. Ship Types in which Respondents Are Serving or 
Served upon As Junior Officers
Figure 8 provides the distribution of respondents across the different ship types. 
The cruiser/destroyer type ships are the most numerous ship-types in the Navy, so it is 
appropriate that most respondents report this ship type. The “other” category is a 
collection of less numerous units with smaller crews such as the Mine Countermeasures 
ship (MCM), the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and replenishment ships such as oilers, 
which resupply combatant ships with food, fuel, and ammunition at sea.
Ethical Work Climate Data
As previously described, the EWC portion respondents used a 6 point Likert scale 
in which points were assigned to responses in this fashion: 0 equated to “completely 
false,” 1 “mostly false,” 2 “somewhat false,” 3 “somewhat true,” 4 “mostly true,” and 5 
“completely true.” In order to score these responses, the individual’s responses were 
sorted into the cluster of statements which defined each EWC type. Then, following the 
grading procedure used by Weber and Gerde (2011) and Weber (1995), all the points for 
each of the EWC ethical statements generated by respondents were summed to arrive at 
the ethical statement total points.
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The ethical statement total points for each EWC type were then summed to arrive 
at the EWC total points. In order to control for the varying number of statements 
associated with the different EWC types, the total for each type was divided by the 
number of statements that define that type. For example, the EWC total points for 
instrumental was divided by seven, the number of statements defining the instrumental 
type, and the caring EWC total points figure was divided by seven, as that number of 
statements defined the caring EWC. This step determined the EWC weighted score.
Once all weighted scores were calculated, the points of these scores were summed 
to determine the total EWC type weighted points, and each EWC weighted score was 
divided by that total. That division produced the percentage of the EWC total for each 
EWC type. This figure shows the relative level of support for each EWC type within the 
SWO community, as reported by the respondents.
Table 4. SWO Community EWC Percentages
SWO EWC %
EWC Type N =  103
Instrumental 18.3
Caring 17.7
Independence 16.6
Rules &
Procedures 24.0
Law & Code 23.4
Table 4 presents the outcomes of the EWC calculations and the information 
required to test Hypothesis 1. The hypothesis asserted that instrumental EWCs would be 
the predominant EWC relative to the other EWCs. The table shows that the instrumental 
EWC is clearly not predominant, its components having received only 18.3% support by 
the respondents. Instead, it is the third most supported EWC after rules and procedures
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supported by 24% of respondents, and law and code EWC representing 23.4%. Although 
the level of the instrumental EWC is noteworthy, the data do not support Hypothesis 1.
The preceding data was processed to inform us about the perceptions of EWCs by 
SWOs as a group, combining all individual inputs and averaging them to capture the 
EWC view of a community. However, in order to analyze the possible relationship 
between the EWC and toxic leadership, one must consider the individual SWO’s 
perception of the EWC and any corresponding presence of toxic leadership. Accordingly, 
each individual SWO’s EWC score must be determined. This was done by first grouping 
the ethical statements by the EWC type they define, and summing the numerical 
responses for each type. This figure was then divided by the number of questions that 
describe the EWC type, as was done for the entire community. This produced an average 
or weighted score for each of the five EWC types for each individual. This was done to 
account for the variation in the number of questions that define the types, as was done for 
the community assessment. Once these weighted numerical scores were calculated, the 
outcomes for each EWC type were compared and each respondent’s EWC was 
determined by the highest score. The results of the individual EWC score analysis are 
shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. Summary of EWC Types Reported by Individual SWOs
EWC Type
Individual
EWC
Count
Percent
Of
EWCs
*SWO 
Community 
Percent of 
EWCs
Instrumental 20 19.4 18.3
Caring 4 3.9 17.7
Independence 4 3.9 16.6
Rules & Procedures 36 35 24
Law & Code 21 20.4 23.4
Caring/Rules & Procedures 2 1.9
Rule/Law & Code 13 12.6
Independence/Rule 1 1
Independence/Law & Code 2 1.9
Total 103 100
*Note: Community percentage shown for reference and contrast.
Observing the individual respondents’ EWC scores in Table 5 reveals an 
anomalous situation. The table reflects four additional types of EWC in addition to those 
that were previously described. These additional types are hybrids of the five EWC’s 
validated by Victor and Cullen (1988). In the case of these hybrids, the responses of the 
individuals were calculated to be exactly equal over two different EWC types, and 
therefore, could not be assigned to a single type. This situation was not seen in the 
preceding analysis as it considered the collective responses of all respondents. The survey 
asked for an opinion of the degree of truthfulness of a series of statements which define 
the different EWCs, but the statements were not all mutually exclusive. Therefore, 
individuals could provide responses showing equal belief in several different EWCs.
Scoring the community’s responses entailed summing and averaging responses by 
EWC type rather than by individuals, and in doing so averaged all the values of the 
individual responses to each statement to make up the community view. By scoring and
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averaging by groups, the relative support for the different ethical statements increased the 
differentiation between EWC types and prevented the “tie” situation seen in Table 5. 
Shown here to accurately account for responses, the hybrid responses will be excluded 
from further statistical analysis of the relationship between EWC and toxic leadership, 
due to the small number of occurrences in several cases and due to their ambiguous 
nature which prevents their fitting into a clearly defined type.
Toxic Leadership Data
The first simple assessment of the level of toxic leadership was conducted by 
counting the number of scores above a grade of 3 on the Likert scale in each of the 
descriptive factors for toxic leadership then dividing that count by 103, the total number 
of respondents. This gives the percentage of the respondents who “somewhat agree,” 
“mostly agree,” or “completely agree” with statements about toxic leadership behavior 
they have observed. This process provides the rather striking data in Table 6. This view 
of the data shows a widespread occurrence of toxic behavior across the community. The 
percentages show a significant presence of all the toxic leadership factors, but 
particularly the occurrence of narcissism, unpredictability, and abusive supervision.
Table 6. Percentage of Respondents Scoring Toxic Leadership Factors > 3
Percentage
Of
Respondent 
Scores 
Above 3
Abusive
Supervision
Authoritarian
Leadership Narcissism
Self­
Promotion Unpredictability
50% 45% 59% 49% 57%
Next, the toxic leadership portion was scored in two ways, similarly to the EWC 
scores. To score the SWO community’s level of experience with the behavior statements 
describing toxic leadership, responses were first grouped into the five factors composing
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toxic leadership, and the numerical responses for each factor from all respondents were 
then summed. Those sums were divided by the number of statements that described the 
factor to achieve an average or weighted score for each factor. There were seven 
statements for abusive supervision and unpredictability, six for authoritarian leadership, 
and five for narcissism and self-promotion. For the community, these weighted scores for 
each factor were then divided by 103, the number of respondents, to determine the final 
toxic leadership factor’s score. The weighted scores for each factor were then added and 
divided by five, the number of factors, to determine the final toxic leadership score for 
the SWO community. These results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. SWO Community Final Toxic Leadership Factor Scores
Toxic
Leadership
Factor
Abusive
Supervision
Authoritarian
Leadership Narcissism
Self­
Promotion Unpredictability
Average
Score
Score 2.94 2.73 3.03 2.66 3.04 2.88
Using the description associated with our six level Likert scale, an average SWO 
community score of 2.88 is a slightly toxic score. A score o f 2.88 is 57.6% of a score of 5 
which equates to “completely agree” and is therefore a positive indicator across the 
community. Also noteworthy are the scores for the factors of narcissism and 
unpredictability, both scoring above 3 or 60% which indicates a more definitive 
endorsement of the presence of these factors, as well as abusive supervision scoring 2.94 
or 58.8% agreement. Examining the information in Tables 6 and 7 shows an interesting 
situation. The factor of narcissism has the highest percentage of respondents who 
observed the factor at 59%, and the second highest score that reflects the degree of 
agreement with the descriptive factor, of 3.03. Meanwhile, unpredictability has the 
highest agreement score of 3.04 and the second highest percentage of observations at
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57%. It would seem that, while more individuals observed narcissistic behavior, those 
that encountered unpredictability had a more intense experience.
Hypothesis 2 theorized that toxic leadership would prove to be significant in the 
SWO community. As Table 6 displayed, more than 50% of respondents reported 
significant occurrences of three aspects of toxic leadership: narcissism, unpredictability, 
and abusive supervision. As Table 7 showed, for the community, there was an overall 
average affirmative score of 2.88 or 57.6% of the maximum score for the presence of 
toxic leadership factors. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 is considered supported.
In order to identify any relationship between the EWC and toxic leadership, 
additional analysis was needed to look deeper at the individual experience, and 
respondents had to be scored as individuals not just as participants in the community. For 
individual SWOs, responses were first grouped into the five factors composing toxic 
leadership (abusive supervision, authoritarian leadership, narcissism, self-promotion, and 
unpredictability), and the numerical responses for each factor were summed. Those sums 
were then divided by the number of statements that described the factor to achieve an 
average or weighted score for each factor, as they were for the community. Each 
individual’s weighted scores for each factor were then added and divided by five, the 
number of factors, to determine the final toxic leadership score.
For individual SWOs, the final toxic leadership scores ranged from 0.069 to 5.00 
on the 0 to 5.0 scale. All respondents with final toxic leadership scores above a 2.9 were 
classified as toxic. Of the 103 respondents, 54 or 52.43% were judged toxic. More 
specifically, this group reported sufficient experience with the negative behaviors queried 
to be considered having been subjected to toxic leadership. Scores for those designated
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toxic ranged from 2.94 to 5.0. The average toxicity score among the toxic group was 4.04 
compared to the average of 2.88 for the community, a 23% higher level of agreement. 
Table 8 shows that among individual SWOs, as in the larger community, the
Table 8. Designated Toxic Individual SWO Average Toxic Leader Factor Scores
Toxic
Leadership
Factor
Abusive
Supervision
Authoritarian
Leadership
Narcissism Self­
Promotion
Unpredictability Average
Score 4.08 3.84 4.10 3.93 4.28 4.04
factors that show the greatest agreement and, by extension, the widest occurrences are 
unpredictability, narcissism, and abusive supervision.
Hypothesis 3 theorized there would be a positive correlation between the presence 
of the instrumental EWC and toxic leadership. The distribution of toxic leadership among 
the EWC types, including the hybrids is shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Toxic Leadership Occurrences by EWC Type
EWC Type EWC Count # Toxic Leaders in EWC
% Toxic Leaders 
in EWC
Instrumental 20 15 75
Caring 4 1 25
Independence 4 3 75
Rules & Procedures 36 15 41.67
Law & Code 21 10 47.62
Caring/Rules & Procedures 2 1 50
Rules/Law & Code 13 7 53.85
Independence/Rules 1 1 100
Independence/Law & Code 2 1 50
Total 103 54 52.43
To determine if there is an association between the EWC type and toxic 
leadership, a contingency table was used to calculate the values of chi-square and 
Cramer’s V for these variables. In order to obtain a valid response, the observed values of 
the hybrid EWCs and those of the caring and independence EWC were eliminated as the
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small number of occurrences were detrimental to the validity of the calculation. The 
testable subset used for the calculations is shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Toxic Leadership Occurrences by EWC Type: Testable Subset
EWC Type Instrumental Rules & Procedures Law & Code
Toxic 15 15 10
Non-Toxic 5 21 11
EWC Count 20 36 21
The results were a chi-square of 5.94,;? = 0.05, for d f -  2. This is sufficiently near 
the critical value of chi-square of 5.99 for p  < 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis, and the 
Cramer’s V of 0.2777 indicates a moderately strong relationship between EWC and toxic 
leadership. Furthermore, calculating Pearson’s r a s a  measure of correlation using the 
average score of the EWC occurrences as the independent variable, and toxic leadership 
average scores as the dependent variable provided an r of 0.45091. This value indicates a 
strong positive relationship between the two factors. Therefore, all calculations support 
Hypothesis 3.
The difference in the strength of the positive indications among those three 
measures could be related to the observation of only five non-toxic leaders in the 
instrumental EWC. Due to the logical basis of the chi-square calculation, five is the 
lowest value considered valid for the calculation. This is a rule of thumb, not a 
mathematical requirement (Lowry 2013). Also, the chi-square calculation is sensitive to 
sample size, rising or falling with the numbers of the observations. These considerations 
could be the source of the differing values for the strength of the relationship.
With the support of the staff at the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and 
Technology office, an additional calculation was done testing for correlation between
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toxic leadership factors and the different EWC types. Pearson’s r was calculated, utilizing 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) application and the entire data set 
of observations, rather than the average scores employed for the preceding calculations. 
Table 11 displays the results of this calculation, which shows a strong positive correlation
Table 11. EWC Type & Toxic Leadership Factor Correlation (Pearson’s r)
EWC Type
Abusive
Supervision
Authoritarian
Leadership Narcissism
Self­
Promotion Unpredictability
Instrumental r .449” .464” .476” .516” .439”
Caring r -.525” -.593” -.466” -.503" -.523
Independence r -.248* -.241* -.159 -.174 -.182
Rules
&Procedures r -.253** -.239* -.291” -.288” -.247*
Law &Code r -.258*’ -.289” -.271” -.304” -.280”
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01 
* Correlation is significant at p < 0.05
(N= 103)
between the instrumental EWC and all toxic leadership factors, providing further support 
for Hypothesis 3. It is interesting to note that the caring EWC has a contrasting strong 
negative correlation with toxic leadership, owing to its benevolent ethical criteria. It is 
also noteworthy that the rules and procedures and law and code EWCs have similar weak 
to moderately weak negative correlations to toxic leadership factors. This is logical as the 
toxic behaviors tend to have an egoistic focus while these EWC’s have external reference 
groups as their ethical locus of analysis.
Unit Success Data
Hypothesis 4 states that there will be a negative correlation between the presence 
of an instrumental EWC and toxic leadership and the objectively measured performance 
of individual ships. To test this hypothesis the level of success by the units the 
respondents were serving upon during their observations had to be determined.
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Respondents provided “yes,” “no,” and “not applicable” answers on the completion of 20 
qualifications and certifications that comprise the surface force Battle Efficiency 
completion, equating to numerical scores of “1,” “2,” and “3” respectively. These scores 
were summed and averaged as a measure of unit success. Scores of 1.47 or less were 
considered “successful” and equated to an 88% success rate in completing the applicable 
qualifications and certifications. That allowed for units to have failed not more than three 
of the requirements and qualify as “successful.”
The responses were also reviewed to ensure answers were appropriate to the ship 
type of the respondent. For example, no gas turbine powered destroyer could complete a 
nuclear engineering certification, nor would an amphibious ship complete a naval gunfire 
qualification. During this review it was decided to remove the inputs by Ensigns, officers 
of the 01 paygrade, from use in testing this hypothesis. This was due to the high number 
of “NA” grades in their inputs. It is possible that their short time in the Navy, less than 
two years, had not allowed them to see an entire completed competitive cycle for the 
award. The elimination of these responses and those with hybrid EWCs, as previously 
explained, reduced the number of useable responses from 103 to 75.
To test the hypothesis the first calculation was the success rates of all responses 
grouped by EWC. The responses were grouped into toxic and non-toxic sets, and 
the “NA” graded subset was identified to be subtracted as ineligible for this test.
The percentage of eligible successful toxic and non-toxic units was then calculated and 
the results compared. Table 12 shows the results o f this process for the toxic set.
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Table 12. Percentage o f Successful Toxic Units by EWC
EWC
#
EWCs
# Toxic 
Leaders NAs Successful
Not
successful
Percentage
Successful
Instrumental 19 14 1 9 4 69
Caring 3 1 1 0 0 NA
Independence 2 2 0 2 0 100
Rules & 
Procedures 32 13 5 5 3 63
Law & Code 19 10 4 6 0 100
Totals 75 40 11 22 7 76
Table 13 shows the results of this process for the non-toxic subset. In comparing 
results in these two tables, it is apparent that the units with an instrumental EWC and 
toxic leadership were actually 19% more successful than the units with an instrumental 
EWC without toxic leadership. As this observation offers evidence in direct contradiction 
to Hypothesis 4, the hypothesis is not supported.
Table 13. Percentage o f Successful Non-Toxic Units by EWC
EWC # EWCs
# Non 
Toxic 
Leaders NAs Successful
Not
Successful
Percentage
Successful
Instrumental 19 5 3 1 1 50
Caring 3 2 1 1 0 100
Independence 2 0 0 0 0 NA
Rules & 
Procedures 32 19 4 13 2 87
Law & Code 19 9 4 3 2 60
Totals 75 35 12 18 5 78
It is also interesting to note the difference in the overall success rates between 
toxic and non-toxic units which were 76% and 78%, respectively. This minor 2% spread 
between the toxic and non-toxic units is a surprise that led to an additional calculation to 
determine if there is a correlation between toxic leadership and unit success. Pearson’s r 
was calculated using individual respondent’s average toxic leadership score and the
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associated unit success scores, once the respondents who reported “NA” were removed. 
The calculation was done using the toxic leadership score as the independent variable and 
the unit success score as the dependent variable which resulted in r = +0.08. This 
indicates no relationship or a negligible positive relationship between the variables, 
which was not the expected outcome.
Summary of Findings
Testing of the hypotheses provided the following results:
Hypothesis 1: Instrumental EWCs will be the predominant EWC within the SWO 
community. Not supported; the rule and procedure EWC was predominant while the 
instrumental EWC was the third most widely observed.
Hypothesis 2: Toxic leadership will prove to be significant in the SWO community. 
Supported; there was 57.6% positive response on the presence of toxic leadership factors 
in the SWO community.
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive correlation between the presence of the 
instrumental EWC and toxic leadership. Supported; statistical tests using chi-square, 
Cramer’s V, and Pearson’s r indicated a moderately strong positive relationship between 
the two factors.
Hypothesis 4: There will be a negative correlation between the presence of the 
instrumental EWC and toxic leadership, and unit success. Not supported; observations 
indicated that 69% of units experiencing both an instrumental EWC and toxic leadership 
were successful, compared to 50% for units experiencing an instrumental EWC and non­
toxic leadership. Further analysis using Pearson’s r produced r = + 0.08 indicating no or 
negligible correlation between toxic leadership and unit success.
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Limitations of the study.
While the results of the survey are indicative of conditions in the community, it 
must be reiterated that the non-probability design of this study and the size of the sample 
from the SWO population does not permit the conclusions to be generalized across the 
community. There was also potential for the study to be biased by the social desirability 
of ethical behavior, but this was addressed by asking for observations on the behaviors of 
others rather than asking respondents to self-report and by maintaining the anonymity of 
the respondents.
Chapter 5 provides recommendations for addressing the conditions highlighted in 
findings and the information presented in previous chapters as well as areas for further 
study.
Excursions.
The following items depict areas of interest not related to the hypotheses that 
could offer interesting issues for subsequent study. The SWO EWC data brought to mind 
Weber and Gerde’s work that contributed to the foundation for this analysis, and raises 
the question, “how widely do the SWO EWC results differ from those Weber and Gerde 
gathered from units with combat missions?” Table 14 contains a comparative view of the 
SWO EWC percentages and those of the combat mission units from Weber and Gerde’s 
2011 work. Here there is a difference between the SWO community and the U.S. Air 
Force combat mission units. Following Weber and Gerde’s method, the Z score, or 
statistic, and a one-tailed test for significance were calculated to compare the two sets of 
observations. For both the instrumental EWC (Z = 1.849,/? = .0322) and independence 
EWC (Z = 1.885, p  = .0297), the differences between the two groups are statistically
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significant. While the data did not support Hypothesis 1, that the instrumental EWC 
would be dominant in the SWO community, the higher occurrence of the instrumental 
EWC in the SWO community compared to the Air Force combat mission personnel could 
be indicative of an elevated occurrence along the lines of the hypothesis, but not at the 
magnitude expected. This poses an interesting situation for further comparative study 
between different communities in the Navy and between other services.
Table 14. EWC Comparison SWO to U.S. Air Force (USAF) Combat Mission
EWC Type
SWO 
EWC % 
N= 103
USAF 
Combat 
Mission 
EWC % 
N = 158
Z Statistic One Tail Significance
Instrumental 18.3 15.63 1.849 0.0322
Caring 17.7 19.19 1.142 0.1267
Independence 16.6 13.43 1.885 0.0297
Rules & Procedures 24.0 26.02 1.371 0.0852
Law & Code 23.4 25.73 1.300 0.0968
Source: USAF EWC data from Weber and Gerde 2011, page 604, Table V.
Table 15. Toxic Leadership Reported by Respondent Paygrade
Paygrade 01 02 03 04 05 06 Total
Responses 14 14 36 25 8 6 103
# Toxic 
Leaders 
Reported 4 10 23 10 3 4 54
% Toxic
Leaders
Reported 28.57 71.43 63.89 40.00 37.50 66.67 52.43
Table 15 presents a summary of the toxic leadership responses grouped by
respondent paygrade. It is interesting to note that the junior officers in pay grades 03 and
below report toxic leadership at a far higher rate than their more senior colleagues.
Calculation of chi-square and Cramer’s V to test the significance of the relationship
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between the paygrade and the report of toxic leadership produces a chi-square of 9.12, 
with d f  = 4 and p -  .0582. While this is close to the critical value of chi-square of 9.49 
for ap  < .05, it is not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between the two. However, the Cramer’s V calculation adjusts for small sample sizes, 
and its score of this observation is 0.3098 which indicates a moderately strong 
relationship between paygrade and the experience of toxic leadership. This could indicate 
a difference in the perceptions of toxic leadership between junior and more senior 
officers, or that toxic leadership is more prevalent now than when the more senior 
officers were serving as Division Officers. This could be an area for additional study.
Table 16. Respondents Reporting Toxic Leadership Grouped by 
Commissioning Source
Source OCS USNA NROTC Other
Graduates 20 28 41 14
Report Toxic 11 13 22 8
Report Non­
Toxic 9 15 19 6
Toxic Percentage 55 46 54 57
Table 16 presents another view of the respondents, grouped by their 
commissioning source. As with the disparity in paygrade perceptions, the difference 
between the reporting rates among these subgroups might appear to be an interesting 
aspect to explore, to determine if there are different attitudes toward the behaviors that 
comprise toxic leadership based upon experiences or training received at the 
commissioning source. However, calculating chi-square and Cramer’s V score finds a 
chi-square of 0.61, p  = 0.8941, for df=  3. This strongly indicates the absence of a 
meaningful association and is confirmed by the Cramer’s V score of 0.077, a very weak 
relationship between the variables.
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The final excursion is an examination of responses by the different genders. Table 
17 shows a comparison of pertinent factors grouped by gender.
Table 17. Comparison of Factors Grouped by Gender
Gender Gender Count Toxic Leader Count
Percentage of 
Toxic Leaders
Average Toxic 
Leadership Score
Male 84 44 52.38 2.90
Female 19 10 52.63 2.81
The table shows that there is little appreciable difference between the genders. To test for 
a correlation between gender and toxic leadership scores, Pearson’s r was calculated. The 
test was conducted using gender as the independent variable and toxic leadership score as 
the dependent variable, producing r = -0.02469. This is a very weak negative correlation 
indicating nearly complete independence of the two variables.
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Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
Assessing the System 
In many occupations a dismissal rate o f 1.6% of its leadership might not be a 
matter of concern. In fact, it might be remarkably low. However, in the Navy’s field of 
Surface Warfare, it represents the occurrence of an unacceptable number of failures. 
These failures of COs incur expensive damage to vessels and the Navy’s image among 
key constituencies, not to mention inflicting physical and emotional injury to its most 
expensive resource, its people. This research sought information on organizational and 
cultural influences contributing to this dismissal rate and found that the process of 
creating a SWO CO is comprehensive, addressing all aspects of skills, abilities, and 
values needed for success.
The mechanics of the systems the Navy uses to create Commanding Officers are sound. 
In reviewing the results of the qualitative assessment of the organizational procedures in 
place for training and selecting COs, it is clear that the Navy employs proven, objective 
policies and practices. The training and qualification regimen for SWOs is rigorous, 
thorough, and demanding. From the initial stages as a midshipman or officer candidate 
through the Command Leadership Course and the associated CO technical refresher 
training, the current combination of classroom and practical on the job training provides 
not just the technical foundation, but covers all facets of leadership, accountability, and 
ethical behavior as well.
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Of greatest interest here is that key ethics and leadership aspects are repeated at 
multiple points in an officer’s development. The additional refreshers on the prohibitions 
against inappropriate behaviors such as alcohol abuse and sexual misconduct provided in 
the GMT program serve to reinforce adherence to basic moral and ethical values 
promoted by the Navy. Additional GMT training on topics such as stress management, 
anger management, and physical readiness provides additional tools for coping with the 
pressures of the shipboard environment.
The process of selecting COs, built upon the basis of the performance evaluation 
and qualification systems, is also an extensive, purposefully objective, and, by reputation, 
a zero-error-allowed process. A process of extreme thoroughness and exacting standards, 
it entails multiple reviews of an officer’s complete record of service and performance, for 
decades in some cases, to achieve the rank to be eligible to command. A demanding, 
comprehensive set of qualification criteria and a final selection board that reviews the 
totality of these preceding steps is conducted by experienced senior SWO leaders who 
have been previously qualified and selected by the process themselves. A key 
consideration is whether the selection board members have the correct and complete 
information as a basis for their selection decisions.
Despite all of the training provided on the moral and ethical expectations placed 
on COs, and the care taken in selecting them, a number of officers succeed in attaining 
the position who prove to be ill-suited for the associated responsibilities. As seen in 
Chapter 4 Figure 3, 43% of SWO DFCs are due to personal behavior failures, often due 
to inappropriate sexual conduct. In the face of all the training provided on how to be a 
leader, another 19% are relieved due to command climate issues involving poor
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leadership. The officers who commit the acts leading to DFCs do not suddenly develop 
those behaviors overnight; they are developed and tolerated, if not fostered, within the 
SWO culture throughout their careers.
The State of the Culture 
While the mechanics of the processes for creating COs are well-planned, 
scrutinized closely by experts and senior leadership, and effective, there are aspects of the 
culture which sustain the creation of some flawed and failure prone COs. The patterns of 
beliefs, symbols, rituals, myths, and practices that compose organizational cultures 
develop over time, through shared experiences, and are begun based on the vision, 
beliefs, and values of the founders (Robbins 1990, 444; Schein 2010, 219). The Navy was 
begun and its patterns set in a simpler, far less technological, and more socially stratified 
era. In some respects, it has been slow to evolve. As Robbins warns, “[m]any large and 
historically successful organizations have learned the hard way that cultures can become 
obsolete and create serious impediments for responding to a changing environment” 
(1997, 263).
The “hard school” from the days of sail, which incorporated abusive supervision, 
including corporal punishment, is as outdated on modem warships as sails themselves. 
Yet, experiences by the SWO community following World War II seem to have 
strengthened its attachment to the “hard school,” to its detriment. The loss of prestige, 
due to the rising importance of the aviation and submarine communities diminished the 
community’s image. The use of special pays and bonuses for the competing communities 
left the SWOs feeling undervalued. The manning policy of sending “fallen angels” and 
“nuclear waste,” aviation and submarine training attrites respectively, to the surface force
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left the community feeling like “second class citizens” and a “dumping ground” 
(Robinson 2008, 47, 41). Although the community’s striving for its own unique 
• identifying items like the SWO pin and SWO sweater may seem trivial or petty, it is 
indicative of a culture seeking to define itself, to regain lost respect, and to overcome a 
post-World War II reputation for being “almost like a lower class . . composed of 
. .  runts that weren’t good enough for the others” (Graham 2006, 65).
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Evidence suggests that its changing fortunes after World War II left the SWO 
community harboring a low level of anger and bitterness about its status in the Navy, 
which it has turned inward on itself. This attitude now drives a rather harsh pursuit of 
toughness as a definitive character of the community, which carries with it a de facto 
tolerance of a degree of toxic leadership within its ranks. Those toxic leaders who 
succeed as COs propagate their toxic patterns by serving as role models for developing 
officers. They also aid in promoting toxic leaders through a natural tendency to look 
favorably on those like themselves for performance evaluation purposes. In contrast, the 
CO development and selection processes, as they currently operate, are not provided by
the performance evaluation system with the information needed to completely winnow
i , , ,
out toxic, ethically deficient prospective COs.
There are additional aspects of the culture which also contribute to an 
environment that fosters poor leadership performance. As in any military organization, 
the structure is hierarchical and the culture bears many artifacts, such as uniforms and 
insignia, which emphasize this structure and contribute to defining roles within it. In the 
case of the Navy, its traditions also have elitist overtones, rooted in its origins and 
propagated by the ceremonies, attitudes, and etiquette. This culture appeals to individuals
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with narcissistic traits. The trappings of the lifestyle, including the automatic respect due 
to seniors, the ranks, the pomp and ceremony, and the existence of wardrooms and 
staterooms, feed narcissists’ desire for the grandiose and the feelings of entitlement. 
These aspects also contribute to a strain of elitism, long noted in the Navy that fosters a 
condescending, dismissive attitude toward subordinates.
Strict behavior control, commonly called micromanagement, and authoritarian 
leadership may have a role in the military training environment, primarily for the creation 
of stress to test the adaptability and endurance of trainees, but it has little place in the day 
to day operations of ships at sea. Those who adopt that approach in the Fleet are not 
preforming in accordance with the Navy’s leadership philosophy and training. Instead, 
they are undermining all the Navy’s efforts to create an effective, principled leadership 
cohort. In modem America, officers cannot treat subordinates, either junior officers or 
enlisted personnel, as inferior simply because of their subordinate roles. In today’s Navy, 
the technological requirements for superior intelligence and training give these roles a 
vital aspect that belies their lower position in a military hierarchy.
Yet, this research has shown the significant presence of toxic leadership, which 
includes authoritarian leadership and abusive supervision, and an elevated occurrence of 
the instrumental EWC which contribute a variety of negative behaviors and attitudes that 
are counterproductive to developing rising officers into successful, ethical leaders. The 
survey portion of this project provided data that furthers the understanding of the climate 
and culture surrounding the leadership development in the SWO community. Survey 
results, as shown in Table 6, indicated that 59% of respondents encountered narcissistic 
behavior among their leaders, 57% encountered unpredictability, and 50% observed
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abusive supervision. The results show a wide spread occurrence of toxic leadership, with 
52% of the respondents having been exposed to demonstrably toxic leaders as junior 
officers. While not generalizable across the entire community, the results are meaningful. 
These observations likely indicate that there are far more toxic leaders in the community 
than the few who are actually relieved and receive a DFC.
This apparent disparity between the occurrence of toxic leadership and the rate of 
dismissal may be due to the comparable level of success achieved by these toxic leaders, 
as seen in the unit success scores. The data in Table 12 shows the units experiencing 
toxic leadership are only slightly less successful with a 76% success rate compared to 
78% for the non-toxic units as seen in Table 13. What the survey cannot show is the cost 
to the Navy for that achievement, particularly in the area of attrition among Junior 
Officers. It was insufficient SWO Junior Officer attrition rates that led to the creation of 
the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay and Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills 
Retention Bonus programs.
Abetting a cultural tolerance for toxic leadership is the performance evaluation 
system which enables documenting success but does not provide adequate tools for 
addressing how accomplishments were achieved. If an officer is effective in 
accomplishing the duties assigned to him or her, but does so employing either toxic
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leadership or unethical methods, is that properly reflected in performance evaluations, or 
might the ends justify the means to the CO? If the CO determines that the toxic or 
unethical behavior is noteworthy, though the outcomes of the officer’s efforts are 
satisfactory, does the current fitness report system provide the tools needed for a 
complete and accurate assessment? The combination of military bearing and character
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into a single grading factor diminishes the importance of character and ethical behavior 
and essentially precludes accuracy in this case, and the culture found in this research 
seems to embrace rather than discourage the behavior. Both of these factors contribute to 
propagating an environment that emphasizes success and will accept some toxic behavior 
being used to achieve it.
Similar to the case of a Junior Officer, a CO may achieve the short term goal of 
creating an operationally proficient unit by employing toxic leadership methods that, if 
not reported to his superiors, may go unnoticed and unaddressed. This short term success 
may suit the individual goals of the toxic CO, and meet the Navy’s immediate term need 
for a capable combatant unit, but it is done at the expense of creating an environment that 
drives young officers and Sailors from the Navy. As a consequence of the SWO tolerance 
of the toxic behavior, that readiness is achieved at a price that understates the long term 
costs to the Navy.
This research should raise concern over the prevalence of abusive supervision, 
narcissism, and unpredictability among the leaders observed by the respondents. Other 
research has shown that abusive supervision diminishes OCBs by those subjected to it. 
Those OCBs contribute to fostering positive work place relationships and teamwork. 
Instead, toxic leadership undermines trust and creativity and stifles communication, all 
factors critical to the highly interdependent tasks involved in safely operating a warship.
Similarly, the aspects of narcissism which adversely affect the safe operation are 
inflexibility and the inability to accept dissent or contradictory information. The inability 
to accept information contrary to one’s perception of a situation at sea could lead to a
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collision, or worse. Furthermore, narcissists lack empathy which inhibits creating trusting 
relationships which in turn interferes with the creation of cohesive teams.
Finally, the notable presence of unpredictability, as described in the survey as 
relating to moodiness, explosive anger, and general volatility negatively complements 
both abusive supervision and narcissism. Like those two other factors, it also stifles 
communication by diminishing a subordinate’s willingness to communicate, to share 
information and ideas, or to bring forth bad, though critical, news out of a fear of 
backlash. Generally, unpredictability on the part of a leader results in shutting down 
communications when it could be most vital.
The findings on the EWC within the SWO community were somewhat more 
positive. It would be appropriate for the SWO community to have a predominantly rules 
and procedures EWC. It is a culture known for perfectionism, but which has logical roots 
in an environment where the risk of physical danger can be mitigated through the use of 
rigidly enforced standardized processes. However, the significant presence of the 
instrumental EWC is a potentially detrimental situation, especially in view of the strong 
positive correlation with toxic leadership, as seen in Table 11. For individuals who 
function within the frame of an instrumental EWC, if their locus of analysis is egotistical, 
the decisions they will make would consider their personal interests above all, even to the 
detriment of colleagues or the organization. If the locus of analysis is local, their
j
decisions would put mission accomplishment above all else, possibly to the detriment of 
others in the organization or in violation of law or policy. In either situation, a CO with 
this ethical framework would be less inclined to make ethical decisions and more inclined 
to place the best interests of the crew or the Navy second, if considered at all.
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Recommendations
The current rates of DFCs and the extent of toxic leadership pose serious 
challenges for the SWO community today, but there is potential for conditions to worsen. 
Consider that the current rate of DFCs, the extent of the instrumental EWC, and the 
observed presence of toxic leadership are indicators of an inherent susceptibility to 
detrimental values and behaviors. Callahan’s conclusions on the nation’s state of ethical 
decline, and Twenge and Campbell’s prediction of an epidemic of narcissism could mean 
that the Navy will be recruiting increasing numbers of ethically challenged, narcissistic, 
potentially toxic officers into its ranks. This situation places the SWO community at 
greater risk for the continuation of, or even increase in, the presence of toxic leadership 
and its detrimental consequences. This possibility makes it even more imperative to take 
affirmative action to alter the process and the culture that produces COs.
The time would seem right to address the presence of toxic leadership and the 
culture that supports it. Over the past decade a number of retention-related studies by 
staff and students of the Naval Post Graduate School have pointed to components of toxic 
leadership contributing to the decisions of those who depart the Navy. The 2013 SWO 
Junior Officer Survey points to similar characteristics as demotivating or dissatisfying 
aspects of the community. During the time of this project, the Navy has taken action to 
strengthen and standardize the CO qualification process to improve the quality of 
selectees and reduce the number of failures (Greenert 2012a). Even as this is being 
written, the Chief of Naval Operations has a blog post, “Focus on Ethics,” discussing the 
critical role integrity plays in the Navy.
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To fully address this cultural flaw of tolerance for toxic leadership and 
compromised ethics will take an extended period of time, due to the enduring nature of 
cultures. It will also require a concerted effort, employing a number of aspects of 
organizational development. In this case, these aspects would include change 
management, leadership development, performance management, coaching, and team 
building initiatives. To do so the Navy should commission an action research project 
leveraging the faculties, students and staffs of the Naval Post Graduate School, Naval 
War College, the U.S. Naval Academy’s Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, and the 
staff of the Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology office. Unlike traditional 
research, an action research project does not focus on knowledge generation, but on 
actions to be taken by insiders of an organization or community to address a particular 
identifiable problem (Herr and Anderson 2005). Such a team could conduct cultural 
assessments and develop a plan for cultural change, employing the methods of Schein 
(2010) who defines a three stage process consisting of the following:
“Stage 1 - unfreezing - creating the motivation to change,
Stage 2 - Learning new concepts, new meanings for old concepts, and new 
standards for judgment, and
Stage 3 - internalizing new concepts, meanings, and standards.” (2010, 300) 
Whatever method or process is chosen, the target for change and the reasons for 
the change must be clearly identified and communicated. There will be considerable 
resistance to such change based on a variety of fears and anxieties in the community, 
among these being: fear of the loss of power among senior members facing new practices 
for exercising authority; fear of temporary incompetence related to learning new skills
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and attitudes; fear of loss of personal identity for those whose leadership style 
incorporates elements that are now being condemned; and fear of loss of group 
membership by those who question the validity of the assumptions behind the change 
(Schein 2010, 303-304).
Some natural resistance to the change could be reduced by incorporating the 
inputs of a broad sample of community members, through the use of cultural 
assessments, possibly including the use of the ECQ to determine the EWC in 
participating units. This would capture information on the extent of the instrumental 
EWC and by association, the extent of toxic leadership. Participation by junior personnel, 
both officer and enlisted, would be key to the development of relevant communications 
and achieving buy-in on remediating actions. As Schein asserts in one of his principles of 
culture change, “[o]Id cultural elements can be destroyed by eliminating those who 
‘carry’ these elements, but new cultural elements can only be learned if the new behavior 
leads to success and satisfaction” (2010, 312). Satisfaction could be increased by broad 
participation in the creation of the “to be” culture.
As part of the process, the Navy could develop an anti-toxic leadership 
communications campaign, perhaps likening it to bullying, a cultural phenomenon 
currently receiving great attention, and citing its detrimental effects on operational 
effectiveness. Leadership curricula, which already contain values and aspects consistent 
with transformational leadership, would require amendments to specifically identify and 
define it as well as transactional and toxic leadership. The purpose would be to foster the 
application of transformational principles and eliminate toxic practices. Another task 
within the plan should be the review of materials providing leadership lessons from naval
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heroes and leaders of the past to identify and stress those who exercised transformational 
leadership. For example Stephen Decatur, famed for his actions against the Barbary 
pirates, was . .  proverbial among sailors, for the good treatment of his men” (Leiner 
2001, 31). In contrast, his contemporary fellow hero William Bainbridge was cited as “an 
accurate navigator, a good ship handler,” but had “a reputation as a hard taskmaster and a 
rigid disciplinarian - in return his men feared and loathed him” (Leiner 2001, 32). There 
is likely much material available for use in stressing the type of leadership being sought 
and multiple examples of what should be avoided.
As a component of the larger culture change effort, there are a number of near­
term corrective actions that can be taken to address some flaws in the process of 
developing and promoting COs. As remarked previously, the mechanics of the system are 
basically sound, but some adjustments are required. First, in the performance 
management area of organization development, the fitness report system must be 
modified to provide more complete and accurate information for selection board use. As 
previously recommended by Higgs (2010) and Light (2011), the character grade must be 
separated from military bearing into a separate grade dealing exclusively with moral and 
ethical behavior and treatment of subordinate personnel. This score should be vital, if 
used judiciously, in identifying those exhibiting toxic leadership behaviors and 
preventing their selection for CO.
Second, to provide additional input on developing leaders’ skills in collaboration 
and cooperation, the teamwork grade should be determined through the use of a 360 
degree review process. This review could incorporate Bruce Bass’ Multi-Factor 
Leadership questionnaire which captures data on the presence and strength of the factors
139
which describe transformational and transactional leadership (Avolio, Bass, and Jung 
1999). These reviews would be conducted at the end of the division officer and 
department head tours, incorporating inputs from subordinates, particularly senior 
enlisted personnel, peers, and senior leadership. Guidance would be needed to define who 
within an officer’s chain of command, both above and below, would participate as raters. 
Other raters outside an officer’s chain of command, such as fellow watchstanders from 
other departments, would also be required for the broadest view of an officer. This 
broader, more complete look at an individual’s skills, abilities, and temperament would 
yield a more objective and useful grade of a key, and previously undervalued, leadership 
skill.
Third, forced ranking for promotion recommendations by the CO, as the reporting 
senior, should be eliminated. They are widely considered to be detrimental to team 
cohesion, promoting strife among those competing for advancement, and have been 
denounced as counterproductive and ineffective. Forced ranking, similar to the team 
work grade would be replaced by a score that combines two grades of the officer’s 
potential to succeed in executing greater responsibilities. The first would be awarded by 
the CO, as the senior technical expert, and the second, of equal weight, would be from the 
previously described 360 degree reviews at the end of the division officer and department 
head tours. These combined scores would provide a more in-depth assessment of an 
officer’s potential for succeeding as a leader in a dynamic and demanding environment. It 
should be possible to have this method yield a numerical score, rather than the present 
descriptive recommendations of “promotable, must promote, and early promote,” which
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could be averaged with the scores of other tours across the career to produce that key 
promotion score for selection board use.
Ending the forced distribution of promotion recommendations would free COs 
from any temptation to game the system to equally reward similarly well-performing 
officers. It would eliminate the responsibility of a single individual for altering the path 
of a subordinate’s career by accurately documenting negative behavior. It would diminish 
an officer’s ability to hide shortcomings, errors, and negative traits by increasing 
significantly the number of those observing them in a wider number of circumstances and 
situations. It would also eliminate the possible effect of favoritism on the part of COs.
To have any real effect, the 360 degree reviews must be incorporated into the 
performance evaluation system rather than being used as a personal growth and 
counseling tool. As currently employed at the Command Leadership Course, there is no 
real effect on the recipients. Once those who have narcissistic or other toxic leadership 
tendencies have been selected for CO and sent to this training, it is too late for the 
feedback to have any effect. According to Maccoby, “narcissists don’t want to change 
and as long as they are successful, they don’t think they have to” (2004, 98).
In order to avoid promoting flawed officers, such as toxic leaders, to command 
positions, additional information on officers’ personalities must be gathered and included 
in their professional records. Personality has been shown to be a key factor in an 
individual’s ability to succeed in a variety of roles, especially in leadership. For currently 
serving officers, this should be done using the Navy Computer Adaptive Personality 
Scales (NCAPS) created by the Navy Personnel Science, Research, and Technology 
office. This system tests for traits specifically related to the issues studied here including
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dutifulness and integrity, leadership orientation, empathy, stress tolerance, adaptability 
and flexibility, and self-control. It tests for 19 total traits proven to be associated with 
success across most Navy jobs, and its predictive capability is currently being validated 
in 13 Navy and Marine Corps training and learning centers (Farmer and Walker 2012).
A potential CO’s personality fit with the requirements for the role of commanding 
officer is another vital fact that should be available to CO selection boards. Initially, this 
information could be used for counseling and coaching individual officers to enhance the 
influence of their positive traits and minimize the effect of negative ones on their 
performance. However, once the application is in wide use and its predictive accuracy 
objectively established, this information could be used to administratively eliminate 
candidates from consideration before going before a selection board. Should the NCAPS 
results show individual officers to be notably unsuitable for command, they could be 
removed from consideration, and designated counselors could inform the officers on the 
findings from the survey and advise them of career alternatives to CO tours. NCAPS 
could also be used at the outset of a career, during the recruiting process. It could be 
administered as an officer recruit qualification test, similar to the Aviation Selection Test 
Battery. Its use in this fashion could eliminate candidates not well-suited to naval service, 
eliminating the expense of training them and the risk of any potential negative 
consequences arising from their service.
Next, a new means of assisting COs to enhance their personal accountability and 
self-regulation is needed to offset the solitary nature of their assignment. As has been 
stated previously, once officers become COs, they are usually the most senior and 
experienced officer onboard a vessel. They have no peers, other than competitors
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commanding other ships, and they may have no one to confide in concerning misgivings, 
errors, or temptations. It may be that a CO has a protege-to-mentor relationship with the 
rating officer, but if not, or if there is fear of an impact on the performance evaluation due 
to the expression of concerns, what resource is available? Some may have a religious 
counselor, others a spouse or close friend, but all could use a confidential advisor who 
has been in similar circumstances to those they face.
The Navy has had mixed success with mandatory mentorship programs in the 
past, due to the complexities of managing participation and the nature of the relationship. 
The relationship between protege and mentor is substantially personality driven and 
incompatible with an assignment by a third party (Johnson and Andersen 2009). The 
solution would be a volunteer mentor who is not part of the CO’s reporting chain.
This could be provided by establishing a Navy-sponsored informal mentor 
program relying on volunteer retired senior officers to mentor COs. In any Navy 
homeport, there are almost certainly a significant number of retired former COs, 
squadron commodores, and flag officers who would be willing to be a CO’s mentor. By 
virtue of their experience, most have likely been mentors to many officers in the past, and 
they have had experiences very like those facing COs today. Their participation could be 
solicited via such organizations as the Surface Navy Association, Naval War College 
Foundation publications, and the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, to name a 
few. The program could be started as a pilot in one of the primary surface ship 
homeports, such as San Diego, California or Norfolk, Virginia, and incorporated into the 
existing Commander Naval Surface Force online e-Mentor program. Naturally, 
volunteers would have to be screened to exclude those whose personalities might
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reinforce toxic aspects of their protege COs. This could be done, possibly with the 
NCAPS survey. These experienced mentors could help guide the COs through their 
solitary tours, offering guidance and helping them to adhere to the Navy’s core principles 
of Honor, Integrity, and Courage.
Finally, while much has been done by the Navy to change the worst aspects of its 
sea-going heritage, by discouraging the excessive use of alcohol, supporting efforts to 
combat trafficking in persons, and prohibiting hazing, there still exist remnants of its past 
more appropriate to the HMS Victory than to a modem warship. The continued existence 
of shipboard wardrooms and the counterpart chief petty officer messes, with the 
concomitant employment of junior enlisted personnel as serving persons, creates
I
unnecessary stratification and barriers between the officers and crew, fostering an elitist 
perspective among officers, and making communication and teamwork more difficult.
The use of these separate messes should be minimized, though not eliminated.
I
Their use should be restricted to evening meals and all meals on Sundays only, with 
cafeteria-style service. Officers and chief petty officers should be required to dine on the 
mess decks with the crew for all other meals. This would serve to humanize the senior 
leaders of the ship and clarify that the superior/subordinate roles are based on the 
education, training, and responsibilities of each group, not due to a perceived elevated 
social status. Table service in the wardroom and chief petty officer mess should be 
limited to special events in port, where U.S. warships represent the interests of the United 
States and dignitaries are being hosted.
All of the preceding recommendations will likely be considered controversial in 
the SWO Community. Stopping forced ranking, which has served the selection process
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well, and removing the CO as the final authority over an officer’s promotion 
recommendation will be seen as usurping a legitimate responsibility of the most 
experienced officers. Allowing personality information to take precedence over 
performance is contrary to long held practices and accepted reasoning. The creation of a 
new mentoring program will not be as controversial, as mentoring programs have been 
and are currently being used, but it may be seen as unnecessary. The changes to the 
wardroom, however, will be highly controversial as this changes long-accepted customs 
and cannot be tied directly to obvious negative conditions as was the case in the effort to 
eliminate hazing and alcohol abuse.
Nevertheless, without such changes the flaws in the SWO culture and its process 
for creating COs will continue to cultivate a small number of brittle and toxic leaders 
whose shortcomings lead to their eventual failure and dismissal as Commanding Officers. 
Although their positive attributes and the accomplishments they can achieve may propel 
them to higher positions under the current system, they lack the ability to sustain superior 
performance in the solitary role of CO.
Along their path to dismissal, these flawed leaders create strife among their 
colleagues, stress among their subordinates, and cost the Navy through the attrition they 
cause and the damage they inflict on ships. It is for these reasons and these costs that the 
recommended changes must be made.
The SWO community is the inheritor of a rich history and of tradition established 
hundreds of years ago, and it is filled with dedicated professionals devoted to upholding 
the Constitution and defending this country. However, this history and tradition have 
contributed to aspects of a culture that pose impediments to the community’s success. It
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is hoped the preceding recommendations can contribute to improving the culture of the 
SWO community and the success of its COs.
Areas for Additional Study 
Benefit could be obtained by seeking official backing for applying the same 
survey to a larger portion of the SWO community to confirm or refute the findings thus
I far, strengthening the case for implementing the preceding recommendations. A 
complementary study of the Surface Warfare chief petty officer community would 
provide additional insight into the EWC onboard ships and the extent of toxic leadership 
from their perspective, potentially strengthening the case for the recommendations.
Comparison studies of the aviation and submarine communities could determine 
if the EWC and toxic leadership findings are peculiar to the SWO community or 
pervasive throughout the warfare communities, which could lead to recommendations of 
a larger scale. Finally, further comparison studies of other branches of the Armed Forces 
might aid in determining if these findings are applicable to all services, and if other 
services have developed the means for dealing with the consequences of the instrumental 
EWC and toxic leadership.
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Ships Contacted Via Facebook 
USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), Gaeta, Italy 
USS Wasp (LHD 1), Norfolk, VA 
USS Essex (LHD 2), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), Norfolk, VA 
USS Boxer (LHD 4), San Diego, CA 
USS Bataan (LHD 5), Norfolk, VA 
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), San Diego, CA 
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), Norfolk, VA 
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), San Diego, CA 
USS Peleliu (LHA 5), San Diego, CA 
USS Denver (LPD 9), Sasebo, Japan 
USS San Antonio (LPD 17), Norfolk, VA 
USS New Orleans (LPD 18), San Diego, CA 
USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), Norfolk, VA
i
USS Green Bay (LPD 20), San Diego, CA 
USS New York (LPD 21), Norfolk, VA 
USS San Diego (LPD 22), San Diego, CA 
USS Anchorage (LPD 23), San Diego, CA 
USS Arlington (LPD 24), Norfolk, VA 
USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), Little Creek, VA 
USS Germantown (LSD 42), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), Little Creek, VA 
USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44), Little Creek, VA
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USS Comstock (LSD 45), San Diego, CA 
USS Tortuga (LSD 46), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Rushmore (LSD 47), San Diego, CA 
USS Ashland (LSD 48), Little Creek, VA 
USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), San Diego, CA 
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), Little Creek, VA 
USS Oak Hill (LSD 51), Little Creek, VA 
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), San Diego, CA 
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), San Diego, CA 
USS Antietam (CG 54), San Diego, CA 
USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55), Norfolk, VA 
USS San Jacinto (CG 56), Norfolk, VA 
USS Lake Champlain (CG 57), San Diego, CA 
USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), Mayport, FL 
USS Princeton (CG 59), San Diego, CA 
USS Normandy (CG 60), Norfolk, VA 
USS Monterey (CG 61), Norfolk, VA 
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), San Diego, CA 
USS Cowpens (CG 63), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Gettysburg (CG 64), Mayport, FL 
USS Anzio (CG 68), Norfolk, VA 
USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51), Norfolk, VA 
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), San Diego, CA 
USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Stout (DDG 55), Norfolk, VA
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USS John S McCain (DDG 56), Yokosuka, Japan
USS Laboon (DDG 58), Norfolk, VA
USS Russell (DDG 59), Pearl Harbor, HI
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), Pearl Harbor, HI
USS Ramage (DDG 61), Norfolk, VA
USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), Yokosuka, Japan
USS Carney (DDG 64), Mayport, FL
USS Benfold (DDG 65), San Diego, CA
USS Cole (DDG 67), Norfolk, VA
USS Milius (DDG 69), San Diego, CA
USS Hopper (DDG 70), Pearl Harbor, HI
I
USS Ross (DDG 71), Norfolk, VA 
USS Mahan (DDG 72), Norfolk, VA
I
USS Decatur (DDG 73), San Diego, CA 
USS Higgins (DDG 76), San Diego, CA 
USS O'Kane (DDG 77), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Porter (DDG 78), Norfolk, VA
i
USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79), Norfolk, VA
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), Mayport, FL
USS Winston S Churchill (DDG 81), Norfolk, VA
USS Howard (DDG 83), San Diego, CA
USS Bulkeley (DDG 84), Norfolk, VA
USS McCampbell (DDG 85), Yokosuka, Japan
USS Shoup (DDG 86), Everett, WA
USS Mason (DDG 87), Norfolk, VA
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USS Preble (DDG 88), San Diego, CA
USS Mustin (DDG 89), Yokosuka, Japan
USS Chafee (DDG 90), Pearl Harbor, HI
USS Pinckney (DDG 91), San Diego, CA
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), Pearl Harbor, HI
USS Nitze (DDG 94), Norfolk, VA
USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98), Norfolk, VA
USS Farragut (DDG 99), Mayport, FL
USS Kidd (DDG 100), San Diego, CA
USS Gridley (DDG 101), San Diego, CA
USS Sampson (DDG 102), San Diego, CA
USS Truxtun (DDG 103), Norfolk, VA
USS Sterett (DDG 104), San Diego, CA
USS Dewey (DDG 105), San Diego, CA
USS Stockdale (DDG 106), San Diego, CA
USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108), San Diego, CA
USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110), San Diego, CA
USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112), Pearl Harbor, HI
USS Nicholas (FFG 47), Norfolk, VA
USS Robert G. Bradley (FFG 49), Mayport, FL
USS Elrod (FFG 55), Norfolk, VA
USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), Mayport, FL
USS Kauffman (FFG 59), Norfolk, VA
USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60), Everett, WA
USS Ingraham (FFG 61), Everett, WA
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USS Freedom (LCS 1), San Diego, CA 
USS Independence (LCS 2), San Diego, CA 
USS Avenger (MCM 1), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Defender (MCM 2), Sasebo, Japan 
USS Patriot (MCM 7), Sasebo, Japan
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Ships Contacted Via Email 
USS Chosin (CG 65), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Hue City (CG 66), Mayport, FL 
USS Shiloh (CG 67), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Mayport, FL 
USS Lake Erie (CG 70), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Cape St. George (CG 71), San Diego, CA 
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), Norfolk, VA 
USS Port Royal (CG 73), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Mitscher (DDG 57), Norfolk, VA 
USS Stethem (DDG 63), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68), Mayport, FL 
USS Donald Cook (DDG 75), Norfolk, VA 
USS Lassen (DDG 82), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS Momsen (DDG 92), Everett, WA 
USS James E Williams (DDG 95), Norfolk, VA 
USS Halsey (DDG 97), San Diego, CA 
USS Gravely (DDG 107), Norfolk, VA 
USS Jason Dunham (DDG 109), Norfolk, VA 
USS Spruance (DDG 111), San Diego, CA 
USS Rentz (FFG 46), San Diego, CA 
USS Vandegrift (FFG 48), San Diego, CA 
USS Taylor (FFG 50), Mayport, FL 
USS Gary (FFG 51), San Diego, CA 
USS Ford (FFG 54), Everett, WA 
USS Reuben James (FFG 57), Pearl Harbor, HI 
USS Nimitz (CVN 68), Everett, WA
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USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), Norfolk, VA 
USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), San Diego, CA 
USS George Washington (CVN 73), Yokosuka, Japan 
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), Bremerton, WA 
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), Norfolk, VA 
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), San Diego, CA 
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), Norfolk, VA
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Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ)
All officers 0-3 and below please answer the following questions based on your current
command. All officers 0-4 and above, former officers, and retired officers please respond
based on your Division Officer afloat tour(s).
1. In this organization, people protect their own interests above all else.
2. What is best for everyone in the organization is the major consideration here.
3. In this organization, people are mostly out for themselves.
4. In this organization, people are expected to follow their own personal and moral
beliefs.
5. In this organization, people look out for each other’s good.
6. People are expected to do anything to further the organization’s interests, regardless 
of the consequences.
7. Each person in this organization decides for themselves what is right and wrong.
8. People here are concerned with the organization’s interest -  to the exclusion of all 
else.
9. It is very important to follow the organization’s rules and procedures here.
10. The most important concern in this organization is each person’s own sense of right 
and wrong.
11. Successful people in this organization go by the book.
12. Work is considered substandard only when it hurts the organization’s interests.
13. In this organization, people are guided by their own personal ethics.
14. In this organization, it is expected that you will always do what is right for the 
country and the public.
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15. People in this organization strictly obey the organization policies.
16. The most important concern is the good of all people in the organization as a whole.
17. In this organization, the law or ethical code of their profession is the major
consideration.
18. The major responsibility of people in the organization is to ensure safe operations.
19. People are expected to comply with the law and professional standards over and 
above other considerations.
20. There is no room for one’s personal morals or ethics in this organization.
21. The most efficient way is always the right way in this organization.
22. In this organization, people are expected to strictly follow legal or professional 
standards.
23. In this organization, each person is expected above all to work efficiently.
24. In this organization, the first consideration is whether a decision violates any law or
regulation.
25. Our major concern is always what is best for the other person.
26. Everyone is expected to stick by Navy rules and procedures.
(Adapted from Appendix A: Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ) Weber and Gerde 2011,610)
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Table 18. Cronbach’s Alpha for EWC Type Scales
Scale Name # Items Mean sd a
Instrumental 7 18.24 4.96 0.69
Caring 7 17.47 6.46 0.87
Independence 4 9.40 3.23 0.75
Rules & 
Procedures 4 13.50 3.28 0.78
Law & Code 4 13.24 3.00 0.76
These are the results of Cronbach’s alpha calculation for the EWC scales, 
showing acceptable to strong scale reliability. This indicates the scales test 
for discrete characteristics. (N= 103)
Table 19. Cronbach’s Alpha for Toxic Leadership Scales
Scale Name
#
Items Mean sd a
Abusive Supervision 7 20.51 10.59 0.95
Authoritarian Leadership 6 16.37 8.66 0.95
Narcissism 5 15.25 7.34 0.95
Self-Promotion 5 13.78 8.01 0.97
Unpredictability 7 21.25 11.39 0.98
These are the results of Cronbach’s alpha calculation for the toxic leadership 
scales, showing very strong scale reliability. This indicates the scales test for 
discrete characteristics. (N =103)
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Table 20. Pearson’s Correlation for EWC Type Scales
Scale Name Instrumental Caring Independence
Rules & 
Procedures
Law & 
Code
Instrumental 1 -0.47* -0.15 -0.36* -0.36*
Caring 1 .40* .42* .59*
Independence 1 0.12 0.13
Rules & 
Procedures 1 0.73*
Law & Code 1
Table 20 shows the correlation between the different EWC types. The negative 
correlation is strongest between instrumental and caring EWCs due to their 
opposing locus of analysis. Instrumental is most focused on the consequence 
for the individual making the ethical decisions, while caring is most focused on 
the consequences to others. (N = 103)
Table 21. Pearson’s Correlation for Toxic Leadership Factors
Scale Name
Abusive
Supervision
Authoritarian
Leadership Narcissism
Self­
Promotion Unpred.
Abusive Supervision 1 .87* .79* .77* .88*
Authoritarian
Leadership 1 .85* .84* .84*
Narcissism 1 .87* .82*
Self-Promotion 1 .82*
Unpredictability 1
This table shows the correlation between the different scales that measure the 
presence of different behaviors that compose toxic leadership. The results show 
very strong positive correlations between the behaviors, which is consistent with 
the design and purpose of the instrument. (N = 103)
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Toxic Leadership Questionnaire 
Active, drilling, and mobilized officers in the grades 0-3 and below, in the past year were 
you under the authority of or did you observe an officer who displayed the following 
behaviors:
Former officers, retired officers and all those in grades 0-4 and above please respond 
based on your experiences during your Division Officer afloat tour(s). During that tour, 
were you under the authority of or observe an officer who displayed the following 
behaviors:
1. Ridicules subordinates?
2. Holds subordinates responsible for things outside their job descriptions?
3. Is not considerate about subordinates’ commitments outside of work?
4. Speaks poorly about subordinates to other people in the workplace?
5. Publicly belittles subordinates?
!
6. Reminds subordinates of their past mistakes and failures?
I
7. Tells subordinates they are incompetent?
I
8. Controls how subordinates complete their tasks?
9. Invades the privacy of subordinates?
10. Does not permit subordinates to approach goals in new ways?
11. Will ignore ideas that are contrary to his/her own?
12. Is inflexible when it comes to organizational policies, even in special circumstances?
13. Determines all decisions in the unit whether they are important or not?
14. Has a sense of personal entitlement?
15. Assumes that he/she is destined to enter the highest ranks of my organization?
I
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16. Thinks that he/she is more capable than others?
17. Believes that he/she is an extraordinary person?
18. Thrives on compliments and personal accolades?
19. Dramatically changes his/her demeanor when his/her supervisor is present?
20. Denies responsibility for mistakes made in his/her unit?
21. Will only offer assistance to people who can help him/her ahead?
22. Accepts credit for successes that do not belong to him/her?
23. Acts only in the best interest of his/her next promotion?
24. Has explosive outbursts?
25. Allows his/her current mood to define the climate of the workplace?
26. Expresses anger at subordinates for unknown reasons?
27. Allows his/her mood to affect his/her vocal tone and volume?
28. Varies in his/her degree of approachability?
29. Causes subordinates to try and “read” his/her mood?
30. Affects the emotions of subordinates when impassioned?
(Adapted from Appendix E-Final Scales Schmidt 2008, 116.)
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Battle Effectiveness, Command Excellence, 
and Readiness Questionnaire
Active, drilling, and mobilized officers in the grades 0-3 and below, during your current 
shipboard tour (or your Division Officer tour for officers in the grades 0-4 and above as 
well as former, Selected Reserve, or retired officers) did your ship win the following 
awards or satisfactorily complete the flowing certifications/qualifications?
[Response will be Yes, No, or Not Applicable (NA)]
1. Battle E?
2. Maritime Warfare?
3. Missile/Torpedo firing?
4. Cruise Missile Tactical Qualification?
5. NSFS gunnery qualification?
6. Aviation Certification?
7. Aviation Readiness Evaluation?
8. AIMD inspection?
9. Engineering/Survivability Excellence Award?
10. Engineering Certification?
11. Safety program evaluation?
12. ORSE?
13. PORSE/RSE?
14. Command and Control Excellence Award?
15. CMS inspection?
16. Communications Readiness Certification?
17. Logistics Management Excellence Award?
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18. Logistics Management Assessment (LMA)?
19. Supply portion of LMA?
20. 3M inspection?
(Adapted from Chapter 5 Unit Competitions, Busch and Perry 1999)
I
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Demographic Data Elements 
Year group: For promotion eligibility determination, all officers are grouped and tracked 
by the year in which they are commissioned. It also serves as an indicator of relative 
seniority within pay grades.
Position: This will indicate the role a participant is presently playing, or the perspective 
from which a senior, former, or retired officer is viewing the experiences which formed 
his or her outlook. The focus of the project is on sea-going junior to mid-grade officers 
and the roles they play at sea. However, categories are included to capture information 
from personnel who are (1) currently serving in positions ashore; (2) have progressed 
beyond these levels, such as Flag Officers; (3) have departed active service for the Navy
I
Reserve; (4) have retired; or (5) have separated from the Navy completely and returned to 
civilian life. Specific categories include Current Division Officer, Current Department 
Head, and Current XO. The body of former, Reserve, and retired officers are considered a 
secondary population whose input does not necessarily capture current conditions but 
may contribute context to the input provided by the primary target group. Position 
descriptions for these personnel include Former Division Officer, Former DepartmentI
Head, Former Executive Officer, and Former Commanding Officer. A final “Other”
i
category captured input from those serving at sea in positions which do not fit neatly into 
the earlier categories such as a post-command 0-5 serving as the Chief Engineer of a 
large amphibious ship.
Pay Grade'. 0-1 through 0-10. Another possible interesting phenomenon would be a 
significant difference in attitudes between certain pay grades or range of pay grades.
202
Gender. Male or Female. Any significant variation in responses between genders could 
inform solution recommendations and the means of implementation.
Status: These terms which capture whether a participant is currently serving as a full time 
service member, as a Reservist, or has ceased serving or has retired. The descriptive 
terms are Active/currently serving, drilling Reservist, former, and retired.
Ship Type\ These are terms for the different collective types of vessels where SWOs serve 
at sea. The groupings are commonly used terms in the SWO community. These are 
CRU/DES, which includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; AMPHIB which includes 
the amphibious ships: LHAs, LHDs, LCCs, LPDs and LSDs; CVN for aircraft carriers; 
and OTHER, which is not a standard grouping, but for these purposes includes Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS), Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Military Sealift (MSC), and 
riverine units as well as sea-going staffs such a Destroyer Squadrons.
Commissioning Source: These are the programs or institutions through which officers are 
commissioned, specifically United States Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Other which 
would capture limited duty officers.
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Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
for the Protection of Human Research Participants
PROTOCOL EXEMPTION REPORT
PROTOCOL NUMBER: IR8-O2921-2013 INVESTIGATOR: Michael Higgs
PROJECT TITLE: Surface Warfare Officer Survey
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD DETERMINATION:
This research protocol is exempt from Institutional Review 8oard oversight under Exemption Category(ies) 2. You may begin your 
study immediately. If the nature of the research project changes such that exemption criteria may no longer apply, please consult with 
the IRB Administrator ( r j J?y-,ico>tj.«.'Cu) before continuing your research.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS:
Although not a requirement for exemption, the following suggestions are offered by the IRB Administrator to enhance the protection 
of participants and/or strengthen the research proposal:
The IRB suggest that you precede the survey with a brief consent statement. Suggested wording is as follows:
You are being asked to participate in a survey research project entitled "Title of Project," which is being conducted by name of 
researcher, a faculty member/stoff member/student at Valdpsta State University. This research focuses on institutional practices: 
personal private information is not being sought. Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to take the survey, to slop 
responding at any time, or to skip any questions that you do not want to answer. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate 
in this study. Your completion of the survey serves as your voluntary agreement to participate in this research project and your 
certification that you are 18 or older.
Questions regarding the purpose or procedures of the research should be directed to name of researcher at telephone number or e­
mail address. This study has been exempted from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review in accordance with Federal regulations. 
The IRB, a university committee established by Federal law, is responsible for protecting the rights and welfare of research 
participants. If you have concerns or questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the IRB Administrator at 
229-259 5045 or 3
I~~l If this box is checked, please submit any documents you revise to the IRB Administrator at ir?)'jy\Mluo •■.«> . c to ensure an 
updated record of your exemption.
Thank you fo r submitting an IRB application.
Please direct questions to irb@voldostQ. eau or 229-259-5045.Barbara H. 6ray, IRB Administrator Date
Revised 08 02 2012
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